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AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF 
 
James R. Podesva, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in History, presented on April 6, 2018 at 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale.  
 
TITLE: EXPORTING AMERICA: THE U.S. INFORMATION CENTERS AND GERMAN 
RECONSTRUCTION 
 
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Jonathan S. Wiesen 
 
 This dissertation examines the establishment of United States Information Centers in 
West Germany immediately after the Second World War, and their role in securing the support 
of West German elites for American occupation policies, particularly democratic self-
government.  Located at the intersection of culture, economics, and American politics, the 
America Houses (Amerikahäuser) educated curious Germans about the United States, presenting 
a carefully curated vision of American life that minimized conflict and highlighted the material 
and cultural prosperity enjoyed by the mythical “average American.”  The Americans contended 
that with the adoption of democracy and a reformed market economy, affluence was something 
West Germans could realistically aspire to. As a key transmitter of American information and 
ideas, the program was a means by which the United States attempted to change German 
resistance to American cultural products, and also served as a way to gauge German opinion t.  \.  
Often lumped together with the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe under the general 
heading of propaganda and receiving little academic scrutiny on its own merits, an examination 
of the U.S. Information Center program gives a more nuanced portrait of the forces shaping 
American efforts for the hearts and minds of newly-made West Germans. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Though almost unnoticed by the public, October 10, 2005 marked the end of an era in the 
relationship between Germany and the United States. On that day, in a formal ceremony befitting 
such an iconic symbol of the Cold War, the United States formally closed the massive Rhein-
Main Air Force Base adjacent to Frankfurt International Airport and turned the property over to 
the German government. In his remarks, the American Ambassador, William Timken, Jr., 
stressed not just the practical value of the base to both the United States and NATO over the 
decades, but also the significant symbolic presence of the enormous American military base in 
the heart of Central Europe. Citing missions from the Cold War to the “War on Terror,” from the 
days of the Berlin Airlift, when the airfield supported more than 300,000 flights over a fifteen-
month period, to NATO operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan, the Ambassador noted the often-
unheralded centrality of the base to some of the most pivotal events in the postwar world.  
For more than fifty years Rhein-Main served as the “gateway to Europe” for hundreds of 
thousands of Americans, with a sign above the main gate that proclaimed the fact in large letters. 
The first point of contact with the former West Germany of the Cold War, the base remained as 
“one of the most visible manifestations of American power” in the newly-unified German state.1 
More than an airport, Rhein-Main was a concrete expression of the political bonds between the 
United States and the former Federal Republic. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact, the focus of NATO was changing, and the American government 
saw the sprawling base as an expensive relic of the Cold War. Ambassador Timken reassured his 
                                               
1 Mark Landler, “Rhein-Main Air Base Journal; After 60 Years, the Yanks Fly Out, Leaving Just 
the Ghosts,” The New York Times, October 21, 2005; William Timken Jr., “Closure of Rhein-
Main Air Base,” n.d., http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/docs/timkenrheinmaine.htm. 
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German audience that despite fall of the Berlin Wall, the disbanding of the Soviet Union, and the 
loss of the Warsaw Pact as a strategic focus, the closure of Rhein-Main Air Force Base did not 
signal any change in the transatlantic partnership between Germany and the United States. 
According to the Ambassador, the defense of freedom, the strengthening of democracy, and 
providing for “a stable climate in which prosperity can grow” were still the animating values in 
the relationship between Germany and the United States, as they had been since the end of the 
Second World War.2 The closure of Rhein-Main Air Force Base was one of the more visible 
indicators of the changes in the relationship between Germany and the United States after the 
Cold War, but many more went unnoticed.  
Almost a year later, in an equally unambiguous display of the new transatlantic political 
reality, Ambassador Timken presided over the closure of another parcel of American property 
that, like Rhein-Main, was once a physical and psychological fixture of the Cold War in 
Germany but now deemed superfluous: the last United States Information Center, or Amerika 
Haus. In retrospect, given the centrality of Berlin to the Cold War in Europe, it seems 
appropriate that the Berlin Amerika Haus on Hardenbergstraße was the last to close. In the 1950s 
the Americans planted their flag in what used to be the heart of West Berlin, across the street 
from the popular Zoo, as well as the main train station (with the one line running to and from 
East Berlin), and within walking distance of the glittering Kurfürstendamm shopping and 
entertainment district. This street, with its displays of conspicuous consumption, framed itself as 
a self-consciously “outrageous and provocative” reply to what was on offer in East Berlin.3 
                                               
2 Timken Jr., “Closure of Rhein-Main Air Base.” 
3 David Clay Large, Berlin (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 481; Gary Bruce, Through the Lion 
Gate: A History of the Berlin Zoo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 210–21; James L. 
Bryan, The Martial Imagination: Cultural Aspects of American Warfare (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2013), 15–35. 
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Anchored by the grand department store Kaufhaus des Westens and the ruins of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Memorial Church, the area was the entertainment and commercial hub of West Berlin, 
and where the American efforts at the Information Center would reach the largest audience. By 
the time of closing of the last Amerika Haus though, the area seemed neglected in comparison to 
earlier decades, particularly after the main train station moved to the newly-reconstituted center 
of the city, and the eastern half of the city opened to economic development. In handing the 
building over to Berlin Mayor Klaus Wowereit, the Ambassador formally ended not just one of 
the longest-running programs in the history of American public diplomacy, but retired what once 
was “the crown jewel” of the American effort to create a democratic West Germany out of the 
wreckage of the Nazi state.4 As was the case with the former Air Force Base, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall made the last Amerika Haus an institution without a mission. 
 As he did a year earlier, Ambassador Timken stressed the interpersonal connections 
between Germans and Americans constructed over the decades, this time through the medium of 
the local Amerika Haus. The mission of an Information Center was explicitly pedagogical, 
Timken recalled, but more so in the case of West Berlin where the political dynamics were 
heightened by the unique circumstances of the divided city. Regardless of where it was located in 
West Germany though, an Amerika Haus, according to the Ambassador, “…was designed so that 
we (the Americans) could reach out to the German people, to show them what America was like, 
how we lived, what we stood for.” But in the case of West Berlin the Americans wanted to show 
the Germans “what we imagined the future of this city could hold for all its citizens” and the 
                                               
4 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
27. 
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Information Center was the best way to demonstrate that vision.5 However, the United States was 
not leaving the newly unified German capital, nor making itself less of a presence in the city. In 
the future, Timken stressed, the new U.S. embassy on Pariser Platz next to the Brandenburg Gate 
would be the most visible symbol of the United States in Berlin, and the Internet would replace 
many of the functions of a local Amerika Haus.6 However, what the Ambassador failed to point 
out was that unlike the former Amerika Haus on Hardenbergstraße, the new embassy (along with 
the extraordinary collection of American art that it held) was closed to the public; the U.S. was 
effectively retreating from the core mission of the Amerika Haus, one of close engagement with 
the German public.  
Rhein-Main Air Force Base in suburban Frankfurt may have been the metaphorical 
“gateway to Europe” as the Ambassador claimed, but it was a port of entry for a relatively small 
subset of Americans: military personnel and their families. Alternately, for millions of West 
Germans the Amerikahäuser across the Federal Republic were one-on-one introductions to the 
United States at the interpersonal level. Accommodating libraries, meeting rooms, performance 
spaces, and dedicated display areas, the Amerikahäuser were immersive, government-sanctioned 
and carefully curated expressions of American society, customs, and culture for the benefit of a 
German public seen by U.S. officials as desperately in need of democratic education.  
In the years covered in this dissertation, 1945-1953, a local Amerika Haus was a cultural 
oasis amid the physical and spiritual desolation of postwar Germany. The centerpiece of the 
                                               
5 “Amerika Haus Turnover Ceremony Ambassador William R. Timken, Jr.,” accessed April 20, 
2015, http://germany.usembassy.gov/germany/timken_09_25_06.html. 
6 U. S. Embassy, “Ambassador Timken Hands over Amerika Haus Building to the Governing 
Mayor Wowereit (September 25, 2006),” accessed April 20, 2015, 
http://germany.usembassy.gov/germany/ahberlin_returned.html; Austilat Von Andreas, “Es War 
Einmal in Amerikahaus,” Det Tagesspiegel, June 29, 2008; Dorothée Schmid Von Eva, “Die 
USA Haben Die Wahl-Berlin Diskutiert,” Berliner Zeitung, September 29, 2008. 
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Information Center was the library with open stacks; being able to browse the shelves was 
almost completely novel to German librarians but extremely popular with German patrons. 
However, with all the other facilities on offer, the Amerikahäuser also became places to learn 
English, watch American movies, and to listen to music, specifically classical or jazz, but not 
rock and roll, which, tellingly, was not part of the American cultural panoply on offer at an 
Information Center. The crowds for rock concerts were too unpredictable, and the music not 
“serious,” while jazz had finally won bourgeois respectability after the war, due largely to the 
work of Americans broadcasting on the Armed Forces Network, Radio Free Europe, and in 
Berlin, Radio in the American Sector (RIAS). The Information Centers served as important 
nodes on the postwar German jazz network, disseminating music among an increasingly 
discerning audience. In doing so, Occupation authorities were giving tacit approval to an art form 
whose roots were solidly in the African-American experience, an acknowledgment rarely given 
to African-Americans or their cultural contributions back home in the United States. The 
Germans genuinely appreciated the diversion, for immediately after the war, the physical 
realities of urban life in Germany were often quite grim.  
There were critical shortages of food, shelter, and transportation; a public health crisis 
encompassing both malnutrition and sexually transmitted infections; a worthless currency that 
virtually guaranteed a thriving black market; and the hyper-awareness of loss, whether temporary 
or permanent. Given these material and psychological conditions, the fact that Information 
Centers were always warm in winter at a time when few German buildings could match such a 
feat due to fuel and spare part shortages was significant. This fact, coupled with the modernist 
design that referenced the influential Bauhaus school of the Weimar period (influences were 
reflected in everything from the architecture to the furniture), made it likely that many Germans 
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would be at least curious to see what the Americans had to offer. For their part, the Americans 
made sure there was “no shortage of useful literature” to examine while thawing out or waiting 
for the streetcar.7  
Before the Second World War, most Germans had neither met an American nor had 
sustained contact with American culture, and vice versa. As such, Occupation officials saw the 
opportunity that the Information Centers offered for contact between Germans and Americans as 
central to the democratic reconstruction of German society. In a visit to an Amerika Haus, West 
Germans could see in the carefully curated photographic exhibitions on American life, the 
judiciously chosen books on offer in the open stacks of the library, and the documentary films on 
American customs and culture that omitted the darker sides of American society, an overarching 
narrative of an American historical experience that equated democracy with high living 
standards, varied consumer choice, and harmonious labor relations, with the promise that the 
same benefits would come to West Germany if it sincerely adopted democratic reforms. An 
Amerika Haus was a tool with properties that allowed the United States to attempt nothing less 
than the wholesale reformation of West Germany, a monumental task that required U.S. 
intervention into every aspect of society, from the family to the workplace. The local Information 
Center, as a shop window for the “American way of life,” displayed American cultural and 
consumer innovations and tied them to the refashioning of German society along solidly 
democratic lines.  
The Amerikahäuser and Americanization 
To say the United States was on a mission to establish economic and cultural hegemony 
over a helpless Germany is reductive, distilling a complex process of negotiation, rejection, and 
                                               
7 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 2009, 27. 
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acceptance of American cultural products and economic precepts, to the catchall term of 
“Americanization.” As such, it hardly describes the relationship between Americans and 
Germans immediately after the war, and consequently the term, and the ideas behind it, have 
fallen out of favor in place of a more nuanced description of the relationship of the United States 
to Western Europe.8 Even though the relationship between U.S. officials and the German 
population under Occupation statutes was hardly one of equals, the United States frequently used 
the physical and intellectual spaces provided by local Amerikahäuser to negotiate with cultural 
and economic elites in an ongoing effort to gain an acceptance of American efforts at making a 
“new Germany.” The records of the Amerikahäuser reflect a process of give and take between 
the Amerika Haus and those who patronized it, with the Häuser staff exquisitely attuned to 
German public opinion through personal contact and extensive use of surveys.9 Rather than 
“Americanization,” with an emphasis on the adoption of “lifestyles and production techniques” 
originating in the United States, the term “Westernization” is far more apt in describing the 
complex interactions between Germans and the attempted imposition of U.S. cultural and 
                                               
8 Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire : America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century 
Europe, 1st Harvard Univ. Press pbk. ed. (Cambridge, Mass. ; Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. 
Press, 2006); Richard H. Pells, Not Like Us : How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and 
Transformed American Culture Since World War II, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1997); 
Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judt, eds., Getting and Spending : European 
and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century, Publications of the German 
Historical Institute (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jan L. 
Logemann, Trams or Tailfins? : Public and Private Prosperity in Postwar West Germany and 
the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Ralph Willett, The 
Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949, Studies in Film, Television, and the Media (London ; 
New York: Routledge, 1989); Michael Ermarth, America and the Shaping of German Society, 
1945-1955 (Providence, R.I.: Berg, 1993); Alexander Stephan, The Americanization of Europe: 
Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945 (Berghahn Books, 2006). 
9 Anna Merritt and Richard Merritt, eds., Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS 
Surveys, 1945-1949 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970); Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. 
Merritt, eds., Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany : The HICOG Surveys, 1949-1955 
(Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 1980). 
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economic practices.10 “Westernization,” an explanatory paradigm proposed by Holger Nehring 
and taken up Volker Berghahn, emphasizes the creation of a “transatlantic community of values” 
based on Enlightenment principles, rather than specifically American precepts; but with an 
emphasis on an ideology of human rights and individual freedoms, “and on the agencies through 
which it was transmitted” such as the Amerikahäuser. The term “Westernization” allows for the 
idea of a negotiated European response to postwar American ideological stimulus, rather than a 
“one-size fits all” solution to the question of the postwar Americanization of Germany.11  
In the Information Centers, the Americans maintained that consumer choice reflected 
larger principles of individual liberty and free markets, and harmonious relationships between 
consumers, producers, labor, and government. The Amerikahäuser were a vital part of this effort 
at acquainting Germans with the American idea of “consensus liberalism.”12 Arguably a “softer” 
version of classical liberalism, “consensus liberalism” differed in that it saw a positive role for 
government in problem solving while still supporting the principles of private property, free 
enterprise, political pluralism (with the exclusion of communist-affiliated parties), and respect 
for individual rights.13 A conscious effort was made by those who ran the Häuser to set the 
United States as an example of the benefits of consensus liberalism. An explicit rejection of the 
politics of emotion and irrationality that had plagued Germany since the First World War, 
consensus liberalism sought to bring rationality back to both the public and private spheres in 
                                               
10 Volker R. Berghahn, “The Debate on ‘Americanization’ Among Economic and Cultural 
Historians,” Cold War History 10, no. 1 (2010): 110. 
11 Holger Nehring, “‘Westernization’: A New Paradigm for Interpreting West European History 
in a Cold War Context,” Cold War History 4, no. 2 (2004): 176. 
12 Ibid; Berghahn, “The Debate on ‘Americanization’ Among Economic and Cultural 
Historians,” 108–109. 
13 Nehring, “Westernization,” 176; Andrew Jewett, “Naturalizing Liberalism in the 1950s,” in 
Professors and Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 191-216. 
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Germany. For the United States, the Amerikahäuser were one of the most visible, sustained 
attempts at effecting this return to reason.  
This work is focused on how the Information Centers presented the United States to West 
German elites in the first years after the war. This focus on elites is unavoidable, for that was the 
target audience Amerika Haus staff worked hard to cultivate relationships with. Though always 
open to the general public, from the very start the Amerikahäuser sought support for Occupation 
policies, democratic institutions, and economic reform from those Germans thought the most 
influential, or to have future influence in West Germany: college students, journalists, members 
of the professions, and distinguished cultural figures.  
Häuser staff and their opposite numbers at the Soviet Palaces of Culture spent a great 
amount of effort to entertain journalists whose reputations were not tainted by Nazism. Courting 
journalists made good sense in a West Germany that had a thriving print culture before the 
Second World War, for the supply of paper was scarce but the demand for news was high. It is 
estimated that each newspaper in Occupied Germany had at least four readers: the person who 
bought the newspaper, and at least three other people who then received it afterwards.14 
Cultivating existing outlets whenever possible, but not afraid to create new press organs such as 
the newspapers Neue Zeitung and Heute, American Military Government officers were not above 
using a carrot and stick approach, rewarding some and denying others the most crucial resources: 
money, paper, and a license to publish.15 While the Amerikahäuser, with thousands of books, and 
                                               
14 Christian L. Glossner, Making of the German Post-War Economy: Political Communication 
and Public Reception of the Social Market Economy After World War Two (I.B.Tauris, 2010), 
25. 
15 Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Arthur W. Macmahon, Memorandum on the Postwar International 
Information Program of the United States, Prepared by Dr. Arthur W. Macmahon (Washington, 
D.C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1945); Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany 
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hundreds of magazines and newspapers, played a major role in the circulation of democratic 
ideas in the Occupation period, it also provided a physical space for journalists and authors to 
work together, hold conferences and entertain speakers, as well as meet with Occupation 
officials. Occupation officials used their local Amerikahäuser as a focal point in their efforts to 
cultivate and mobilize German opinion makers in support of democratic institutions, particularly 
in the divided city of Berlin.16 As a result, the local Amerika Haus often provided the physical 
and intellectual space for an ongoing dialogue on press freedom and restraint. Ultimately, what 
the Americans wanted from the German intelligentsia was real support for the creation of 
democratic institutions in postwar Germany, and not a return of the so-called 
Vernunftrepublikaner, an intellectual whose support for the Weimar Republic was a matter of 
“cool rationalism,” not an emotional investment in the success of the Republic.17 To that end, 
staff at the Amerikahäuser went out of their way to court German intellectuals, who despite their 
eminence, were as lost as every other German in making sense of their recent history. 
After the Second World War, German intellectuals were at a crossroads. Going forward, 
they were going to have to come to terms with a new world, one in which the sacred tenets of 
German Kultur no longer held the power they once did. In 1945 German intellectuals were 
                                                                                                                                                       
(New York: Macmillan, 1947), 161–164,; Hart, Empire of Ideas : The Origins of Public 
Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy; Frances Stonor Saunders, The 
Cultural Cold War : The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: New Press, 2000); 
Stephan, The Americanization of Europe, 73; Glossner, Making of the German Post-War 
Economy, 21. 
16 Udi Greenberg, The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of 
the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 109–16. 
17 Peter Gay, Weimar Culture : The Outsider as Insider (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 2; 
Wolf Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Gregory S. Parsons, “German Politics and the Burden of Kultur: Mann, 
Meinecke and the Psychology of the Vernunftrepublikaner in Early Weimar Germany,” UCLA 
Historical Journal 16, no. 0 (January 1, 1996),; Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic : The 
Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992); Eric D. Weitz, Weimar 
Germany : Promise and Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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presented with the same stark choices they faced in 1918: commitment to democracy, or heeding 
the call of Friedrich Meinecke, Julien Benda and the pre-democratic Thomas Mann before the 
war, disengagement from politics altogether.18 Though the war had ended in 1945, they argued, 
German society was still under assault from all sides, but in the guise of reconstruction. As one 
of the most visible symbols of the United States in Occupation-era Germany, the Amerikahäuser 
was seen by Meinecke and other traditionalists as a Trojan Horse; it was the attractive vehicle by 
which the destructive force, American culture, was introduced into the very Heimat. In this 
defeated and paranoid conception, a U.S. Information Center was not a repository of American 
culture, but the delivery system for a weapon aimed squarely at German Kultur.  
Those in charge of the Information Centers took great pains to reassure skeptical 
Germans that the United States respected German cultural achievements, particularly in 
symphonic music. At the same time, they were introducing jazz music, to a wider audience. It 
was not uncommon in the early years of the occupation to have a local Amerika Haus playing 
symphony records in one room, while a jazz club might meet and listen to the latest record 
imports in another room. And that, for many German cultural elites, was the problem. Through 
music, depending on cultural perspective, the Amerikahäuser were either subverting or restoring 
German culture, or doing both at the same time. The Americans were sending a message to their 
German visitors: the Amerika Haus was, like American society, was big enough to successfully 
weave tradition and innovation into the cultural fabric of the nation.  
 This work does not challenge existing historiography on the Information Centers as much 
as it refocuses scholarly attention on the Amerikahäuser as cultural and political actors in their 
                                               
18 Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
2007); Thomas Mann, Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man, accessed September 10, 2015, 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=946; Parsons, “German 
Politics and the Burden of Kultur.” 
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own right. For an institution that lasted more than half a century, introduced millions of Germans 
to the United States, and cost billions of dollars over the decades, there is a real paucity of 
scholarship surrounding the Amerikahäuser. Two factors make the Amerikahäuser a challenging, 
but ultimately rewarding topic for extended examination. First, as alluded to above, is the lack of 
sustained scholarly attention aimed at the Information Centers in West Germany. The 
Amerikahäuser are conspicuous by their absence from the larger historiographies on the Cold 
War, cultural diplomacy, and the post-war “Americanization” of Europe. They have gone 
relatively unmentioned by American historians, subsumed into larger histories of the Cold War, 
diplomacy, and propaganda. Two examples are representative of the treatment of the Information 
Centers within larger works. Though authoritative, in The Cold War and the United States 
Information Agency, Nicholas Cull refers to the Amerikahäuser as the “crown jewels of the 
occupation” in Germany, but declines to address what made them so.19 Likewise, in America and 
the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, Volker Berghahn notes that by the early 1950s more than a 
million Germans attended programming at an Amerika Haus every month, but he does not say 
why.20 In the otherwise laudable Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War, 
Laura Belmonte omits any mention of the Häuser, despite their centrality to postwar events in 
Germany. Likewise, they are missing from Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the 
Cold War, the survey by Walter Hixson. The Amerikahäuser are also absent from larger 
discussions on consumption, the Americanization of Europe, and the presentation of American 
                                               
19 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 27. 
20 Volker Rolf Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe : Shepard Stone 
between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 
c2001.), 61. 
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race relations in Europe.21 It is telling that Coca-Colonization and the Cold War, the work that 
covers the Amerikahäuser most directly, is a translation written over twenty years ago and set not 
in Germany, but in Austria.22 However, German scholars, unsurprisingly, have turned their gaze 
to the Häuser in recent years, though the works tend to focus on individual aspects of the 
Amerika Haus phenomenon, such as attempts to change consumption patterns.23 One of the most 
complete studies in German, Orte für Amerika: Deutsch-Amerikanische Institute und 
Amerikahäuser seit der 1960er Jahren, by Reinhild Kreis, focuses on the Häuser after they were 
well-established in Germany.24 The other English-Language work that examines the Information 
Center is Designing Democracy: Re-education and the America Houses, 1945-1961, was 
published as part of a Habilitation by a degree-holder in Design at the University of Wuppertal, 
                                               
21 Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Hixson, Parting the Curtain; Ruth 
Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann, eds., Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and 
European Users (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009); Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire : 
America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe, (Cambridge, Mass. ; Belknap Press of 
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and while well researched, takes the most obvious point for a thesis: that the Information Centers 
were a central part of the effort to re-educate Germans in the way of democracy.25  
 The other challenge facing the scholar of the Amerikahäuser is the fragmentary nature of 
primary source materials, most importantly the operating files of the various Häuser themselves. 
Amerika Haus personnel often destroyed records when Information Centers were closed or 
consolidated over the years, and particularly after the formal end of the program in 1996. Little 
regard was given to archival preservation, and often the documents that did survive were passed 
on to the Stadtarchiv of the various host cities. As a result, these record holdings are often 
incomplete, but nonetheless spread across Germany with few finding aids. For this project, I 
used the facilities of the Frankfurt and Berlin Stadtarchiv, the German Foreign Office Archives, 
the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, and the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. 
At College Park, most of the materials for this project were found in Record Groups 59, Records 
of the Department of State; 208, Records of Office of War Information; and 306, Records of the 
United States Information Agency. Most of the Congressional hearing testimony can be found in 
the Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, and the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, of the 79th through 83rd Congresses. Additionally, the Foreign Relations of the 
United States series was used.  
Periodization  
In spring of 1947, the Reading Room in Bad Hamburg was closed, its contents moved 
approximately fifty kilometers southwest to Wiesbaden, and reopened as the first Amerika Haus 
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that July.26 This begins the formal story of the Amerikahäuser, a story of cultural transfer that 
ended with Ambassador Timken handing over the keys to the Berlin Amerika Haus nearly fifty 
years later. However, rather than an institutional history, this work focuses on the period of 
formal military occupation, which ended with the adoption of the Paris Agreements in 1954. By 
that time, a profound change in orientation on the part of the United States toward the former 
German state had occurred: the ideological threat was now Communism, not a resurgent Nazism.  
The Korean War had a profound effect on the Federal Republic in that it facilitated the 
growth of West German export industries, as well shortening the path to regaining sovereignty, 
an act given the force of law in the 1954 Paris Agreements. These accords solidified West 
Germany as a bulwark of anti-Communism, providing not just for sovereignty but rearmament 
and membership in NATO. However, this was not the original orientation of the Amerikahäuser. 
Rather, preventing a reoccurrence of Nazism, or the political conditions that allowed it to 
flourish, were the original goals for the Häuser, but as time passed and Soviet behavior became 
more obstreperous in the eyes of the Americans, the orientation of the local Amerika Haus 
changed to reflect the new state of affairs. By the time the U.S. ended the formal military 
occupation of West Germany in 1953, anti-Nazism had been replaced by anti-Communism as the 
organizing principle for U.S. public diplomacy efforts in West Germany. Of course, the East 
German state next door gave particular urgency and focus to U.S. efforts, particularly in that 
“showplace of the West,” divided Berlin. A more prosaic reason for ending this study in 1953 is 
that Dwight Eisenhower and the Republican Party took control of the White House and 
Congress, running on promises of cutting taxes and expenditures, and restoring efficiency to 
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government. One way these goals were realized was by cutting the number of Amerikahäuser 
and consolidating them under the civilian control of the newly created United States Information 
Agency. The Amerika Haus program reached a peak in 1953, with more than thirty Häuser in 
operation across West Germany.27 
My work attempts to fill this lacuna in the existing scholarship by restoring the 
Amerikahäuser to a central position in U.S. efforts to reconstruct German society. Looking at the 
Amerikahäuser gives us a better way to understand not just American concerns about the future 
of Germany, but also the concerns Americans had over the position of the United States in the 
world. Through the vehicle of the Amerikahäuser, both Germans and Americans were able to 
help define themselves and create a new narrative for both nations.  
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter one examines the reverence with which bourgeois Germans held matters of 
culture (Kultur), and how the Americans—in part through the American Houses-- attempted to 
leverage German cultural self-regard into gaining greater access to the cohort of educated elites 
that both American and Soviet Occupation authorities sought so hard to entertain. The 
Americans found themselves caught between two opposing ideas regarding the relationship of 
culture to politics. On the one hand was a significant segment of the “population of influence” 
(Einflussgemeinschaft) who, taking their cue from nineteenth-century philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche, believed that democratic politics, with the necessary compromises and appeals to the 
public, was fundamentally incompatible with matters of Kultur. 
Conversely, there were those Germans who linked matters of culture to nationalism. 
German culture helped unite the bourgeiosie before the failed revolution of 1848, as well as after 
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the unification of Germany in 1871, and the Americans attempted to use culture to stimulate a 
“healthy” nationalism among the occupied German population. As a counter to the toxic 
nationalism of the National Socialist period, they looked to the historical examples of Weimar 
classicism,  the open-minded Germany of Beethoven, Goethe, and Schiller as examples of the 
fusion of Kultur and politics.  
 Chapter Two looks at the portion of the Information Center most popular with the West 
German visitors, the library. Until the introduction of the Amerikahäuser libraries, the relatively 
scarce German public libraries were librarian-centered, instead of being focused on the patron 
and the circulation of materials. In this context the librarian was a gatekeeper, restricting and 
granting access to cultural products through a criteria based on educational status and personal 
wealth. The shelves in the Information Center libraries were open to patrons because the 
emphasis at an Amerika Haus was on the expression of civil liberties, and the Americans placed 
great symbolic value in the open stacks and curtain wall of floor-to-ceiling windows in the 
library.  
The emphasis in the library on one-on-one contact with American culture reflected a 
sentiment that privileged American engagement with West Germans, not segregation, and drew a 
direct connection between democracy and education. Drawing heavily from Progressive-Era 
thought, the American organizing the Information Centers, particularly the libraries, were 
engaged in nation-building, and that saw their work in quasi-messianic terms. The emphasis in 
the libraries was on the free exchange of ideas and information, a policy that was sorely tested 
when anti-communist crusader Senator Joseph McCarthy turned his attention to the books on the 
shelves in the Information Center libraries.  
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 This third chapter surveys the Amerikahäuser and their furnishings not just as physical 
objects, but as a complete sensory experience approaching the “total work of art” 
(Gesamtkunstwerk) that German intellectuals prized so highly. From the premium building 
materials to the modernist architecture and furniture that bore the clear influence of the Bauhaus, 
the Information Center was designed to entice as well as impress the West German visitor. The 
wealth and cultural sophistication of the United States was on display in an Amerikahaus, made 
even more evident from the relative poverty of their surroundings. During the years surveyed in 
this work, 1945-1953, many German cities were still reconstituting themselves after wartime 
devastation, and from the moment the visitor saw it from the street, the modernist Amerika Haus 
was a clear statement of American affluence.  
American Public Diplomacy: From the American Revolution to the America Houses 
The remainder of this introduction lays the groundwork for the following chapters, in part 
by surveying earlier attempts by the United States at public diplomacy. Previous American 
experiences with propaganda, particularly in the twentieth century, informed the creation of the 
U.S. Information Centers program after the Second World War, and by placing the Information 
Centers within a larger historical context of U.S. public diplomacy we will see how the 
Amerikahäuser represented a substantive break with existing American diplomatic custom and 
practice.  The creation of the Information Centers in West Germany reflected the unique 
historical circumstances of postwar American economic prosperity, while the portrait of the 
United States presented in the Centers was in turn fashioned by the political pressures brought to 
bear against the State Department and Military Government alike. To better understand the 
phenomenon of the early Information Centers, it is necessary to examine the debates that 
influenced the American posture towards occupied Germany immediately after the war, and how 
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those conflicts were reflected in the efforts to create a coherent national narrative for export to 
the German public through the Information Centers. 
In an essay in the February 1941 issue of Life Magazine, less than a year before 
American entry into the Second World War, publisher Henry Luce declared the twentieth 
century to be “The American Century.” In his essay, a thinly described “plea for Americans to 
take up a global mission,” Luce wrote a passionate, if vaguely worded, call for the United States 
to assume a position of global leadership.28 Luce called for “…a vision of America as a world 
power which is authentically American,” and saw the conflicts in Europe as the crucible for 
refining the image of the United States abroad: 
And as we come now to the great test, it may yet turn out that in all our trials and 
tribulations of spirit during the first part to this century we as a people have been 
painfully apprehending the meaning of our time and now in this moment of testing there 
may come clear at last the vision which will guides us to the authentic creation of the 20th 
Century- our Century.29 
 
With characteristically bombastic prose, Luce chastised the political leadership of the United 
States, a nation “conceived in adventure and dedicated to the progress of man,” for what he saw 
as a lack of American leadership in world affairs after the First World War.30 Worse still, Luce 
declared, was that the lack of American global leadership was a conscious decision not “to rise to 
the opportunities of leadership in the world,” and to instead acquiesce to European hegemony in 
global politics and trade.31 Luce believed that horrific as it might be, the coming war also 
presented the United States with it the opportunity to fill the inevitable vacuum in power left by 
the decline of Europe. “Like most great creative opportunities,” Luce wrote, “it is an opportunity 
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enveloped in stupendous difficulties and dangers. If we don’t want it, if we refuse to take it, the 
responsibility of refusal is also ours, and ours alone.”32  
By the end of the Second World War it was undeniable to even the most hardened 
isolationist that the position of the United States relative to the rest of the world had been 
radically altered, and American efforts at self-presentation abroad were no longer a luxury, but a 
necessity, particularly in occupied Germany where fears ran high of recidivist Nazism and the 
omnipresent challenge posed by the existence of the East German state. Problematizing the issue 
was that when State Department and Occupation officials reviewed previous American attempts 
at public diplomacy, they found the result  very mixed at best. 
The Amerikahäuser did not represent the first American attempts at presenting the “aims 
and policies of the United States government” to Germany.33 Indeed, it is worth noting that since 
the American Revolution, Germany and German-speaking peoples have been central to debates 
over how the United States should present itself to the world. During the American Revolution, 
Hessian mercenaries, essential to British military efforts in North America, found themselves the 
targets of not just bullets and bayonets; they also faced appeals from fellow German-speakers to 
surrender and join the Americans, where they could make new lives for themselves after the 
Revolution.34  During the American Civil War, the Philadelphia Union Society published a tract 
written in German, Lincoln or McClellan, an Appeal to the Germans (ein Appell on die 
Deutschen), in which support for the Democratic Party was likened to self-bondage: “If you 
would have masters set up over you, on this principle, vote for McClellan. Would you retain 
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your equal rights as the citizens of a free country, vote for Lincoln, who has been an honest 
working man like yourselves.”35 Of course, in the twentieth century it was war with Germany 
that forced the United States to try to come up with a coherent plan for how it presented itself to 
the larger world. The First World War raised the question of American national self-presentation; 
the Second World War demanded an answer. 
Though still separated from Europe and Asia by two oceans, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century the United States was no longer on the periphery of global affairs. Despite the 
economic depression of 1893, American business expanded into global markets, and aided by a 
lopsided victory in the Spanish-American war, the U.S. was an emerging colonial power. While 
neither their economic or cultural equal, the United States was seen by the European powers as a 
legitimate player on the world stage with sharply defined spheres of influence.36 The mood of the 
United States before the First World War reflected a growing sense of American exceptionalism, 
marked by the “belief that other nations could and should replicate America’s own 
developmental experience,”  and the support for free enterprise.37  
Two particular cultural events give an indication of the tenor of the times in the United 
States. The Influence of Sea Power on History cited examples from antiquity to Trafalgar in an 
attempt to push the United States into global leadership on the back of a large navy.38 Three 
years later, in a speech before the American Historical Association, Frederick Jackson Turner 
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spoke on The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in which he declared the 
American drive for geographic and economic expansion as nothing less than the “manifest 
destiny” of the nation. Despite this growing belief by many in the United States that their 
political institutions were both exemplary and exportable, neither the U.S. government had plans, 
informal or formal, regarding how it presented itself to the world, nor was their much of a call 
for them on the part of the American public.  
German actions in the First World War forced the United States, in spite of itself, to 
address the task of presenting itself to the world. The “Committee on Public Information,” a 
public/private partnership under the energetic leadership of George Creel, had the mission of 
selling American involvement in the First World War to both domestic, as well as foreign 
audiences.  
 A firm believer not just in the rightness of U.S. entry into the war, but the rightness of 
the American institutions and culture in general, Creel had the zeal of a missionary and framed 
his work in explicitly religious terms. Prone to grandiosity, Creel had no doubt about the 
importance of his task and saw the creation of the CPI as a “splendid opportunity to preach the 
history, aims, and ideals of America,” and saw the Great War as nothing less than a “fight for the 
mind of mankind.”39 President Wilson, squeamish over the domestic use of propaganda, was 
assured by Creel that the work he envisioned would not be propaganda, “as the Germans defined 
it, but propaganda in the true sense of the word, meaning the 'propagation of faith.’”40 
Presumably, Creel meant faith in U.S. motives and war aims, and in the civic religion of 
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“Americanism.” This mixture of Babbitry and religiosity was neatly summed up in the title of his 
wartime recollections: How We Advertised America: the First Telling of the Amazing Story of the 
Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of 
the Globe. The CPI employed print, radio, and film to generate support for the war to a public 
that still cherished the idea of the United States as culturally and economically unattached to the 
rest of the world.  
Creel and his office attempted to reach every American, through every means possible, 
focusing on “the importance of public opinion in building domestic unity, on the multiplicity of 
information channels, on capitalizing upon American pluralism, and on the possibilities for using 
‘truth’ as a weapon against enemies that told only ‘lies.’”41 For the members of the CPI, 
propaganda equaled lies. As did the staff of the Amerikahäuser who came after them, CPI 
personnel considered themselves to be in the business of providing information, not engaging in 
propaganda; in both cases, the CPI and the Amerikahäuser drew the line between “information” 
and “propaganda” so thinly as to be invisible.  
Responsible for creating a coordinated propaganda campaign using every available 
means, including print, radio, and film, the CPI had a long reach and a heavy hand. Indeed, the 
hand of the CPI was so heavy, and the reach so long, memories of the CPI fueled domestic 
suspicion of U.S. public diplomacy efforts for decades.42 Creel and his committee had what most 
today would consider a shocking amount of latitude in carrying out the mission of generating 
support for American involvement in the First World War and had access to every means of 
communication. The CPI had the full backing of all three branches of government, and 
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insinuated itself into international business as well, controlling the distribution of American films 
overseas. However, the CPI was interested not just in distributing films, but their content as well, 
going so far as to prosecute film producer Robert Goldstein under the Espionage Act for his 
patently anti-British picture, The Spirit of ’76.43 The film, which featured British soldiers 
committing acts of sexual violence and theft, was deemed as detrimental to the war effort. For 
his efforts though, Goldstein received a sentence of ten years, though he served only one.44 The 
heavy-handedness of the CPI was recalled in the following decades, with many in Congress leery 
of funding public diplomacy through Information Centers and broadcasting. Though given little 
of the latitude of the CPI, the overarching message put out by Occupation officials after the 
Second World War was strikingly similar to the one used by officials during the First World 
War: The United States reluctantly entered the war in order to create a better, more democratic 
world. There was one huge difference between the two examples, though: after the Second 
World War, the United States remained in Europe.  
Thanks mainly to the actions of the CPI, by the end of the war American attitudes were 
hardening against the use of propaganda, regardless of the target audience. The end of the war 
gave the isolationist wings of both parties in Congress the opening they were looking for, cutting 
funding for the CPI altogether in 1919. Alleging that the U.S. was duped into entering the war by 
British and French atrocity propaganda designed to seduce naïve Americans into supporting a 
war that was beneficial only to Europeans, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, one of the leaders of the 
isolationist wing in Congress, railed against “the poison gas of propaganda” as an impediment in 
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determining the proper role of the U.S. in world events.45 The Special Committee on 
Investigation of the Munitions Industry, commonly referred to as the Nye Committee, followed 
this line, arguing that bankers and munitions manufacturers, the “merchants of death,” led the 
United States into World War One in search of profits.46 Congress wanted it both ways after the 
war, with political sentiment in the interwar period vacillating between “economic engagement 
via loans, exports and investments,” and attempts to distance itself “from individual countries 
and new international institutions, the League of Nations above all.”47 The isolationists had their 
day, rejecting membership in the League of Nations and securing the passage of the various 
Neutrality Acts of the 1930s.48 However, in rejecting what Senator Lodge described as the 
“mongrel banner” of the League of Nations, the Senate also rejected the opportunity to present a 
coordinated picture of the United States to the world.49 
Again Germany, this time under National Socialism, forced the United States to engage 
with the larger world, and use culture as formal tool of diplomacy. It was the German designs in 
Latin America that in 1938 led to the creation of the Division of Cultural Relations within the 
State Department. By 1941, it had morphed into to the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs.50 Led by Nelson Rockefeller at the personal request of the President, Inter-
American Affairs supported cultural interaction through touring art exhibitions and musical 
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performances in Latin America and South America. It also launched a Spanish- language 
newspaper, En Guardia, and shortwave radio broadcasts to Latin America.51  Rockefeller took 
his job of maintaining U.S. hegemony in Latin America seriously, declaring, “regardless of 
whether the outcome of the war is a German or Allied victory, the United States must protect its 
international position… it must take economic measures at once to secure economic prosperity in 
Central and South America.”52 Congress allowed President Roosevelt to conduct much more 
extensive bilateral diplomacy in Latin America than he was ever allowed to with European 
nations; in the case of German diplomatic moves in South America, proximity and the Monroe 
Doctrine superseded Congressional reticence for American involvement in the affairs of other 
nations. Nazism in Europe was one thing, but Nazi overtures to Buenos Aires was completely 
unacceptable to both Congress and the White House.53 This parochial vision would, out of 
necessity, be broadened, but not until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  
The Second World War necessitated new approaches to American public diplomacy. 
Unfortunately for the Americans, the United States had little experience with public diplomacy, 
and furthermore the experience it had gained through the Committee on Public Information was 
at the expense of public support. A realization had set in that both the war and what would come 
after it required “a new conception of diplomacy,” one not so “exclusively preoccupied with the 
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legal and commercial problems of its traditionary field of action but is fully alive to… the 
cultural problems of peoples living in dangerous and difficult times.”54 The war catapulted the 
United States into global preeminence, and the need to explain itself before the world had never 
been greater.  
In issuing Executive Order 9312, President Roosevelt created the Office of Wartime 
Information in order to “plan, develop, and execute all phases of the Federal program of radio, 
press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of 
information.”55 Led by Rhodes scholar and Peabody Award-winning journalist Elmer Davis, the 
OWI had a wide brief. It published books and magazines for occupied areas, and produced 
thousands of short films on topics that ranged from  American agricultural practices, to the 
popular Autobiography of a Jeep.56 The growth of the OWI was proportionate to U.S. 
involvement in the war; so much so that by the end of the conflict, the OWI had become a global 
media operation engaged in every aspect of film, radio, and print production and distribution. 
Though other agencies such as the Office of Strategic Services also dealt with propaganda and 
public affairs during the war, it was the experience garnered by Office of Wartime Information 
personnel that was put to work in Occupied Germany through the Amerikahäuser.57 Many of 
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those who planned and lead the Häuser during the Occupation period learned their craft while 
serving in the OWI, their expertise growing as the Allies moved across Europe. Through trial 
and error, the Americans established practices in wartime that carried over into the creation of 
the Amerikahäuser, particularly in the establishment of reference libraries and reading rooms.  
These libraries were open to neither Army personnel, nor the local civilian population. 
Rather, they were mainly filled with reference books for the use of Allied journalists working in 
Occupied areas.58 Testifying before a Congressional committee in 1945, OWI Director Edward 
Barrett elaborated on a OWI practice that carried over to the Amerikahäuser and remained in 
place for the next fifty years: while often employing German nationals, the Amerikahäuser 
would almost always be led by Americans. Creating and managing the narrative was crucial; 
Barrett was explicit in his desire for U.S. staff to run these libraries and reading rooms because in 
his view, “the American story must be told by Americans… in our own terms if we are to win 
the support America needs in this critical period.”59 The sentiment was clear: only Americans 
could be trusted to correctly interpret the American experience.  
Though late to the idea of culture as a tool of foreign relations and diplomacy, the 
Americans more than made up for lost time. By the end of the war the United States had 
amassed, less by design than out of necessity, a “mighty global apparatus of advocacy and 
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cultural projection” without parallel.60 However, many in the United States and Europe saw that 
apparatus, in the guises of Radio Free Europe and the Amerikahäuser, as Trojan Horses. The 
classical music recitals, jazz clubs, libraries, and reading rooms in the Amerikahäuser hid a move 
for U.S. cultural and economic hegemony in postwar Europe. 
Wishing, in the words of William F. Buckley, “to stand athwart History, yelling stop!” 
the increasingly isolated isolationist wing of Congress fought a rearguard action against 
expanded American commitment to Europe after the war.61 They feared the reconstruction of 
German industry, for they saw it as the key to German aggression, and they had grave concerns 
over the commitment of the United States to international organizations requiring binding 
obligations, such as the United Nations. To Germans who saw themselves as guardians of culture 
and homeland, the Häuser were designed to seduce susceptible Germans with the false promises 
of American “civilization (zivilisation)” as opposed to the contribution of German culture 
(Kultur) to the larger world.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
KULTUR, CULTURE, AND THE INFORMATION CENTERS 
 
The Americans overseeing the Information Centers were there to assist in the restoration 
of a “(German) intellectual, spiritual, and cultural life,” that going forward “would be based on 
the principles of freedom, social justice, brotherhood, and individual and group responsibility” to 
the German people.62 Germans who came of age at the beginning of the twentieth century faced 
some of the same choices regarding politics in 1945 as they had in 1918, in that the end of the 
Second World War forced members of the educated German bourgeoisie to once again formally 
come to terms with their relationship to politics, democracy, and mass culture (Massenkultur). In 
the postwar disorder of occupied Germany, some of the defeated took refuge in a mythopoetic 
culture they believed offered something superior to the utility of politics. Conditioned by 
upbringing and education to see political participation with a skeptical eye, for them the 
inevitable compromises, disappointments, and appeals for popular support that define democratic 
politics epitomized the pitfalls of “civilization” after 1945, just as they had after 1918. The 
attitude of German elites toward democratic reform was of vital importance to American 
occupation authorities, who took advantage of the opportunity that cultural offerings afforded 
them to make sustained contact with influential Germans.   
An emergent youth culture was one of many signifiers of the societal changes underway 
in East and West German cities after the war, and clothing choices among the young reflected 
the growing influence of American popular culture in postwar German society. Governments and 
individuals on both sides of the German ideological divide were forced to address the growing 
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importance of satisfying the consumer cravings of young people, whose adoption of elements of 
American popular culture such as Rock and Roll and the mythos of the American West were 
seen as challenges to existing cultural practices. In 1950, the capitol city of Bavaria was the 
scene of one such challenge. “It is no unusual thing in Munich,” an observer of German society 
wrote with dismay, “to see ten-year old boys with toy pistols and sombreros, playing in the street 
under posters advertising (American) motion pictures of gangsters and degenerates.”63 The 
author saw no connection between the playacting of the children and the widespread German 
fascination with the American West (or at least the idea of it), which predated the Occupation by 
many decades.64 In the eyes of the author, the children, heirs to the cultural patrimony of Goethe 
and Schiller, had been degraded by “primitive, vulgar, trashy” American popular culture.65 
Tonally, it certainly had much in common with those German cultural commentators who more 
often than not saw the products of American popular culture as societal threats, such as the 
movie reviewer who asserted The Blackboard Jungle, an American film whose plot revolved 
around juvenile delinquency, was more than a cultural artifact, it was “an expression of 
American civilization (Zivilisation).”66 To these authors and those who shared their concerns, 
German culture was something to be protected from the outside world, unless those outside 
cultural actors reinforced notions of German cultural superiority.  
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However, the alarm over presumably American-influenced sombrero wear among 
Munich children was sounded by an American historian: Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, the 
Edwards Professor of American History at Princeton University, scholar of the colonial 
American South, and by the time his letter from Germany was published, a past President of the 
American Historical Association. Trained in German ways of scholarship, and enamored of 
Germanic ideas surrounding the development of the inner self (Bildung), Wertenbaker had been 
a visiting professor at the University of Göttingen before the war. In 1931, at the very institution 
where the Grimm brothers compiled the first German dictionary, and where both Metternich and 
von Humboldt had studied law, Wertenbaker observed first-hand the end of the Weimar 
Republic and the establishment of the National Socialist regime. 
The occasion of Professor Wertenbaker returning to Germany after the war was a U.S. 
sponsored two-week conference on how to “introduce the study of American civilization into the 
schools and how best to promote it in the universities.”67 He deplored the fact that many 
Germans, particularly German youth, received their earliest impressions of the United States 
from movies such as The Wild Ones, where Marlon Brando flouted authority and led a 
motorcycle gang, or from the early Rock and Roll percolating through German youth culture, 
marked by a “wild rhythm” that according to the West German newspaper Bravo, could turn an 
otherwise normal German youth into a “white negro” (Weißer Neger); according to the author, 
cases of spontaneous negritude had already happened in England.68 Distressed by the how the 
United States was perceived in the German popular imagination, and concerned that popular film 
was filling in for missing American history lessons among young Germans, Wertenbaker wanted 
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to challenge what he believed was a widespread German perception of the United States as “…a 
land of millionaires, or of organized crime, or of money chasers, or of demagogues.”69 While 
acknowledging the necessity of military forces, Wertenbaker believed the political culture in the 
United States offered something the force of arms could not and wondered if “…an exchange of 
students, a visiting professor from Germany, a scholarship for the study of our civilization in a 
German university may be more potent for victory than a bomb or a cannon,” declared 
Wertenbaker.70 Without knowing it, Professor Wertenbaker became a champion of  American 
“soft power,” and epitomized the thinking behind the establishment of the Information Centers.    
Professor Wertenbaker is relevant to the story of the Amerikahäuser because his thinking 
typified that of many of the Americans helping to establish the network of Information Centers 
across American-occupied Germany. They, like Wertenbaker, shared a deep appreciation of 
German culture, as well as a belief that exposure to the American historical experience could 
serve as a guide for Germans rebuilding their society. And as members of a larger transatlantic 
cultural community whose mission was to help bridge a transatlantic cultural divide, Americans 
in the Information Centers also shared a belief with Wertenbaker that cultural means could be 
used to accomplish political ends; German culture was a vehicle by which Germans could transit 
the intellectual space between the anti-democratic past of their shared historical experience and 
their American-envisioned future predicated on mass democracy and economic reform.  
This chapter examines how the Information Centers used culture, particularly musical 
culture, to establish connections with the influential Germans the Americans thought essential to 
their work: members of the professions, journalists, and politicians, whose pre-Occupation 
conduct was generally free of Nazi taint. The manipulation of vanity is at the heart of this 
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chapter; these influential Germans were, despite recent depredations against the rest of humanity, 
often firmly convinced of the superiority of German culture. But most of all, after years of Nazi 
cultural repression, many Germans were hungry for virtually any kind of artistic expression. The 
Americans knew this, and in interpreting German music and introducing the audiences at the 
same time to modern American works, Information Center programmers played to German 
cultural self-regard in an attempt to make a connection. In highlighting German contributions to 
the arts, the Americans gave the Germans what they wanted, an affirmation of the German 
cultural tradition and demonstrative appreciation for German cultural contributions throughout 
history. But they also made an argument for the validity of American musicianship, and in 
sponsoring Jazz clubs in the Amerikahäuser, the American government formally recognized an 
indigenous American art form that was rooted in the African-American tradition, albeit in a 
manner that somewhat decontextualized the music from the ethnic culture it came from.  
This chapter necessarily examines specifically German conceptions of “culture” (Kultur), 
the antithetical state of “civilization” (Zivilisation), and the importance both held to bourgeois 
Germans and the Amerika Haus staff attempting to influence German opinion. While most 
German intellectuals shared a respect, if not reverence for the constituents of Kultur, not all 
Americans working on cultural issues in the early years of the Occupation knew what the elastic 
term Kultur meant to the Germans, or the esteem in which it was held by educated Germans. 
When we look at the American emphasis on the creation of a “healthy” German culture and the 
strong response by the German public to U.S. cultural efforts on display at the Amerikahäuser, 
we find mutual agreement on the importance of culture to the rebuilding of German society. The 
fetish-like devotion with which many German intellectuals held to their culture was both 
reinforced and challenged by the Amerikahäuser, where German cultural needs were catered to 
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as part of an ongoing effort to cultivate elite acceptance of Occupation policies. American 
support for the arts via the Information Centers was never an expression of l'art pour l'art; the 
tremendous work on the part of the Americans to reach Germans through their own culture was 
done, as always, to aid “Germany’s integration into the family of nations.”71  
Before we look at how the Americans used German culture as a lever to move elite 
opinion, we must first understand the importance of Kultur in the minds of educated Germans. 
Members of a societal elite based on education rather than wealth, many bourgeois Germans saw 
their history, from the abortive 1848 revolution to the fall of Weimar and the rise of Nazism, as 
validation of their belief that politics and culture were mutually exclusive terms.72 Taking their 
cues from the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, particularly his Twilight of the Idols, advocates for 
German culture saw it as a transcendent, quasi-spiritual force that united Germans in ways 
politics never could. Furthermore, they believed engaging in politics, particularly those which 
appealed to the mass of the citizenry, like democracy, as antithetical to cultural life, and as such 
was the chief signifier of the vulgar temporal realm of the mundane, Zivilisation (civilization). 
The Americans wanted a passionate support for democracy from the Germans under Occupation, 
and the Amerikahäuser were a primary means by which to instill that passion.  
American notions of mass democracy and economic consumption put them squarely at 
odds with the traditions of Kultur, which demanded from adherents an almost monastic retreat 
from public affairs and displays of wealth. More than anything, the Americans wanted the 
influential Germans coming through the doors of the Information Centers to be engaged in the 
political, as well as the cultural, reconstruction of postwar Germany, as opposed to the lukewarm 
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response many of them gave to the Weimar Republic. Typical of that response was the eminent 
German historian Friedrich Meinecke, who before fleeing Germany and finding refuge in the 
United States, saw himself “…at best, a monarchist at heart,” while “in regards to the future, a 
republican of reason (Vernunftrepublikaner)."73 The author of an examination of the rise of 
Hitler, The German Catastrophe, came around to the virtues of democracy, declaring that 
“cosmopolitanism (Kultur) and the modern idea of the national state were not originally rigid 
contrasts,” but existed “for mutual enrichment,” an example of “polar and dialectical tension and 
connection with one another.”74  
What the Americans needed were more intellectuals to follow the lead of Meinecke and 
take the leap of faith into the modern postwar German state. Rather than harboring feelings of 
cultural insecurity, the Americans in the Information Centers engaged influential members of 
German society in a mutually understood language, that of the arts, and specifically, German 
contributions to a shared transatlantic culture. By exploring the sometimes-tortured relationship 
between culture and politics in German society before the Occupation, we gain a better 
understanding of both the cultural milieu the Americans found themselves in during the first 
years of Occupation, and a greater appreciation of the challenges they faced in their attempts to 
engage the “mandarins” of German Kultur. 
The years encompassing the Great Depression and the Second World War were difficult 
for the Metropolitan Opera in New York City. Lower attendance, heavy real estate taxes, and the 
cumulative effects of wartime rationing of everything from electrical wire to silk led to serious 
doubts about the commercial viability of the opera company. A shareholder revolt in 1940 forced 
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the sale of the original opera house at 39th and Broadway, with only a frantic public fundraising 
effort and the corporate largesse of the Texas Company (otherwise known as Texaco, whose 
public image was tarnished from the extensive business it had done with pre-war Germany), 
keeping the lights on.  As the most widely-recognized American opera company, the financial 
distress of the Metropolitan Opera had larger implications for how the cultural pretentions of the 
United States were perceived abroad, with many culturally-sensitive Europeans (as well as to 
many Americans) taking the lack of support for a leading American artistic institution as 
something of a referendum on the state of American culture. According to one professed devotee 
of European high culture, the difficulties of the Metropolitan Opera were hardly surprising, for, 
according to Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, it was bound to happen “in a country 
that only has a single opera.” He went on in this vein, writing in his diary:  
The American continent is hardly in a position to bring forth anything of its own in the 
cultural realm. It is dependent upon (cultural) imports from Europe, and since the 
Americans are so crazy about money they naturally like to take possession of the results 
of our creative and inventive labors as far as possible without paying for them.75 
 
That the Propaganda Minister saw himself as a defender of art, music, and literature is 
instructive, for the comments in his diary reveal attitudes and beliefs regarding culture held by 
many educated Germans of his age, not just Party elites. In believing in the superiority of 
European culture and the parallel lack of culture in the United States, Goebbels was not that 
different than many of countrymen.  
 Another example, from a more palatable source, the author Thomas Mann, who had 
settled in California after his flight from Nazi Germany. Mann, the author of Buddenbrooks and 
The Magic Mountain and recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature, had enormous cultural 
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weight in Germany, which consequently made him quite a propaganda catch for the Americans. 
In Pacific Palisades, California, in a home he had custom-built, Mann presided over the German 
exile community in Hollywood.76 Regardless of his new surroundings, the pull of German Kultur 
still held him in thrall. When asked to organize donations for the construction of an American 
bomber with the slightly insulting name Loyalty, he refused. "I do not want,” he wrote in a letter 
to his onetime muse, Agnes Meyer, “after my death, that Germans who read my books- or don't 
read them- think of myself as chairman of a committee responsible for the destruction of German 
monuments of culture (Denkmäler der Kultur)."77 Apparently the qualms Mann felt over the 
bomber were not caused by being associated with the air raids consuming the lives of countless 
Germans, but with the destruction of “monuments of culture.” Perhaps most revealing is the 
realization that this privileging of monuments over people would have been seen as perfectly 
understandable by his peers back home in Germany, who, it is presumed, might have been on the 
receiving end of the Allied bombing campaigns.78  
These two examples, though extreme, do reveal a common trait among many educated 
Germans: the oversized emphasis placed on matters of Kultur, to a degree many Americans 
serving in the Occupation saw as absurd. This emphasis on cultural matters meant the Americans 
in the Information Centers had to cater to a discriminating German audience, whose members, 
despite the events of the first half of the twentieth century, were frequently convinced of their 
own cultural superiority. For the Americans to make headway with the lasting reconstruction of 
German civil society after the war, they addressed these cultural attitudes by engaging the 
Germans on their own terms; this time, however, the field of battle in the war of ideas was the 
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performance spaces and exhibition areas of the Information Centers. That Goebbels saw the 
propaganda value in the financial distress of the Metropolitan Opera tells us something about the 
importance of cultural matters to the German state, even during wartime; in this case, the news of 
the Opera facing bankruptcy happened to reinforce existing prejudices against the cultural life of 
the United States, a happy accident from the point of view of the Reich Minister of Propaganda. 
After the downfall of Nazism, the importance of cultural matters did not diminish in the German 
public or private spheres; if anything, some who had a vested interest in cultural matters clung 
tightly to what they knew.   
For something so important to so many people, Kultur is a very hard concept to define, 
particularly for the non-native German speaker. The elasticity of the idea of Kultur sometimes 
posed a challenge for those on the front lines of the battle for hearts and minds, for sometimes 
Kultur signified  
… the sum-total of civilization, including its moral standards (as when the political 
parties promise to protect Christian-Western ‘Kultur’),” while “the next moment it means 
no more than an education (as when the work ‘Kultur’ appears on a poster advertising an 
illustrated lecture on Bulgaria.”79  
 
The Americans appreciated the chameleon-like qualities of Kultur, correctly determining that 
  
This diversity of meanings permits many groups to consider themselves the guardians of 
“Kultur.” Because of the noble connotations of the word, even the simplest activity, when 
described as “Kultur” becomes strangely sanctified in the popular mind. Today many 
hope to save “Kultur,” and many hope to be saved by it. For some, it is the last refuge in 
defeat and disaster.80 
 
This is as close as the Office of the U.S. Military Government (OMGUS) could get to a working 
definition of Kultur, and it is, as the author points out in his report from the Research Branch of 
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the Military Government, “dangerously imprecise.”81 Problematizing the issue for the Americans 
in the Information Centers was the frequent association between Kultur and German nationalism, 
particularly political nationalism. Before the unification of Germany in 1871, historian Hugh 
Trevor-Roper argued, Germans were a people who shared a culture, they were, in his words, a 
Kulturvolk, who after their military success against France in 1870 transitioned into a people 
living in a culturally-unified state, a Kulturstaat.82 As state and culture walked in lockstep, 
victory in the Franco-Prussian War was evidence not just of Prussian mastery of arms, the victors 
argued, but also a triumph of German Kultur; as a consequence of statehood, politics was to be 
“the guarantor of German culture,” while at the same time, “culture provided politics with added 
legitimacy” and supported the State.83 A vivid example of this phenomenon came to light early 
in the First World War, when 93 prominent German academics and artists, self-styled “heralds of 
truth” (Herolde der Wahrheit) including the discoverer of the X-Ray, Wilhelm Roentgen, the 
pioneering physicist Max Planck, and the avant-garde theatrical impresario Max Reinhardt, 
published a manifesto entitled To the Civilized World (An die Kulturwelt). When they declared 
“Were it not for German militarism, German civilization would long since have been extirpated,” 
they enlisted the legacies of Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant to serve in the trenches alongside the 
soldiers whose belt buckles were inscribed Gott mit uns, a carryover from the Prussian era.84 
Little had changed by 1945, where some intellectuals who stayed in through the rise and fall of 
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Nazism saw themselves as patriots who “did not abandon their sick mother Germany” in time of 
need.85  
German sociologist Norbert Elias, like Trevor-Roper, located the origins of Kultur in the 
nineteenth century, before the unification of the German states, and saw it as a thoroughly 
middle-class construct.86  The “learned middle class,” in his words, first attempted to create 
models of what a German was, “and thus to establish at least in the intellectual sphere a German 
unity,” which did not seem achievable after the failure of the 1848 revolution.87 As “invented 
traditions,” ideas of culture and civilization, among other uses, fulfilled a desire among the 
middle-class for national identity when none was available. Language and music unified German 
intellectuals when there were no corresponding political institutions to draw their focus, as 
members of an imagined community of “cultural people,” (Kulturvolk) without a state.88 
German ideas surrounding culture were also frequently woven into Protestant narratives, 
which favorably compared themselves against their Roman Catholic neighbors. This 
increasingly-educated middle class, growing in size from the rapid industrialization and 
minimum education standards, frequently framed the Catholic Church as opposition, sentiments 
abetted by the actions of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck who singled out Catholics in his “culture 
wars” unifying the new German state.89 To members of the mostly Protestant educated middle 
class, the Roman Catholic Church, with a liturgy that was still in Latin, even in the land of 
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Luther, and led by the ferociously anti-modern Pope Pius IX, whose Syllabus of Errors 
condemned such propositions as “The Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and 
come to terms with, progress, liberalism and modern civilization,” a position which only 
reinforced existing German anti-Catholic cultural prejudices.90  
Not all German elites were completely in thrall to their national past. Indeed, many 
prominent intellectuals saw German ideas of Kultur as familiar and comfortable traps, dead-end 
roads which they and their fellow Germans had been lured down before. Among those disturbed 
by the postwar use of culture as a substitute for politics were the returned German exiles, 
Theodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt, who had taken up teaching positions in West Germany. 
The two scholars shared similar experiences in their dealings with postwar Germans and reached 
similar conclusions about what they saw as the negative consequences of continuing the practice 
of Kultur-worship into postwar German society.  
The two public intellectuals, though they disliked each other intensely, had one thing in 
common: their initial appreciation for the work ethic of their students was ultimately replaced by 
concern that German universities were on the verge of turning out, in the words of Arendt, “a 
whole class of frustrated and starving intellectuals.”91 Their students felt no need to involve 
themselves in politics because they believed Germany had no political future. “The desire to 
become a world power has proven to be a false idol for us,” declared Friedrich Meinecke, who 
hardly spoke for the young but still managed to convey the aimlessness and sense of betrayal felt 
by those finding their place in a new Germany, echoing Nietzsche when he declared politics “an 
adventure which cuts in two directions leading to temptations in which culture is too much the 
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loser.”92 Both Adorno and Arendt had returned to Germany after the war to teach and to get an 
informal sense of postwar German sentiment, to mark the changes wrought by Nazism, war, 
defeat, and occupation.  
Like many in their situation, both Adorno and Arendt were trying to make sense of the 
cataclysm that was Nazism. They tried to understand how it began and under what conditions it 
flourished. However, the two scholars were not completely fixated on the past, they were also 
concerned with the effect of the recent Nazi past on the German future. For his part, Adorno 
thought he “could do some good things to prevent a repetition of disaster.”93 In the beginning, 
both had high hopes for their students which were replaced by something more ambivalent. 
Apparently, the work of their German students was exemplary, but Adorno and Arendt, who 
believed intellectuals had a public duty to weigh in on the issues of the day, were appalled at the 
lack of political interest on the part of their students. The only enthusiasm the students showed 
was for their studies, and the more esoteric, the better. Though clearly disgusted at the political 
apathy displayed by her peers who had remained behind in Germany, Arendt refused to ascribe 
this behavior to a German “national character,” an idea she rejected out of hand, and in her now-
famous 1950 essay, The Aftermath of Nazi Rule: Report from Germany, she argued, 
provocatively, that the supposed German “national character” was not the issue; rather, it was the 
lack of it. Interestingly, she linked ideas of national character to militarism, but not in the way 
one might expect.  “The real problem,” she said, “is not the German national character but rather 
the disintegration of that character, or at least the fact that this character does not play any role in 
German politics any more. It is as much a part of the past as German militarism and 
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nationalism.”94 Both the threat of a resurgence in militarism and the cultural baggage that came 
with claims of “national character” were apparently no longer an issue for Arendt, for they had 
been replaced by apathy and self-centeredness.  
Similarly, Theodor Adorno was at first struck by the dedication of his philosophy 
students, going so far as to praise them and their efforts at rebuilding German culture in an essay, 
The Resurrected Culture (Die auferstandene Kultur) and was optimistic that he could help 
Germany rebuild. Adorno looked forward to teaching in German, the only language “he 
considered fully suitable for dialectical-speculative, anti-positivist thinking.”95 Adorno was 
impressed with the work ethic of his students, and their “passionate participation regarding these 
(philosophical) questions and matters, a participation that has to make a teacher happy.”96 
However, in a letter to Thomas Mann, Adorno soon likened his students to German students 
before the wars of liberation; like them, these young German intellectuals after the Second 
World War were fated to be “poor in deeds and full of thoughts again,” as they had in 1800.97 
Neither Adorno nor Arendt thought this boded well for the future of democratic Germany, and 
neither scholar was particularly well received upon their return to Germany. Adorno, in 
particular, had to put up with a great deal of hostility from his colleagues at the University of 
Frankfurt.  
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However, not all German intellectuals agreed with this comingling of politics and culture 
and took their cue from Friedrich Nietzsche in seeing the Reich not as the defender of culture, 
but rather as an impediment. Culture had held together German-speaking peoples in an imagined 
community before 1870, but Nietzsche and others saw the spiritual power of the emergent state 
as something approaching a zero-sum game, and it was crucial where that energy was spent:  
If you spend yourself on power, on grandiose politics, on economics, world trade, 
parliaments, military interests- if you give yourself away in this direction the quantity of 
understanding, seriousness, will and self-overcoming that you are, then this quantity isn’t 
available in the other direction.”98 
 
 “Politics swallows up all seriousness about really spiritual things,” Nietzsche wrote in 
Twilight of the Idols. “Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles: I’m afraid that was the end of 
German philosophy,” he added, neatly summarizing the position he and his adherents took 
toward the partnership of State and Kultur.99 For Nietzsche, Burckhardt, and other like-minded 
German intellectuals in this camp, culture was not apolitical, it was explicitly anti-political. That 
these words were written regarding events set into motion by the Franco-Prussian War was 
irrelevant to those German intellectuals picking up the pieces of their cultural life after the 
Second World War. His words were relevant to their own historical experience, for those who 
were inclined to agree with Nietzsche took his words in Twilight of the Idols to heart; the fall of 
Weimar and the rise of National Socialism had shown them the virtues of retreat from the public 
sphere and “inner emigration.”  
However, where Adorno, Arendt, Nietzsche, and others saw the postwar political apathy 
and embrace of “culture” and intellectual pursuits as an illusionary retreat from politics, others 
saw the measured embrace of German culture as a way forward. As was the case with those 
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running the Information Centers, public intellectuals such as the historian Friedrich Meinecke 
saw the reconstruction of German culture through institutions such as the Amerikahäuser as 
affirming the best in the German liberal cultural and political traditions, and as an inoculation 
against both Soviet enticements and a resurgence of right-wing authoritarianism. Americans such 
as Professor Wertenbaker and other advocates of “soft power” believed culture could serve as the 
transatlantic bridge between Germany and the United States. As a means by which Germans 
could interpret “American civilization” for their own edification and benefit, Wertenbaker 
believed the displays, exhibits, and musical performances in the Amerikahäuser were ways by 
which Germans, particularly German intellectuals, could see that the American relationship to 
Germany was “not merely a matter of guns and planes and divisions,” but that it was also “a 
matter of ideals, of mutual understanding, of friendship” as well.100 This appeal to international 
friendship and mutual appreciation through the exchange of ideas, regardless of borders, was a 
message that echoed Goethe and the Weimar classicism that Wertenbaker and others knew held 
such cultural weight among educated Germans. Americans in the State Department hoped the 
combination of an appeal to these high-minded ideals, plus incorporation of the “best in foreign 
music and literature” would effect change in German elites.101 The Amerikahäuser were 
supposed to serve as “islands of democratic ferment” within the larger German cultural sphere.102 
 To those steeped in the German intellectual tradition of the past century, the opposite 
state of Kultur was “Zivilisation” (civilization). To the casual observer the distinction seems 
minute and the two states even complimentary or symbiotic, but to a devotee the distance 
between the two conditions was so vast as to render them antithetical. Drawing from an 
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intellectual tradition firmly anchored in the past, bourgeois Germans made an acute distinction 
between Kultur and what they considered to be the lesser, pedestrian realm of civilization. But 
unlike culture, the state of Zivilisation was more easily defined. German sociologist Norbert 
Elias defined it as the world of “political, economic and social facts,” as opposed to the more 
rarefied realm of the spirit.103  
While the tangible products of “civilization” such as the products of applied science were 
impressive, many German elites saw these accomplishments as inherently inferior to the cultural 
products of such luminaries as Goethe and Wagner, because the products of their art were 
expressions of the soul and, it was argued, spoke to eternal truths. To a devotee of Kultur, the 
ingenuity behind the internal combustion engine of Karl Benz, the x-rays of Roentgen, or the 
aniline dyes which propelled the German economy were impressive achievements, but ultimately 
the product of the factory reflected neither a higher truth, nor anything about those who created 
it.  
In their efforts to secure the allegiance of influential Germans, the Information Centers 
found themselves serving two masters: those who associated Kultur with German nationalism, 
and those who saw politics as the antithesis of culture. Both positions were problematic for the 
Americans. On the one hand, they wanted to keep a tight lid on unapproved expressions of 
German nationalism, forbidding parades, flag displays, and other overt signs of patriotism 
without prior approval from Occupation authorities.104 Between fears of Nazi recidivism and 
communist infiltration, the Americans were extremely wary of unapproved political expression. 
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They wanted Germans to take pride in their country, but, as one official put it, “within a 
permitted context.”105  
On the other hand, the Americans wanted to encourage political participation in the new 
German state, which meant convincing those intellectuals who wanted nothing to do with 
politics. Information Center officials could to some extent empathize with their German patrons 
who took shelter in their shared culture. It was explained in the pages of Information Control 
Review, published for those officials serving in the Information Control Division of Military 
Government, that “The almost religious emphasis on Kultur fulfills several important functions 
for Germans,” among them: 
Dwelling on the past glory of German culture restores some measure of self-respect and 
national pride, within a permitted context, and the hope of rebuilding Germany's prestige 
in the eyes of the world. It supplies an avenue of escape from the harsh economic and 
political realities of present-day German life. In effect, it supplies a symbol, something 
Germans can believe in and cling to in the midst of the general spiritual and intellectual 
wreckage.106 
 
For many German intellectuals, politics after the Second World War, as it did in 1918, 
represented national failure and humiliation, “while culture represented the sphere of their 
freedom and their pride."107 Those responsible for cultural programming in an Amerika Haus 
took this deep-seated attachment of German elites to their culture into account when making 
programming decisions. However, Information Center officials faced another challenge beyond 
those posed by skeptical German intellectuals and the hardships of providing services in 
bombed-out cities. The Americans faced the delicate task of recognizing and supporting German 
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cultural and intellectual traditions and achievements while at the same time pointing out that 
Americans could actually make a contribution to European culture.  
A trait shown by many of those Germans who worshipped at the temple of German 
Kultur was the belief that the United States was a cultural wasteland, and as a consequence had 
with very little to offer the world of lasting value. Many Germans looked at American cultural 
production the same way Americans of the period looked at Japanese industrial production, as 
ultimately derivative of other, more “advanced” societies, and dependent upon the contributions 
of others. Americans, it was argued, were first-rate copyists who confused economic 
consumption with culture, and regarded “technological achievements as cultural 
accomplishments.”108 Some Germans admired the sense of dynamism they encountered in their 
visits to the United States, such as the politician Walter Rathenau when he enthused, “Away with 
Athens on the Spree,” referring to Berlin, “now we have Chicago on the Spree.”109 This was not 
necessarily a compliment; Berlin was often looked down on, even by fellow Germans, as a 
parvenu city, whose energy, as was the case with America, masked a superficiality at the heart of 
both. “Berlin,” according to one cultural critic, was “the capitol of German non-culture (die 
Hauptstadt der deutschen Nicht-Kultur).”110 The American author and humorist Mark Twain 
referred to Berlin as “the Chicago of Europe,” a decidedly mixed compliment.111 The staff of the 
Information Centers faced a daunting challenge in reversing this attitude and emphasized to the 
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Amerika Haus patrons that the United States excelled not just at the mass production of 
refrigerators and automobiles, but in the production of cultural artifacts of lasting value as well. 
One way the Americans attempted to prove that assertion was through music, because according 
to one American official, “experience has shown that (the) presentation of American music and 
concerts by outstanding American interpreters impress the German audience more than most of 
the other offerings.”112 Gaining the respect of the German public for American musical culture 
was an important was not just important, it was the sole reason for the music program. 
As was the case with virtually everything else about the Information Centers, the 
objective of the music programs at the various Amerikahäuser was the promotion of the United 
States in as favorable light as possible. It was necessary, according to an American cultural 
official, “to impress upon the German audience that the United States is a worthy heir to the 
great Western musical tradition and that our people are doing their part in carrying on and 
developing this tradition.”113 Excerpts from a 1953 internal study of the Information Centers 
illustrates the shared belief in a cultural lacuna between Germany and the United States, and the 
American attempts to cross that gulf and meet the Germans on their own cultural ground. To do 
that, the Americans devised a four-part strategy, quoted here verbatim: 
1. By the presentation of young American artists who can demonstrate the high level of 
musical competence, sensitivity, and technical perfection achieved by our present 
rising generation of musicians and who can show their grasp and mastery of the great 
classics; 
 
2. By the performance of American compositions in order to acquaint the German 
audiences with the many American contemporary composers and their great creative 
effort; 
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3. By record concerts of the great American symphony orchestras and choral ensembles 
in order to show the vast public interest and support which alone make these 
expensive organizations possible; 
 
4. By a serious and intelligent presentation of pure jazz and musicals to show America’s 
unique contribution in these art forms.114 
 
An examination of the weekly program for March 5-11, 1951, at the Frankfurt Amerika Haus 
reveals a mix of American and German cultural products. On Monday, there was a lecture, 
accompanied with photos, on the German painter Max Beckmann, on Tuesday there was a 
documentary film on the Californian Youth Symphony Orchestra, and a lecture, American 
Drama on German Stages, also in German and with photographs. On Friday, selections from 
Bach, Beethoven, Marcello, Krenek, Honegger, and Milhaud were played in concert.115 On 
Wednesday, however, the programming made an unexpected turn, with a lecture on the “Nature 
and Development of Jazz Music. From the Folklore to the Vanguard, Swing and Bebop,” led in 
German by Olaf Hudtwalcker, with recordings.116 The title of the last presentation gives 
something away about the tenor of the event; it was a sober examination of a musical form, not a 
jam session.  
Jazz and the Information Centers 
Much to the consternation of the proponents of traditional Kultur and morality, jazz was 
enormously popular in Germany before, during, and after the Second World War. With origins 
specific to the African-American experience, it was no surprise that jazz was a target of Nazi 
opprobrium. The Nazi rejection of jazz played out in different ways. According to a German 
                                               
114 Ibid. 
115 Pilgert, History of the Development of Information Services, 79. 
116 Ibid. 
  
52 
 
 
 
musician working during the period, a Bavarian Nazi official issued the following decree 
regarding music:  
…As to tempo, preference is also to be given to brisk compositions over slow ones (so-
called blues); however, the pace must not exceed a certain degree of allegro, 
commensurate with the Aryan sense of discipline and moderation. On no account will 
Negroid excesses in tempo (so-called hot jazz) or in solo performances (so-called breaks) 
be tolerated.117 
 
Such “rules” certainly do adhere to a National Socialist musical aesthetic that fundamentally 
revolved around race. As a cultural import from America after the First World War, the so-called 
“Jazz Age,” the music was  popularly associated with the bohemian demi-monde through the 
association with the African-American musicians who had pioneered the form and brought it to 
Europe. However, as the musical form became codified into various schools such as Bebop, jazz 
had gained in respectability among the German middle-class. As Uta Poiger has pointed out, 
because jazz was broken down into discrete “schools” and seriously studied, it was able to resist 
being tarred with the same critical brush as Rock and Roll, which German cultural critics 
dismissed as dysfunctional.118 As a result, the listening experience inside an Information Center 
was usually closer to an introductory music history course than a jazz club. As in the case of 
Herr Hudtwalcker, there was often some form of presentation or lecture, and it was not 
uncommon to find audience members taking notes. In Berlin and Frankfurt, jazz found a home at 
the Amerika Haus, where patrons carefully listened to, rather than danced to the music. The 
semi-scholarly tone of the jazz lectures at the Amerikahäuser was noted, and added legitimacy to 
the emergent genre.119  
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In one instance, the Berlin Amerika Haus became a place of refuge for a jazz band. The 
members of the New Jazz Circle, looking for a professional home in a city where performance 
space was at a premium, were invited to take up residence at the Amerika Haus and quickly 
became noted for their serious approach to the performance and study of Jazz music. Dues were 
collected from the members, who were dropped from the rolls if they did not regularly attend 
lectures. Greatly assisting not just the jazz groups, but all the music programs at the Information 
Centers was that most ubiquitous piece of postwar technology, the record player. Recordings 
made all of this possible, first, because Jazz musicians were scarce in postwar Germany, and 
unlike live music, records could be replayed at the leisure of the listener, which allowed for close 
study of the music.120 This of course, tended to render the act of listening into a more academic, 
and less visceral, experience, but more importantly, it also tended to remove Jazz from the 
African-American culture that spawned it and place it within the larger context of Modernism, a 
framing device the Germans were far more comfortable with. It should be noted that during the 
age of Jim Crow, by allowing Jazz music in the Information Centers the U.S. government was 
officially endorsing the validity of this music, a product of African-American culture and giving 
it added legitimacy in the eyes of the wider (and whiter) public. Granted, it was easier for the 
American government to make this statement outside the borders of the United States than within 
them, but nonetheless it sent a clear message of inclusion to the citizens of Germany, a country 
that until recently had been centered on racial exclusion and inequality.    
As Penny von Eschen has pointed out, “there was constant tension between the view of 
jazz as high modernist art and the view of jazz as popular culture meant to appeal to the 
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masses.”121 However, Jazz was as close to popular culture as the Information Centers wanted to 
get. The burgeoning Rock and Roll scene in Germany was deeply problematic for the Americans 
in charge of the Information Centers. Demographically speaking, Rock music was associated 
more often with the German working class, not the intelligentsia that the Amerikahäuser were 
aimed at. Furthermore, the educated bourgeoisie closely associated Rock and Roll music with the 
phenomenon of urban delinquency, the so-called Halbstarke, who, with “Texas pants,” 
motorcycles, and appreciation of the American films Rebel Without a Cause and The Wild Ones, 
symbolized to cultural critics everything that was wrong with postwar German society. The 
Germans the Americans wanted were older, college educated, and at least until the war, had 
career prospects through which they could hope to have some measure of influence over German 
society.  
Performances and Recordings   
The Americans were counting on an acute hunger for novel cultural products, particularly 
music, as a means of attracting otherwise skeptical Germans into the Amerikahäuser. University 
educated Germans were often musically literate as well, with pianos being a common bourgeois 
household accompaniment. The Amerikahäuser in urban areas thus found music students willing 
to utilize their services to supplement their school librettos and sheet music. Music holdings were 
integrated into the larger facility in a seamless fashion. In addition to books, the libraries inside 
the Amerikahäuser also contained sheet music that could be checked out. Larger Information 
Centers offered listening rooms for patrons, who could select the music they wanted and take it 
to a room and enjoy it in privacy, with or without headphones. It should be noted that for many, 
if not most Germans after the war, record players and a large collection of records were luxuries, 
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and remained so for several years, making the offerings of the Amerikahäuser that much more 
desirable. And with paper shortages common immediately after the war, sheet music was 
considered a luxury item as well. With an average of more than 250 scores on offer, the 
Americans allowed professional musicians to check out music for up to four weeks, and students 
two weeks. In this fashion the Amerikahäuser had some small part to play in the revitalization of 
popular entertainment in Germany, at least in the cities where professional musicians took 
advantage of the generosity of the Americans. The only time a charge for the sheet music came 
into play was when it was used for film scores or radio broadcasts. In that situation a rental fee 
on a sliding scale was paid to the Combined Allies Lending Library in Berlin with the fee 
determined by the “importance of the orchestra.”122  
Record libraries were also an important part of the music programs at the Information 
Centers. Each Center had a basic set of twenty-one titles, with anywhere to one and three copies 
each, depending on the size of the Amerika Haus. The titles were broken down into three groups: 
Classical music, Classical music performed by Americans, and specifically American music such 
as folk songs and African-American spirituals. Since musicians were not always easy to come 
by, recording played an important role in the music programs. A report, Monthly Musical 
Programs at the America Houses, of musical programs at each of the 36 Amerikahäuser for 1952 
shows far more recorded programs than live. For example, the Information Center in Augsburg 
offered one live performance per month, with 60 people attending, but 69 recorded 
performances, with over 1800 people in attendance. This is compared to Munich, which offered 
31 live performances with almost 21,000 audience members, but only twelve recorded 
performances with just under 700 attendees, by far the largest number of live performances that 
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year. With the exception of Munich, smaller towns pulled much bigger audiences than larger 
cities, since in the words of one American official, “there is such a splendid supply of quality 
music programs in the community, the need for the America Houses’ contribution in this area is 
not great.”123 For 1952, there were a total of 117 live performances across all the Information 
Centers, with 40,916 people in attendance, for an average of 350 guests per live performance per 
month; there were exactly twice as many recorded performances in the Amerikahäuser at 234 per 
month, with 9156 people in attendance, for an average attendance of 39 people per recorded 
concert, and a total of 50,072 people attending musical events, for an average of 143 average 
attendance per program each month.124  
In early 1953, almost 32,000 records were in circulation at the America Houses, with 
Munich (which also had the most live performances) having the most at over 1700 recordings for 
patrons to choose from. Bremen, came in second with nearly 1600, which was more than 
Frankfurt, which owned approximately 1500 albums. Folk music was extremely popular, 
according to the report that furnished these totals. While the Daughters of the American 
Revolution prevented opera singer Marian Anderson from singing at Constitution Hall in 
Washington, D.C., “Negro spirituals sung by Marian Anderson” were some of the most popular 
recordings at the Information Centers, along with “native music by Sioux and Navajo Indian 
tribes.”125  
During fiscal year 1952, 47 singers and musicians performed at the Information Centers, 
38 of them coming from the United States, two from Holland and Germany, and one each from 
Great Britain, Latvia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Of these 47 artists, eighteen were solo 
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vocalists and sixteen performed piano concerts. There were five concerts for violin and piano, 
two organ and string quartet recitals, and one concert each for harpsichord, cello and piano, one 
choir concert, and one dancer, though the addition of the dancer may have been a typographical 
error. Polling of the audience confirms that the music programs were popular with visitors. When 
asked where the musical programs ranked in attracting visitors to the Amerikahäuser, 60 percent 
of those who responded put them in the upper third, 35 percent ranked them in the middle third, 
while only five percent put them in the lower third. However, “when asked to make a similar 
rating with regard to their effectiveness in achieving the objectives of the Public Affairs 
program,” only ten percent of the Amerika Haus Directors said the music program ranked in the 
upper third in achieving directives, while 80 percent said it ranked in the middle third. Only ten 
percent said it ranked in the lower third, revealing a slight disconnect between Center Directors 
and audiences, who seemed to think the music more of a draw than the Amerika Haus personnel 
did.126 What was undeniable was the popularity of musical offerings to the guests of the 
Information Centers. Unfortunately for the Americans, paying for musicians was much more 
difficult than presenting their music.  
An internal report neatly summarized the problem facing Amerika Haus Directors when it 
came to finding performers: “To remain within the policy governing reimbursements which 
HICOG [the office of the High Commissioner for Germany, which replaced Military 
Government in 1953] can pay artists for their services in the America Houses, it is difficult to 
present programs of the quality normally presented elsewhere in the communities.”127 Until 
1950, distinguished members of the American artistic community were invited to visit the 
Amerikahäuser on an ad hoc basis, and often with the visitors having to manage some of the 
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costs themselves. For example, if Information Center personnel learned that a distinguished 
author or musician happened to be in a German city, the person was often invited to give a talk 
or performance, but not at U.S. government expense. Hoping that speakers and performers would 
be satisfied with the prestige associated with the Information Centers was hardly suitable for 
acquiring talent over the long term, and after 1950 visitors were booked centrally and visited 
numerous Amerikahäuser across Germany, instead of just one. In this way, a visitor to an 
Information Center in Augsburg had as good a chance as someone in Berlin at meeting American 
playwrights Arthur Miller or Thornton Wilder, both who spoke at Amerikahäuser over the years. 
Further complicating the search for guest speakers and performers was the legislative 
requirement that speakers obtain a security clearance, which made it difficult to use people who 
were visiting Germany for only a short time.128 
Despite vague attempts at central planning, performing or speaking at an Information 
Centers were hardly moneymaking propositions, with the government picking up of the cost of 
travel and issuing a per diem of 42 Deutschmarks, or roughly $10.00. Because of this, many of 
the speakers were locals, or the Americans recorded their talk, which was then circulated among 
the various Amerikahäuser. Such was the case with the American playwright Thornton Wilder, 
who recorded his talk at an Amerika Haus, where, according to one report “audience 
participation was enthusiastic.”129 Of the 69 speakers brought to the Information Centers by the 
Speakers and Artists section in 1952, 42 came from the United States, eight from Germany, five 
from Switzerland, four from Great Britain, two from India and Austria, and one speaker each 
from Finland, Canada, Ireland, Cuba, and two speakers classified as “stateless,” whose names 
were not revealed in the report. Of these 69 speakers, thirteen of them discussed International 
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Affairs and U.S. foreign policy, twelve discussed music, theater, and art, and the rest of the 
lecture topics ran the gamut from German-American relations, which brought eight speakers 
over the year to discuss the topic to English folk songs.130  
Lectures and Discussion Groups 
 Those who led the Amerikahäuser had two priorities that were sometimes in competition 
with each other. On one hand, they were charged with running what was essentially a cultural 
institution open to the German public. However, it was also an institution that had the task of 
giving a “full and fair picture” of the United States to a select audience of Germans whom the 
Americans considered essential to the reconstruction of civil society. This binary choice, in the 
words of one official, came down to the decision as to whether or not the Information Centers 
should be seen as “… passive library operations intersticed (sic) with concerts, non-controversial 
films, and talks of a primarily cultural nature,” or as “articulate, positive outlets of the complete 
Public Affairs program, using the facilities of the Houses to achieve a better understanding and 
support of the United States” and American foreign policy.131 As the Cold War progressed, the 
question became increasingly rhetorical, as the Information Centers began to conform to the 
latter priority and as fundamental to American public diplomacy in Germany.  
To this end, lectures and discussions were a large part of the community outreach 
program for an Information Center. Seen as the most direct route to West German audiences, 
lectures provided “information on and the philosophy of the American pattern of life and United 
States foreign policy,” in a straightforward manner, “with minimum assistance from 
entertainment type programs.”132 About 30 percent of the lecturers, singers, and musicians who 
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appeared at the Amerikahäuser were booked by Military Government officials, while the 
remainder were booked directly by Information Center staff or Public Affairs officers with the 
U.S. Army. Lectures were extremely popular with German audiences, who were starved for 
reliable information on the world outside of Germany. A sample of lectures and discussions in 
the Amerikahäuser for one month in 1952 reveals 349 lectures and 433 discussions booked, with 
an average of ten lecture programs per house, and twelve discussions. Attendance was 
impressive, with a total audience for lectures of 41,000 people, and 23,522 in attendance for 
discussions for the month. The average audience for each program was 120 for the lectures, and 
55 for the discussions. In Berlin, for example, there were four lectures on “Americana” (broadly 
interpreted to mean American history, customs, and culture) with 886 attendees, while the eleven 
lectures on literature drew over 1000 people. Literature was popular in Hamburg as well, with 
seven lectures pulling in 1700 people during the same month. The most popular topics regarded 
daily life in other countries, followed by politics.  “Americana” came in third, while “other” 
came in fourth, followed by lectures on art and literature. Literature and “Americana” were the 
most popular topics, followed by politics and life in other countries besides the United States. On 
average in 1952, 154 people attended lectures on life in other countries, while 120 people 
attended lectures on politics, and slightly fewer, 113, attended lectures on Americana.133 
Considering the growing number of entertainment options available in German cities during the 
“economic miracle,” Amerika Haus administrators were pleased with the attendance figures. 
 The topics varied according to the location of the Amerika Haus, the interests of the 
patrons, and the desires of the Information Center staff. A look at the list of adult discussion 
groups on offer at one anonymous Amerika Haus had a wide variety of topics on offer, from 
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“Norman Mailer,” to “Is money the root of all evil,” and “Television’s advantages and 
disadvantages.” Some Houses tried to walk a line between culture and politics, with odd results. 
Such was the case in one Amerika Haus, where the “Young People’s Groups” were tackling 
issues of greater import, such as “Should Germany participate in her own defense,” and “Will the 
Republican government change the policy of the United States to a great extent?” than those of 
the adult groups, who were more interested in topics such as astrology and film history. That the 
“Young People’s Groups” were asking harder questions did not go unnoticed by the author of the 
review. “It is interesting to note,” it was pointed out,  
…that the discussion subjects for the adult group have little program value, whereas the 
young people’s group consistently discusses topics which further the America House 
mission. The Director of this House explained that he was displeased with the 
composition of the adult group, but that he could not radically change its nature nor 
redirect the selection of topics without causing a minor furor. He therefore established a 
second group for young people, for which he personally undertook the responsibility of 
supplying topics. He thus avoided offending anyone, while at the same time reaching a 
much sought-after target group with topics of program value.134 
 
In this case it was the young, not the older professionals, who were of more value to the Amerika 
Haus staff, a reversal of normal policy. While a reversal of policy, the Americans could also see 
it as confirmation of their policy of engagement with the German population, and the validity of 
the Amerikahäuser in the pursuit of the hearts and minds of the German population. 
The Americans wanted to reinforce the themes of brotherhood and transnational 
understanding so central to the “good Germany” of Weimar classicism, while opening up 
German culture to what “seemed vital and fruitful” in the postwar world.135 Through the 
adoption of democracy, the rule of law, and a market-based economy, West Germany, like the 
United States, would combine the New and Old Worlds, with the rare ability to peacefully 
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harness economic, cultural, and military force. Unlike the German examples of unification under 
Bismarck, democracy from below, not the state, was the animating force to unify culture, state 
and nation. 
When we encountered Professor Wertenbaker of Princeton at the beginning of this 
chapter, he was, like many intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic, deeply concerned about the 
future of German culture. Though an American, Wertenbaker, like many educated Germans, 
firmly believed that Kultur was the foundation for German society. The grandson of the man 
Thomas Jefferson appointed the first Librarian at the University of Virginia, Wertenbaker was a 
member of southern intellectual aristocracy. Born into a world of economic, racial, and 
intellectual deference, and thus sensitive to it, Wertenbaker carefully noted some of the more 
striking cultural changes that had occurred because of the war, notably the absence of the 
traditional regard shown to social and cultural elites. Before the war, he recalled, old men spoke 
of “our dear Kaiser,” but of the “rising generation” after the war, none confessed to missing the 
Hohenzollern monarch, or for that matter, the Republic that replaced him.  Nor did any, of 
course, express any sense of loss for Hitler within the earshot of Wertenbaker. As in the cases of 
Adorno and Arendt, it was not so much that the Princeton historian found German intellectuals 
harboring a secret fondness for totalitarianism of either the left or right; rather, it was that these 
elites, who would ordinarily be the political leaders of the German nation, displayed little interest 
in public affairs or the future of the German state at all. “In their bewilderment,” he wrote, “some 
of the students have become pacifists,” which bewildered Wertenbaker.  His reaction, though, 
perhaps reflected the relative security which he enjoyed as an American during the 1930s and 
1940s, running counter to the experience of the Germans over those decades. It is just as valid to 
  
63 
 
 
 
ask why, after all they had been through over the last decade, these Germans would not want to 
wash their hands of politics forever.  
These were some of the cultural currents the Information Centers navigated during the 
first years of Occupation, and the cultural values that the Americans attempted to both reinforce 
and challenge. In interpreting German music for German audiences, the Americans were making 
a statement about the quality of American musicianship, and by introducing Germans to 
American music, making a bid for cultural equity with the Germans. Also, by giving the 
imprimatur of the American government to jazz music, the U.S. was also championing the music 
whose roots lie in the African slave trade and West African rhythms. In doing so, the Americans 
challenged existing racial and musical hierarchies abroad, something it was less comfortable 
doing at home. 
 As was the case with seemingly every other aspect of West German society, Kultur was 
a contested intellectual space after the Second World War. Gatekeepers of traditional German 
culture found themselves stuck in the past and on the defensive, with their artifacts unable to 
provide an adequate reply to the horrors of recent German history. German high culture was a 
raft many bourgeois Germans were clinging to after the war, despite the inability of German 
Kultur to account for the horrors that occurred under Nazism; Reconciling Goethe and Hitler was 
an impossible task.  
For their part, the Americans were not sure what the Germans meant when they discussed 
Kultur, problematized by the fact that culture was intimately associated with German cultural 
and political nationalism. Furthermore, the Americans had to manage the political expression of 
the Germans, promoting a historic German cultural legacy while dampening nationalistic 
impulses, unless those nationalistic desires comported with democratic values. As members of an 
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imagined community united by language and shared histories, German intellectuals had first 
been united by a shared culture regardless of statehood. After victory in the Franco-Prussian war 
and the consequent creation of the German Reich in 1871, the members of that imagined 
community of Germans, a so-called Kulturvolk, had their membership in the community 
exchanged for citizenship in the real, and far more complicated, German state. The bourgeois-
invention of Kultur, coopted and protected by the State, and the two engaged in a symbiotic 
relationship by which both parties were allegedly strengthened. However, not every German 
intellectual agreed about the correctness of the new “cultured State,” the Kulturstaat.  
Complicating matters for the Americans was the strain of German intellectualism whose 
militant rejection of politics began with the thought of Nietzsche and served as a model to like-
minded intellectuals. To him, and those who followed him, politics and culture were antithetical; 
the State, in using culture for political purposes, transformed Kultur, which before had been 
about matters of the spirit, or Geist. Politics epitomized “civilization,” (Zivilisation) the temporal 
realm of the mundane, the opposite of Kultur, and prolonged exposure to politics was grounds 
for expulsion from the Germanic intellectual paradise that was Kultur.  
As a result, the Americans served two groups of Germans with competing beliefs about 
the role of politics in German life. One group identified Kultur with German nationalism, either 
intellectual or political, while the other rejected any role for politics in Kultur whatsoever. The 
Americans understood the appeal of Kultur to the shattered community of bourgeois intellectuals 
and attempted to both play down the nationalistic impulses of one, while trying to create support 
for democratic government among a group that though politics should be kept out of matters of 
culture, for politics was the cause of most problems. The Americans chose music as the point of 
connection between themselves and the Germans and used it to both support German cultural 
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pretensions as well as advertise the quality of American musicianship and the arrival of the 
United States on the cultural stage. Also, the liberal policies regarding the use of the sheet music 
and record libraries at the Amerikahäuser also helped resuscitate the musical culture of the cities 
that hosted them.  
Lectures, performances, and discussion groups played an important role in the lives of the 
Amerikahäuser as well as the lives of the cities where they were located. The topics mirrored the 
two competing visions for the Information Centers: as innocuous cultural destinations, or as 
“islands of (American-style) democracy,” integral parts of the American public diplomacy effort. 
As time passed and the Cold War became a fixture, the question became irrelevant; the 
Information Centers were central to American efforts to transform postwar German society into a 
democratic state with a market-oriented economy based on balanced economic consumption and 
a healthy relationship with Labor.  
For Professor Wertenbaker, despite the challenges faced by the Americans, the overall 
cultural trends were positive for the Americans in Germany. He took heart at the positive West 
German reaction to the Amerikahäuser, reasoning that “the fact that they are usually crowded is 
the best evidence of the good they are doing.”136 Often, most of the crowds were in the library, 
the most popular part of an Amerika Haus, and the most visible demonstration of American 
democratic values. Despite the popularity among German patrons and the great symbolic value 
the libraries held, they became the center of a debate on free speech that would call into question 
everything the Americans had built up in Germany after the war. At the center of the dispute was 
Senator Joseph McCarthy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE LIBRARIES 
 
On July 12, 1948, the United States Information Center in Munich opened at 45 
Briennerstraße, in the former Nazi Party building where Adolf Hitler kept a suite of offices used 
for formal ceremonies. Presiding over the dedication of the building that only three years earlier 
had been referred to as the Führerbau was the Deputy U.S. Military Governor, Major General 
George P. Hays, who in his prepared remarks drew a connection between the library of the new 
Amerikahaus and the renewal of democracy in postwar Germany. To Hays, the library of the 
Information Center was more than a collection of books; it was a foundation of personal 
freedom, and an indicator of the health of the state:  
A free people must have access to the world’s knowledge and must be in a position to 
decide for themselves what they shall read; what they shall listen to; what they shall 
believe. This is only possible when there is a free access to books, theater, and the radio 
under a government that guarantees the liberty and dignity of the individual man.137 
 
The anodyne words of the General regarding the virtues of liberty and dignity were in sharp 
contrast to the history of the building, a fact that surely must have resonated with the audience of 
more than 300 who had gathered for the dedication. The German guest of honor was the 
Bavarian Minister-President, Dr. Hans Ehard. In 1923 it was Ehard, as Public Prosecutor 
(Staatsanwalt), who had prosecuted Adolf Hitler and Erich Ludendorff for their roles in the 
abortive coup against the Bavarian state, and his comments had the effect of giving the event a 
quasi-mystical tone. In order to disconnect the building from the recent past, Ehard, like most of 
his constituency a conservative Roman Catholic, attempted an exorcism of historical memory. 
The Minister-President, in the very room where Hitler and British Prime Minister Neville 
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Chamberlain signed the Munich Treaty hastening the Second World War, declared the building 
cleansed from past associations and gave the repurposed building his blessing. “The evil spirit 
has been driven out of the building,” Ehard declared. “May it be replaced by a new spirit of 
peace, culture, and goodness.”138 The veteran politician, who less than a year earlier had publicly 
broken with Americans over proposed school reforms that lessened the role of the Catholic 
Church in Bavarian education, on this day found himself in agreement with the Americans.139 
The sentiments expressed by General Hays regarding intellectual freedom were, for the most part 
were principles adhered to by those in charge of the Amerika Haus libraries.  
However, less than five years later, the spirit of “peace, culture, and goodness” so longed 
for by Minister-President Ehard was put to the test by U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy and his 
hunt for Communist subversion of American foreign policy, a pursuit that led his investigators 
across the Atlantic to the very shelves of those Amerika Haus libraries that were so cherished by 
their German patrons. The Information Center libraries in Germany found themselves at the 
center of an entirely manufactured political crisis that in the end generated much heat, but very 
little light; no communist subversion was found in the libraries, and the inspection tour was 
derided as an expensive transatlantic joke. The attack by McCarthy and his sympathizers on the 
libraries proved to be an embarrassment to American occupation officials, and it worked against 
U.S. efforts promoting a more democratic and open society in postwar Germany. "It is 
impossible to calculate the harm the United States is doing to itself,” wrote a letter to the Editor 
of The New York Times, but it was clear “the hullabaloo raised by McCarthyism” did not serve 
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American interests in Germany.140 Perversely, the scrutiny of the Information Center libraries by 
Senator McCarthy and his followers was a testament to the enormous popularity the libraries 
enjoyed among the German public. Had they not been so accepted among the German people, 
the Senator and his Committee would never have noticed them.  
In 1951, three years after Minister-President Ehard performed his exorcism of the 
Führerbau, the Director of the Stuttgart Amerika Haus, Peter Behrens (no relation to the famous 
German architect and industrial designer) announced to his fellow State Department employees 
that "German readers have run into something new, and they like it."141 In the pages of the 
monthly Information Bulletin, published for State Department personnel in West Germany, 
Behrens shared the enthusiastic German response after nearly five years of exposure to the 
Information Center libraries, particularly their system-wide policy of open stacks, where patrons 
could browse the books on the shelves at their leisure. Allowing the German public relatively 
unobstructed access to library resources such as books and recordings, an act taken for granted 
by the millions of Americans who were familiar with their local public libraries, ran completely 
counter to existing German library practices, which focused more on the physical security of the 
library property, than on broadening patronage and encouraging the circulation of resources.  
Before the introduction of the Information Centers, libraries circulated books the same 
way archival documents are today: the visitor to one of the relatively scarce German public 
libraries who wanted to borrow a book first consulted a catalog, then filed a written request to a 
librarian who, if the patron was found worthy and if the book was available, would then grant the 
request. German public libraries were librarian-focused, rather than book-focused; the librarian 
                                               
140 George Patrick Carlin, “Our Overseas Libraries; Regret Expressed for Undermining of a 
Program Considered Valuable,” The New York Times, July 21, 1953.   
141 Robert Behrens, “Democracy Stalks the Library,” Information Bulletin, 1951, 35. 
  
69 
 
 
 
was the gatekeeper to whom patrons had to appeal for access. This was a thoroughly bourgeois 
construction that reinforced existing class lines and benefitted the growing educated German 
middle-class, not the working poor concentrated in the growing German cities. In the eyes of the 
librarians, the literate poor could not be trusted with books, while the wealthy had their own 
libraries, the often-conspicuous totems of the intellectual and spiritual development (Bildung) 
that was so prized among educated Germans. As a result, in the words of one State Department 
employee surveying the state of German library affairs after the war, the few functioning public 
libraries were considered by Germans and Americans alike as uninviting, “dismal places with the 
books hidden away.” And unlike those in the Amerikahäuser, those German libraries still 
standing after the war had “no reading rooms” or “children’s corners” and were lacking any kind 
of organized cultural programming.”142 Under National Socialism, libraries and librarians were 
important parts of the domestic propaganda effort, and while Nazi officials considered the idea 
of libraries with open stacks before the war, the practice remained dormant within German 
libraries until the arrival of the U.S. Information Centers.143 “Nothing seems to have impressed 
the German reading public more,” than the open-shelves of the Amerika Haus library, one 
American observer noted in the pages of the Christian Science Monitor, to the point that by the 
early 1950s, almost half of the 525 public libraries spread across West Germany had adapted 
open-shelving or planned on incorporating it into building renovations.144 The undeniable 
popularity of the libraries among the German public gave the Americans a powerful instrument 
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with which to influence elite opinion. That the U.S. also permanently changed German library 
practices was an unintended consequence of occupation. 
However, it is important to note that the library inside an Information Center was not the 
same thing as a public library in the United States. The differences between the two institutions 
were subtle but hinged on the question of mission. While both offered open stacks to peruse titles 
at leisure, a public library necessarily needs to stock materials that appeal to a wide audience.  
Amerika Haus librarians however, stocked material whose subject matter was the United States, 
broadly conceived. A visitor to an Information Center library would be struck by the number of 
reference works focused on the United States, and when it came to prose fiction, the absence of 
foreign authors on the shelves. However, the most important difference was political, in that the 
libraries inside the Information Centers were carefully curated to put forth an image of the 
United States that aligned with the policies of the American government and put the best 
possible gloss on the intellectual products of the United States. As the Information Centers 
featured the “best” in American architecture and design, the libraries also stocked what were  
considered the highlights of American literature. But it was what was not on the shelves that was 
particularly telling. There were few, if any, portraits of race relations in the United States under 
Jim Crow to counter the narrative such as those presented in the government-sponsored book, 
The Negro In American Life, that of incremental, but substantive, progress among African-
Americans in the United States. This period shows us the limits to freedom of speech in the 
Amerika Haus.145 
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This chapter examines the establishment of the first U.S Information Center libraries in 
Germany and their role in early U.S. efforts at reaching out to Germans through cultural 
diplomacy. As institutions predicated on intellectual and cultural exchange, the Amerikahäuser 
and their libraries swam against the current of early U.S. occupation policy, particularly as 
expressed in the foundational document for the American occupation, JCS 1067. This document, 
unabashedly punitive in tone, emphasized a clearly subordinate relationship between the 
conquered Germans and the Allied conquerors. The libraries were a tacit repudiation of those 
policies, an acknowledgement on the part of the Americans that engagement, not the restrictive 
practices forbidding “fraternization,” was the way to help secure the allegiances of influential 
Germans. As the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union began in earnest for the 
political fidelity of the German population, the Americans were not content to have their patrons 
come to them; through the Bookmobile (Autobücherei) the Americans came to their rural 
patrons. However, the libraries and bookmobiles were more than their collections. As was the 
case with the Amerikahäuser in general, they were carefully constructed symbolic and physical 
representations of the stated cultural and political values of the United States to the German 
population under Allied occupation.  
Though organized on the model of an American public library, and as well as 
superficially resembling U.S. examples, the Information Center libraries were sui generis. Part 
reference library and part cultural center, the libraries had a natural appeal to the sorts of German 
most sought after by American political officers. One report paints a gemütlich (cozy) scene: 
In the spacious, well-lighted rooms people sit and read. There are students and school 
boys and girls- and old gentlemen who can work here undisturbed, while at home their 
wives are preparing the dinner on the little cooking-stove. There are journalists copying 
biographical notes on Hawthorne from an encyclopedia; a teacher, whose pupils expect 
from her some enlightenment about Abraham Lincoln of whom she does not much know 
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herself. There are housewives, too, who take a holiday from the everlasting monotony of 
the daily household chores.146 
 
As representations of the United States abroad, the libraries, particularly their collections 
of books and periodicals, reflected the highly-charged partisan political climate of the time. The 
libraries, while outwardly presenting a positive image of the United States for German 
consumption, were, for the Americans responsible for them, often contested ideological spaces 
whose occupants had a capacity for cognitive dissonance.  
The first half of this chapter looks at the ideological foundation of the Information Center 
libraries, one informed by Progressive-era beliefs that linked democracy to education and 
emphasized the free exchange of ideas. The second half of this chapter examines how the 
American commitment to these principles was tested, as the libraries were swept up in the 
American “Red Scare” of the late 1940s and early 1950s. By inserting himself into German 
occupation policy via the hunt for “communist subversion” in the Information Center libraries, 
anti-communist crusader Senator Joseph McCarthy forced American occupation authorities to 
publicly address their commitment to free speech and transformed the libraries into a front in an 
internal ideological conflict among the Americans that once exposed was profoundly 
embarrassing to the United States. As we will see, the U.S. commitment to free speech through 
the vehicle of the Information Center libraries had limits, and American efforts to both comply 
with McCarthy and other anti-communists while exemplifying the American commitment to free 
speech were marked by policies quickly established then withdrawn; lists of questionable titles 
circulated, then disavowed; and titles quietly removed from library shelves, then mysteriously 
returned. In capitulating to Senator McCarthy and his supporters by removing books written by 
“controversial” authors (a euphemism for known and suspected communists, anti-
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segregationists, and members of the nascent postwar American counterculture), the State 
Department caused far more damage to the reputation of the United States in Germany than 
whatever quantum of “subversion” was uncovered in the German Information Center libraries. 
American anti-communist hysteria came to Europe when Senator McCarthy sent his two 
investigators, Roy Cohn and David Schine, on a whirlwind trip across Europe to root out 
“subversion” and “anti-Americanism” within State Department facilities, including the 
Amerikahäuser. The tour of overseas libraries was an embarrassment to the U.S. government, 
with the two “junketeering gumshoes,” as one American diplomat described Cohn and Schine, 
confirming the worst suspicions of nervous European elites who were dubious of the enormous 
American cultural, political, and economic footprint then forming in postwar Europe.147 The 
patient work of many individuals serving in West Germany was challenged by the reckless 
conduct of McCarthy and his followers, who ultimately found little of substance but nevertheless 
tarnished the reputation of the Amerikahäuser among Americans and Germans alike.  
McCarthy and his henchmen, while failing at exposing Communist subversion, did 
highlight institutional divisions that that hampered the effectiveness of American efforts in 
reconstituting German society. The dissonance between American political thought and practice 
generated confusion, ill-will, and mistrust among Germans and Americans alike, while the 
sniping from members of Congress who saw the overseas information programs as easy ways to 
burnish their anti-communist credentials, the frequent policy revisions resulting from political 
pressure, and the changing and generally unclear guidance from superiors hardly helped matters. 
Despite this, the libraries remained overwhelmingly popular among Germans, though their faith 
in American commitment to free speech was sorely tested by the Senator from Wisconsin. 
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Beginnings 
 Alonzo Grace, in his role as the Director of Education and Cultural Relations for the 
United States at the beginning of the occupation of Germany, held a retreat for Amerika Haus 
personnel in, of all places, Berchtesgaden in the Bavarian Alps. The setting was both 
breathtakingly beautiful, and as the place where Hitler had planned the destruction of France, 
Poland, and the Soviet Union, rich in historical irony. Grace, the Connecticut Commissioner of 
Education before the war, described the task ahead them in language approaching the religious, if 
not the apocalyptic. “Few people have ever been privileged to be a part of a more important or 
more challenging mission,” he informed his audience. The stakes were enormous, for they were  
nothing less than “the intellectual, moral, spiritual and cultural reorientation of a defeated, 
conquered and occupied Germany,” and the Amerikahäuser spread across western Germany 
were the agents by which real change would be brought to German society.148 The American 
philosopher and public intellectual John Dewey had written that democracy “needed to be reborn 
in each generation,” and Grace believed that to be the case in Germany as well.149 He hoped the 
Information Center libraries under construction across Germany would serve as birthing suites. 
The initial occupation of Germany after the war was marked by fear and loathing on the 
part of the Americans toward their German charges; fears over a general sense of German 
political unreliability and a communist future, and a loathing of the immediate Nazi past. For the 
initial cohorts of U.S. cultural officials travelling to Germany for duty, there was no more 
important mission than securing the political allegiances of the German population. Politically, 
the situation in Germany, especially in the devastated former capitol Berlin, was very fluid, with 
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the Americans extremely conscious of political extremism of all kinds, and in the case of Berlin, 
the three-month head start enjoyed by Soviet cultural officials before the Americans took up 
residence in the former capital. During that time, the Soviets had successfully courted many of 
those Germans working in the culture industry of Berlin.150 At the same time, from 1945 to 1947 
the Americans were deeply concerned about a Nazi resurgence, or at least revanchist sympathies, 
fears which then transferred to the Soviet Union as the relationship between the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. became increasingly acrimonious.151 Despite the wartime alliance between the 
United States and the Soviet Union and the apparent warm personal relations between Roosevelt 
and Stalin, as early as 1944 The Saturday Evening Post was already asking, “Will Europe Go 
Communist After the War?”152 All this added urgency to American efforts to reach out to 
influential Germans and initiate some sort of rapprochement. The library and book clubs of the 
Amerikahäuser were purpose-built vehicles for facilitating that contact.  
In modern terms, entities such as the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio in the American 
Sector (RIAS) were true broadcasters, in that they existed to appeal to as many people as 
possible. On the other hand, the Amerikahäuser libraries were examples of narrowcasting, in 
which specific audiences are targeted and engaged. The library patrons tended to be intellectually 
curious, educated, and open to new ideas, just the sort of people the Americans desperately 
wanted to cultivate relations with. The libraries were uniquely suited to reach those elites where 
they lived: in the world of arts and letters. With pent-up German demand for reading material, 
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the libraries in the Amerika Häuser were uniquely placed to satisfy the needs of German elites. 
The library served, as one patron put it, “as a bridge of understanding,” between West Germany 
and the United States.153  
As extensive as the American efforts in Germany were, they were part of a larger global 
effort to counteract Soviet propaganda that was critical of the United States. “The character of 
the American people, their purposes and their motives are being systematically and savagely 
attacked,” Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared in a 1950 budget hearing. “…We owe it to 
ourselves to meet this campaign of vilification with an energetic campaign of truth.”154 For his 
part, at the annual conference of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, President Truman 
framed the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union as “the cause of 
freedom against the propaganda of slavery,” and argued for presenting a positive picture of the 
United States to the world. The peoples of the world, Truman explained, did not understand that 
Americans, despite their high standard of living, had “hopes and problems like their own.”155 As 
the most popular part of the Häuser, the libraries were foremost a vehicle to promote 
understanding between the United States and West Germany, to advance American policies, and 
to remind German visitors of the virtues and benefits of democracy. While the Information 
Center libraries and superficially resembled American public libraries, they were different 
institutions that served different purposes, they both operated from the assumption that education 
was inextricably connected to the growth of political democracy. This was a premise taken from 
the American Progressive political tradition, particularly as championed by John Dewey, and 
transplanted in Germany.  
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Democracy and Education 
Those responsible for the libraries believed their work was inextricably linked to the 
success or failure of democracy in postwar Germany. Fearing that postwar German society 
would revert to the tribal politics of Weimar, dividing people into what Dewey described as 
“antagonistic sects and factions,” which served to undermine “the democratic way of life,” the 
Americans responsible for the Amerikahäuser agreed with Dewey and his fellow Progressives on 
the connection between education and the construction of democratic institutions.156 The 
librarians in Germany had American institutional support for their beliefs on democracy and 
education. After the war, the American Library Association (ALA) made the same hypothesis 
connecting the education of the individual citizen to the health of political democracy, in this 
case by using library patronage as an indicator of education. As an individual, a library patron 
was negligible,  
…merely an individual, seated in a library or his home, absorbing wisdom and beauty 
from a book… but multiplied a million-fold in every section of the country, the result is 
significant in the eternal search for personal fulfillment and a better group life.157  
 
Alonzo Grace would have been in full agreement, and he saw his role in Germany in much the 
same way. In this context, the librarians in the Amerikahäuser had a larger purpose, one that was 
much more than merely supervising collections. Like Johnny Appleseed, they went across 
Germany spreading libraries that bore the fruit of democracy, American-style, their highly-
visible shelves of books serving as tangible examples of American democratic ideals and adding 
ideological luster to a temple dedicated to American political values.  
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In the 1948 National Plan for Public Library Service, the ALA argued that public 
libraries in the United States were more than buildings holding books. Collectively, they served 
as “an organ of social democracy” for their communities, “and an instrument of self-realization” 
for their patrons.158 The librarians had a voice in Washington, D.C. in Archibald McLeish, the 
Librarian of Congress, who saw the role of libraries in a global context of promoting democracy 
around the world, particularly in Europe, where Soviet expansion replaced Nazism as the focus 
of concern among the Americans. The United States was now engaged, he said, in a global 
struggle in which “librarians must become active, not passive agents of the democratic process,” 
an idea completely in keeping with the mission of the Amerikahäuser, and put into practice 
through the Information Center libraries.159  
From Control to Exchange 
By the end of the first year of occupation, the American policy of non-fraternization with 
the German population was an obvious failure. For evidence, the Americans had to look no 
further than the rate of sexually transmitted infections (STI) among their own troops.160 Indeed, 
Allied health care workers were the first to warn of the negative consequences of American non-
fraternization policies to the sexual health of U.S. soldiers. “There is no prospect whatsoever,” 
declared one despairing medical professional,  
…of achieving success in the battle against V.D. through the seemingly easy course of 
automatically making sexual intercourse by V.D. sufferers, or the transmission of the 
disease, a criminal offence… Indeed, it is highly probable that it has tended to produce 
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the very evil which frustrates all workers in this field—viz, that of driving the disease 
underground.161  
 
Rates among the American soldiers were so high that General Eisenhower bowed to the 
inevitable and quietly ended the policy linking a STI diagnosis to a violation of the non-
fraternization policy, “except in cases of willful concealment of infection.”162 It was clear that on 
a local level the Americans and Germans were creating bonds of affection between themselves; 
what U.S. occupation officials wanted was an enthusiastic emotional bond between influential 
Germans and American-style democracy, not the measured support some German intellectuals 
had for democracy during Weimar, the phenomenon of  “rational republicanism 
(Vernunftrepublikanismus),” support for the former Republic that was based on reason, rather 
than actual attachment to democratic values. For the Americans, the tool of seduction was not the 
carton of cigarettes, or the access to sugar, or chocolate, or coffee, or reliable heat, electricity, 
and water, but the library. It was there that the Americans revealed their intentions for postwar 
German society, their own society serving as a model for the future German state, in which 
access to information and the unimpeded exchange of ideas were paramount.  
Where once the U.S. emphasized the control of the German population, the newfound 
stress on engagement required the creation of permanent institutions such as the Information 
Centers to facilitate American contact with German elites.163 The open stacks of the America 
Haus libraries provided such a space in which the Americans could reach the Germans where the 
latter were most comfortable, in the world of ideas. However, the Americans could not be too 
heavy-handed in their linkage of education to democracy, for “the guiding images for the 
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majority of non-Communist Germans,” warned one American report, were “cultural and not 
political symbols."164 The library was an intersection of culture and politics; granting unfettered 
access to library books in the Amerikahäuser was an inherently political act on the part of the 
Americans, and, it was hoped, taken as a statement to the Germans about the U.S. commitment 
to free speech and access to knowledge. As we will see, those principles were put to the test 
when the libraries came under the scrutiny of Senator McCarthy.  
 Because of their overt political nature, the Information Center libraries, though informed 
by the same Progressive Era values that connected education to the growth of democracy, did not 
have much in common with American public libraries. Sources of funding, the process of book 
selection, and audience tastes, not to mention the buildings themselves, where the libraries 
shared space with exhibitions, displays, and performance spaces, separated the Amerikahäuser 
libraries from the local Carnegie library most Americans were familiar with.  
Because of the unique mission of Amerikahaus libraries, that of presenting information 
about the “American way of life” to curious Germans as part of a political reeducation process, 
they had collections much narrower in scope than that of an American public library. The U.S. 
Information Centers were exactly that, centers where Germans could find credible information 
about the United States, and this propaganda mission was reflected in the books chosen for the 
Amerikahäuser collections. Bestsellers and beach books were not prominent in the offerings of 
an Information Center library, nor were books overly critical of American foreign policy. 
However, one could pick up a copy of Democracy in America, by Alexis de Tocqueville, The 
Road to Serfdom, by Friedrich Hayek, and as soon as it came out, the German memoir Child of 
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the Revolution by Wolfgang Leonhard, which chronicled his tortured relationship with the 
Soviet-style communism established in East Germany.165 
The largest difference between an American public library and an Information Center 
library is the political context. A public library works within a political context of state and local 
government, a framework which determines everything from monetary funding to location 
choices. On the other hand, though the facilities were open to all, an Information Center library, 
funded by the U.S. government (generously, as we will see in the next chapter) as a tool of 
cultural diplomacy, an attempt at exerting “an effective democratic influence,” and overt organ 
of propaganda, attempted to draw patrons from German intellectual circles and from those in 
positions of cultural and political authority.166 While American public libraries might conceive of 
themselves as “instruments of self-realization” for their patrons, the libraries in the Information 
Centers concerned themselves with the realization of the future German state, one modelled 
along American lines.167 “The American public library collection that does not include a copy of 
The Iliad, or of Gibbons’ Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire is probably a bad collection,” 
according to an American internal review document. However, in the case of an Amerika Haus, 
the situation was reversed: 
It may be said that an America House library that does own these books is a bad 
collection, or, at least, that it is giving shelf space to books that are meaningless to the 
program. On the other hand, an American public library collection may still be excellent, 
even though it lacks such books as Jacobs’ Amerikanische Umgangssprache (American 
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Colloquialisms) or Gunther’s Inside U.S.A., while an America House library without 
these books is open to a charge of inadequacy.168 
 
This comment also highlights the importance of reference materials to the library mission. As a 
literal “Information Center,” whose patrons were often members of the professional class, 
librarians supplied reference materials on the United States that were unavailable elsewhere, as 
well as a reference service where patrons could fill out reference requests and receive their 
answers later. Most of the material for the reference libraries was furnished by the Department of 
State, under the auspices of the Library and Institutes Division of the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Public Affairs.169  
Organization and Structure 
The libraries varied in terms of physical space and the size of their collections, depending 
on the size of the city where they resided. Though by 1953 most libraries were in urban centers, 
some had also been established in smaller, culturally significant cities such as Bayreuth, home of 
the annual Wagner festival. These smaller libraries held collections that ranged in size from 
4,500 to 12,000 books and a limited selection of English-language newspapers and magazines, 
while the medium-sized libraries in cities such as Mannheim and Hannover had collections 
running from 13,000 to more than 20,000 books, and almost 600 newspapers and periodicals for 
patrons to choose from.170 Finally, the residents of Frankfurt, where the Americans were 
headquartered, Stuttgart, and similar-sized cities enjoyed Amerikahäuser libraries whose 
collections had 20,600 or more books. Because of the unique status of Berlin, where the 
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Information Centers were visibly competing with the Soviet Palaces of Culture described in the 
next chapter, the former German capitol city had five branch libraries possessing a total 
collection of more than 51,000 books.171 Adding nuance to these numbers is the fact that about 
85 percent of the books on offer at an Information Center Bibliothek were in English, not 
German.  There were two reasons for this elevation of the English language at the expense of the 
German: sensitivity toward German claims of American cultural hegemony, and the use of 
English as a filtering mechanism by which the “right” kind of German could be identified by the 
Americans for further attention.  
First, in privileging English-language titles, the Amerikahäuser libraries tried to avoid 
competing with the German public libraries that were being established after the war. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, the Americans were acutely sensitive to German accusations of 
American Zivilisation running roughshod over German Kultur.172  Second, and most importantly 
to the Americans, stocking the libraries with English-language titles was done, 
counterintuitively, in order to facilitate contact with West German elites. In this case, the term 
“elite” was elastic, and not necessarily defined by wealth, but by the potential for cultural 
influence. The Americans sought out those with “…a real desire to enlarge their knowledge and 
cultural experience” of the United States,” and familiarity with the English language (or a desire 
to learn it) was something of a filtering mechanism.173 Within this context, it is not surprising 
that members of the professions, writers, journalists, and artists were popular targets for the 
Americans seeking to influence the course of occupation immediately after the war.  
                                               
171 Division and Affairs, The America Houses, 20–22. 
172 Gordon Textor, “Uniform Operation of U.S. Information Centers,” December 7, 1948, RG 
260, Box 320, National Archives 2. 
173 Textor. 
  
84 
 
 
 
When it came to selecting fiction titles, German visitors focused on the German-language 
titles, but tended to read non-fiction in English, favoring books on housing and architecture, 
trade unionism, psychology, political science, social science, medicine, and enjoyed brief 
histories and biographies. The privileging of English-language titles did not abate over time; in 
1950, when the Americans added 265,556 new books to their libraries, of this number, only 
72,775, or 27 percent, were in the German language. Though the majority of books in the 
Amerikahäuser would always be in English, over time U.S. officials would arrange for 
“worthwhile German translations” of American books, purchased in Switzerland, Sweden, and 
Holland. 174  
Book Selection 
 Choosing the books for the Amerikahäuser was a tedious, time-consuming task that 
required patience and the successful navigation of several layers of U.S. occupation bureaucracy. 
To request an addition to a library collection, a local librarian first filled out a standard-size 
notecard for each title requested. On the notecard was the publication information, as well as an 
affidavit signed by the librarian certifying the book would be “appropriate” for the library in 
question.  
The cards, with their affidavits, were then forwarded to the OMGUS Central Distribution 
Section in Munich, where the requests were discussed at the monthly meeting of the Book 
Selection Committee. The Committee, whose members were the Chief of the Central 
Distribution Section, a “field liaison librarian” representing the Amerikahäuser libraries, four 
members of the Library Committee, and a German member of the German book unit at Army 
headquarters, was the first level of approval. The book request then was forwarded to the 
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Information Center Division headquarters in Frankfurt, where another committee examined the 
requests and gave the final disposition the book requests. The entire process took from five to 
eight months, and reasons for rejecting a title were “given only to America House directors and 
at their specific request.” 175  
The seemingly innocuous slip of paper requesting a book, highlighted a central question 
asked by Information Center librarians and Congressmen alike: which books were appropriate 
for the libraries, and which, if any, were not, and if there were limits, how were the Americans 
going to reconcile those limits to their German patrons? The question of what was considered 
suitable material for the libraries was answered on the local level until the scrutiny of Senator 
McCarthy. Up to that point, the Americans had spent much time and effort in Germany 
trumpeting the freedoms enjoyed by their fellow countrymen, particularly the freedom of speech. 
Suddenly removing books from library shelves because their authors were deemed politically 
unreliable did nothing to support the American message in Germany but did much to discount it. 
German Staff 
 Though the Information Center libraries were inspired by U.S. Progressive Era thought, 
stocked with English-language books and almost always supervised by an American, most of the 
staff were German. The same counterpart funds that paid for the construction of the 
Amerikahäuser also paid for the West Germans working there, a phenomenon of government 
largesse discussed in length in the following chapter. By 1951, 830 German-speaking personnel 
were on the payroll, but as the author of one study pointed out, “too few of the German 
employees in key positions had first-hand knowledge of the United States,” a situation that was 
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somewhat alleviated by exchange programs run by the American Library Association.176 The  
librarians, “selected from the top brackets of the better trained and better educated elements of 
the population,” typified the type of German the Americans were after, and the Americans hoped 
the cultural affinity the librarians shared with their patrons would overcome their lack of 
personal experience with the United States or with Americans.177 To the degree that the libraries 
were popular, and indeed they were, this gap in personal experience did not seem to hinder the 
library experience for the patrons who interacted with the librarians. Notwithstanding, it is not 
hard to imagine the mutual bafflement between librarian and patron over American customs and 
mores. 
 Despite their newness, or perhaps in part because of it, the libraries were enormously 
popular with German audiences almost from the beginning. By 1950, seven out of every 100 
Germans living in the American occupation zone, both urban and rural, patronized the 
Amerikahäuser, with visitors citing the library as the most popular feature, despite the fact that 
most of the titles were in English. A few years later, American officials estimated that fully 42 
percent of staff time in the Information Centers was consumed by library functions.178 What the 
numbers do not reflect is the gain in a sense of intellectual autonomy that the libraries provided 
their German patrons. They went from one extreme to another, from over a decade of intellectual 
privation to becoming enthusiastic library patrons, choosing the books they wanted for 
themselves, without an intermediary or justification. As one American report put it, the overall 
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tone of the Amerika Haus libraries was less about “what do you want, and why,” and more about 
“what can I do to help you?” This in itself was a reflection of a cultural shift; the libraries were 
more than collections of books, they were also agents of societal change. However, not all the 
Germans the Americans were after lived in the cities; there was a sizable rural contingent as 
well. Through the use of bookmobiles (Autobucherei), the reach of the libraries was extended to 
a countryside otherwise shut out of what was nothing less than a national intellectual 
reformation.  
After the war, according to the author of a State Department public affairs piece, 
Germans living in rural areas “could not go out to the world,” due to a lack of affordable 
transportation or employment opportunities, but through the support of the American occupation 
authorities the world would now come to them “on the wheels of the Amerika Haus 
bookmobile.”179 This was a bit of hyperbole, what rural Germans were getting was not “the 
world,” but a selection of materials that highlighted American accomplishments in the arts and 
culture, such as American orchestras interpreting German classical music contributions, as well 
as access to reference works such as English-German dictionaries. The Bookmobiles held small 
book collections, periodicals, record albums, and display materials that often mirrored the larger 
exhibitions on display at the larger Amerika Häuser. Tellingly, Displaced Persons (DP’s) and 
refugees (Fluchtlinge) were not denied access to the bookmobiles in their circuits around the 
countryside, where they also stopped at internment camps.180 This stood in contrast to the 
attitudes many American soldiers held toward the refugees, which at best was not charitable, and 
often openly hostile. General Patton, briefly the American Military Governor of Bavaria, was 
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disgusted by the living conditions of the camps, and placed the blame squarely on the refugees, 
many of whom had recently been freed from the Nazi death camp apparatus. When ordered by 
General Eisenhower to improve conditions at one camp for Jewish DP’s, Patton took his time in 
carrying out the order and confided in his diary, “If for Jews, why not Catholics, Mormons, 
etc.?”181 The circulation of books to the refugee and DP community was not entirely altruistic 
behavior on the part of the Americans toward the profoundly less fortunate; there was a political 
dimension to the American largesse, as the stateless were considered by the State Department to 
be “the readiest raw materials for revolution and communism.”182 It appears that anti-
communism took precedence over any personal revulsion Autobücherei staff might have felt 
toward their refugee and DP patrons, though to the credit of the Bookmobile drivers there was no 
evidence of any ill will, and the act of providing books and music was a humanitarian gesture, 
perhaps a small confirmation of a shared humanity between those who had so much and those 
who had nothing.  
In addition to the bookmobiles, book and dramatic reading clubs centered around 
American literature and drama were established in the libraries, and they quickly became 
popular. The Americans thought it was important to present the Germans with “an opportunity to 
make themselves familiar with American literature,” because “through fiction,” the Americans 
believed, “a great deal of the American spirit is transmitted in an attractive and discerning 
manner.” 183 Library staff  answered myriad questions about American lifestyles, from “whether 
or not U.S. schools allow the teachers to spank their pupils,” to use of cloth diapers among 
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American mothers.184 While the German response to the female library staff was often gendered, 
the librarians were praised for their professionalism, which was, according a patron writing in the 
pages of the Allgemeine Zeitung in 1949,  
…one of the most attractive features of the Amerika Haus, for they were by no means 
‘Ami Girls,’ elaborately made up and stalking around smoking ‘Luckies,” but rather 
providing service to their patrons, always ready to help, who are on excellent terms with 
their regular visitors, but without showing too much familiarity.185 
 
It appears to at least one patron of the Amerika Haus library that the professionalism of the 
library staff transcended his assumptions regarding their moral integrity. The popularity of the 
libraries was noted on both sides of the Atlantic. While the local reactions to American efforts at 
cultural outreach around the world varied, one reporter noted:  
In all the reports received, hardly an ill word was uttered about any of the U.S.I.S. 
libraries. Wherever operated they seemed to stand in relation to foreign students, teachers 
and others with special interests as the films stood to the public in general.186 
 
Those “foreign students, teachers, and others with special interests” were just the type the 
Americans were looking for. Despite, or perhaps because of, the popularity of the libraries, they 
had come to the notice of anti-communist crusader McCarthy, who saw in them another venue 
for his cause. He used the popularity of the distant libraries that few Americans would ever visit 
to stoke fears among some in the United States that the Information Centers were insufficiently 
rigorous in their anti-communist ideology, making them easy targets for communist subversion. 
American anti-communist hysteria came to Germany and found a home in the Amerika Haus 
libraries.  
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“Don’t Join the Book Burners” 
June 14, 1953, marked Commencement Day at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New 
Hampshire. The weather was mild, and the temperature struggled to reach the 70-degree mark as 
the students fidgeted in their caps and gowns, waiting to receive their diplomas. But first, they 
had to sit through several speeches from the recipients of honorary degrees, among them the 
future Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, and more notably John J. McCloy, the 
American High Commissioner for Germany. Most eyes, however, were on President 
Eisenhower, sitting in his academic regalia next to the pine tree stump that traditionally serves as 
the Commencement lectern at Dartmouth. Seated behind Eisenhower was College librarian 
Richard Morin, and as the graduating class marched in, he was in the perfect spot to overhear a 
conversation between the President and Federal Appellate Judge Fred Proskauer, who was also 
receiving an honorary degree, and who was seated next to the President. According to Morin, 
Judge Proskauer “was disturbed by the withdrawal of books from American libraries in Germany 
on grounds of a disapproval of their contents or their authors.” Eisenhower seemed genuinely 
surprised by the news and initially disputed any notion of government censorship:  
The President said he didn’t believe that this kind of censorship was going on because 
Jack McCloy had told him not so long ago that American libraries in Germany contained 
books which made numerous critical references to him (the President). The President 
seemed amused by the presence of books critical of him, and certainly there was nothing 
in his reference to them that suggested the slightest disapproval of their being available in 
libraries.187 
 
Judge Proskauer politely contradicted the President, pointing to the removal of the book The 
United States and Russia, by Vera Micheles Dean, the head of research for the non-partisan 
Foreign Policy Association and a scholar Proskauer admired. Published in 1948, the book, with a 
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preface written by the former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, was a conventional, 
dispassionate examination of the historical forces that have influenced the relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. However, in calling for peaceful coexistence rather than 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, The United States and Russia must have been seen by the 
State Department as insufficiently anti-communist for distribution in the overseas Information 
Center libraries. Eisenhower seemed genuinely perplexed by what Proskauer was telling him. 
“But who is withdrawing the books?” Eisenhower asked. “The State Department,” the Judge 
replied, which McCloy confirmed. Eisenhower, his interest piqued, said he would be speaking 
elsewhere that day and might bring the subject up. For most people, that would be enough. But 
Judge Proskauer persisted, telling the President that if he was ever going to speak out against 
censorship, “the time to do it is now here at Dartmouth, in front of this library.”188 Much to the 
surprise of Judge Proskauer and McCloy, the President accepted the challenge, and in only four 
sentences began a process that brought a curtain to McCarthyism. The Information Center 
libraries in Germany had inadvertently struck a blow for civil liberties in the United States.  
 After congratulating the graduates and thanking the College for inviting him to speak, 
Eisenhower addressed the audience briefly, with “courage” as his topic. Most of the speech was 
forgettable, but near the end, the President ad-libbed and got specific in his prescriptions to the 
new graduates. “Don’t join the book-burners,” Eisenhower urged them: 
Don’t think you are going to conceal faults by concealing evidence that they ever existed. 
Don’t be afraid to go in your library and read every book, as long as that document does 
not offend our own ideas of decency. That should be our only censorship.  
 
Temperamentally averse to the less-salubrious aspects of political life, until then Eisenhower was 
reluctant to address the issue of Senator McCarthy and his strong-arm tactics, particularly as the 
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two men belonged to the same party. However, it is possible that the persistence of Judge 
Proskauer and the information regarding the removal of books from German Information Center 
libraries was the tipping point for the President, as the remarks the President made that day were 
clearly intended to address the phenomenon of the Wisconsin Senator and his ambitions. In 
making his remarks, though he did not mention McCarthy by name, Eisenhower made criticism 
of the Senator acceptable, and by the same time next year McCarthy would be formally censored 
by his colleagues, his aide Cohn publicly fired, and his nemesis, Time Magazine, supplying a 
corporate officer to speak at Commencement at Dartmouth. 
But when President Eisenhower spoke in New Hampshire, McCarthy was arguably at the 
high point of his brief political career, and his focus was now on the U.S. Information Center 
libraries in Europe. Germany, serving as a physical and ideological front-line in the war against 
Soviet Communism, came under special scrutiny, to the point that McCarthy sent his 
investigators Roy Cohn and David Schine on a whirlwind tour of the European Information 
Center libraries. While there, they interviewed employees about possible communist infiltration 
and subversion and made a great display of scrutinizing the ideological content of the library 
collections to make sure it was sufficiently anti-Communist. At the same time, before being 
asked, the State Department circled the institutional wagons and bowed to the prevailing political 
sentiment. Books from authors such as James Baldwin or Langston Hughes, who portrayed the 
unvarnished realities of life in the United States brilliantly, but unflatteringly, were put into 
storage. Works that seemingly had nothing to do with communism, such as the now-classic 
mystery novel The Maltese Falcon, were pulled from the shelves because of the political beliefs 
of the authors, not because the work itself advocated communism or class struggle. According to 
The New Republic, among the titles removed were a novel by Walter Duranty; the works of 
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Thomas Paine edited by Howard Fast; Union Now, by Clarence Streit; the two-part study of 
small-town life in Muncie, Indiana, Middletown; and The Loyalty of Free Men by Alan Barth.189 
The experience of McCarthy and the libraries was an enormous embarrassment to the United 
States, with U.S. actions contradicting the democratic principles the Americans had been 
preaching to the Germans since 1945, while at the same time proving to be a failure in 
professional statecraft, and “unwise as a measure to combat Communist propaganda.”190  
On February 19, 1953, the State Department issued orders to the overseas libraries 
forbidding the use of materials produced by “Communists, fellow travelers, etcetera.”191 As this 
guidance was vague and left to individual interpretation, the result was not surprising: confusion 
among State Department personnel and librarians alike all around the world. However, The New 
Republic took it to mean “…as referring to any author about whom derogatory information has 
been offered before a Congressional committee," which, as it turned out, was pretty close to the 
truth.192 Their works, while never actually burned, briefly disappeared from Information Center 
library shelves in Germany in the early 1950s, as American anti-communist hysteria was 
exported globally, via the State Department.  
A week after the State Department directive to the libraries became public it was quietly 
rescinded; the original guidance, it appeared, was “based on erroneous interpretation of an office 
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directive.”193 The questions of exactly whose office and whose “erroneous interpretation” 
remained unanswered. Any opportunity for the issue being resolved quietly was removed when 
Senator McCarthy, in his capacity as Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Permanent 
Investigations, inserted himself into the book selection policy for the overseas libraries, finding 
the guidelines too “pro-Communist” for his liking. McCarthy was not alone in his sentiments. 
Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD), who co-authored the Smith-Mundt Act that enabled U.S. soft-power 
programs such as the Amerikahäuser had misgivings about those in charge of book selection for 
the Information Center libraries. As was the case with McCarthy, Mundt too feared the State 
Department did not take the threat of communist infiltration seriously enough. In a Senate 
hearing on U.S. public diplomacy programs,  Mundt alleged that there were books on the shelves 
of Information Center libraries that “enthusiastically applauded the Russian regime,” while 
advocating for the overthrow of government by force, though he was not specific about which 
books he was using for examples.194 A colleague charged that the books in the libraries were 
“derogatory to the American system,” and “favorable to the system that prevails in Russia,” 
though again the books in question were never specified.195 The final report of the Committee 
was clear: despite the lengthy book selection process described earlier in this chapter, patrons 
could find books supporting communism, broadly speaking, because the books were chosen by 
people who were color-blind to “anything red or pink.”196 Chiming in, Senator McCarthy and the 
members of his Subcommittee determined there were 30,000 books by Communists and “fellow-
travelers,” in the combined holdings of all the Information Center libraries around the world, 
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though as with many of the figures McCarthy came up with, there was little hard evidence for his 
conclusions, nor was the methodology revealed by which he arrived at the figure of 30,000 
books.197  
 The works under threat by the anti-communist activists ranged from the obvious targets- 
the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, to the works of historians, mostly identified with the Left, 
who challenged the dominant narrative on race in America such as Philip Foner, and the 
mysteries of Dashiell Hammett, a favorite author of President Eisenhower. Hammett had refused 
to testify against his peers while being deposed by the House Un-American Affairs Committee, 
an act that as The New Republic pointed out, virtually guaranteed removal from the shelves of 
the Amerikahäuser.198 Until the arrival of Senator McCarthy, it appears that local libraries 
handled the question of which books were appropriate for the library at the local level. This 
laissez-faire approach was an unsatisfactory solution for the bi-partisan anti-communist faction 
within Congress.  
“The Junketeering Gumshoes”: Cohn and Schine Inspect the Libraries 
The overseas library tour of Cohn and his friend David Schine, an unpaid consultant to 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was dismissed by many in the Washington 
establishment as a stunt designed to keep Senator McCarthy in the headlines, and their actions 
did little to dispute that narrative. The two travelled from west to east, starting in London, then 
moving on to Paris, Bonn, Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Rome, Athens, Belgrade, and finally 
Vienna, often staying only a day or two in each city, not at the embassy, but at the finest hotels. 
With a travelling press corps and photographers following the two wherever they went, the 
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inspection tour took on a circus-like aspect, with Cohn at center of it. Unabashedly hungry for 
the spotlight, Roy Cohn was brilliant, but deeply flawed. The son of a New York Supreme Court 
Appellate Judge, Cohn graduated from Columbia University Law School at nineteen, and had to 
wait two years to take the bar exam. He landed on his feet after graduation, with his first job as 
an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, a highly visible  assignment 
that would usually go to an applicant with many more years of legal experience, not, as was the 
case with Cohn, an attorney who had just passed his bar exam. He cultivated relationships with 
the press as well as his superiors; he served as confidential assistant to the U.S. Attorney, then 
was assigned to work in the Internal Security Section of the Department of Justice, another job 
usually reserved for much more experienced attorneys. Through hard work and ambition, he 
insinuated himself into the Department of Justice to the point where he assisted in the 
prosecution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for spying on behalf of the Soviet Union. “Brash kid,” 
was “one of the more genteel descriptions” given to Cohn, according to a 1953 profile in The 
New York Times.199 Cohn got his first anti-Communist experience while serving as an Assistant 
U.S. Attorney trying to ferret out alleged Communists from the United Nations, and along the 
way cultivated a relationship with powerful Democratic Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada. From 
there, at only age 25, Senator McCarthy appointed Cohn as Counsel for the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations.  
 The inspection tour of the European libraries by Cohn and Schine was quickly derided as 
a farce on both sides of the Atlantic. The two were often photographed in profile, looking 
pensively at books on the shelves, or turning magazine pages, apparently looking for signs of 
anti-Americanism. The mission itself was unclear. According to Cohn, “waste and 
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mismanagement,” and the need to “pin down responsibility,” presumably for such 
mismanagement, were the reasons for the trip.200 However, it quickly became apparent that 
shoring up the anti-communist ideology of the libraries took precedence over hunting for waste, 
and “mismanagement” was a euphemism for Information Center staff being insufficiently anti-
communist. The two investigators were profiled during the trip by Time Magazine, which cast a 
skeptical eye on their tour of European capitals:  
After twelve hours in Bonn, Cohn proved that he was indeed a fast worker. Already, he 
announced at a press conference, ‘we have some significant things to report.’ Asked for 
specifics, Cohn said portentously that there were not enough copies of the American 
Legion Magazine in U.S. Information libraries.201 
 
Also damning, in the eyes of Cohn and Schine, was that the libraries contained such magazines 
as The Nation and The New Republic, and books by authors Agnes Smedley, Dashiell Hammett, 
and Anna Louis Strong. From the American perspective, each of these authors were problematic. 
Smedley, whose semi-autobiographical novel Daughter of Earth was her most famous work, had 
had been known to the U.S. government since her work on birth control with Margaret Sanger, 
her advocacy of Indian independence from Britain, and her work on behalf the intelligence 
agencies of both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party. In her peripatetic 
existence, she was romantically involved with the Soviet spymaster Richard Sorge and her ashes 
are buried in a Shanghai cemetery reserved for communist revolutionaries.202 Though not evident 
in his prose fiction, Dashiell Hammett did not hide his communist sympathies, going so far as to 
endure time in jail and professional blacklisting instead of giving up the names of his 
compatriots to a U.S. District Court. Anna Louise Strong was a pacifist during the First World 
War, as well as a member of the Seattle School Board and a supporter of the Industrial Workers 
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of the World (IWW). Her support of the IWW eventually led to a narrowly-lost recall of her seat 
on the School Board, and she began travelling to the Soviet Union, where she became a 
champion of Stalinism, and painted an altogether positive picture of Soviet life that defied 
historical experience, with her works The Soviets Conquer Wheat: The Drama of Collective 
Farming, and The New Soviet Constitution: A Study in Socialist Democracy being typical of her 
oeuvre.203 With the exception of Hammett, these were not authors the Americans wanted in the 
libraries, because their work was stridently pro-communist, yet at the same time, through the 
Information Center libraries the U.S. trumpeted the American commitment to free speech and the 
exchange of ideas in civil discourse. By removing the books from the shelves, the Americans 
belied their stated commitment to free speech and took a “realist” approach to the situation, 
arguing that the preservation of a democratic state was more important than the preservation of 
democratic values. 
For his part, Cohn related that “with us, TIME is a four-letter word.”204 Inexplicably, 
Cohn and Schine did not make it to the Amerika Haus in Berlin, the centerpiece of State 
Department efforts in Germany, and a showcase for American cultural diplomacy. The two did, 
however, cause a stir when they arrived at the Amerika Haus in Frankfurt. Hans Tuch, the 
facility Director was there to greet the two, who were followed by a crowd of reporters. Cohn 
asked Tuch directly, without a so much as a greeting, where Tuch had “hidden the Communist 
authors,” the former director recalled. Upon telling Cohn that to the best of his knowledge, there 
were no Communist books in the library, Cohn asked to see the Dashiell Hammett books. Tuch 
took Cohn and Schine to shelf where The Maltese Falcon and The Thin Man resided. “He turned 
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to the reporters and announced triumphantly that this was proof that there were indeed 
Communists represented in the American library.”205 As Tuch recollected the scene,  
We proceeded to the periodical section, and Mr. Cohn asked me where the anti-
Communist magazines were. I pointed out those that I considered anti-Communist, 
showing him the Jesuit periodical America, Business Week and others, including Time 
and Newsweek. He dismissed Time by saying that the magazine was a swear word to him. 
He asked, did we have the American Legion Monthly? When I said no, he countered that 
we obviously didn’t have anti-Communist magazines.206 
 
The trip ultimately proved very little, though it did speed up the resignation of Theodore Kagan, 
the Deputy Public Affairs officer at the U.S. High Commission in Germany, who on his way out 
gave Cohn and Schine the soubriquet of “junketeering gumshoes,” which stuck to the two on 
their trip across Europe.207 The end result of the trip was the finding that “many persons working 
in the Information Service were “doing a sound, efficient and effective anti-Communist job."208 
Disappearing Books 
 There were indeed Communist works in overseas libraries, because the State Department 
wanted, in the words of William Benton, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 
“a balanced approach” when it came to Communist materials, in which readers could draw their 
own conclusions about capitalism and communism. As far as the image of America on display at 
the Amerikahäuser, the existing policy was animated by the belief that the best picture of the 
United States for foreign consumption was one that incorporated “the whole and sometimes 
controversial range of American thought.”209 These nuances were lost on McCarthy and his 
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supporters. By the spring of 1953, books by “controversial authors” began disappearing from 
Amerikahäuser library shelves. Works on race in America by Marxist scholars such as Herbert 
Aptheker were removed, as was The Thin Man, by Dashiell Hammett. Evidence was beginning 
to mount of a purge, and rumors of “book-burnings” were circulating. The New Republic put the 
President on notice about what was happening in the libraries, declaring that “a match bearing 
the brand name of Eisenhower and Dulles” was used to light a metaphorical bonfire of books. “A 
score of books were removed from all Amerika Haus libraries in Berlin,”  the staff of the 
magazine noted, including the poems of Langston Hughes, as well Howard Fast’s edition of the 
works of Tom Paine.210 
Judging by his reaction at the Dartmouth Commencement, Eisenhower was unaware of 
what was going on. Regardless, by June 1953, “several hundred books from more than forty 
authors” had been removed from overseas libraries, apparently at the instruction of a new 
memorandum.211 According to the State Department the original memorandum banning 
“undesirable” books was no longer valid, though it served as the basis for the new list of books 
to be removed, or in the language of the State Department, the list of banned books was “not 
directly related to the original policy directive, but the listing nevertheless would serve here as a 
guide to books that should be taken from present library stocks.”212 The removal of the books 
drew harsh criticism, which focused for the most part on charges of hypocrisy on the part of the 
U.S. government. The authors of a New York Times editorial went so far as to argue that it would 
have been “…far better that the U.S. have no libraries abroad at all than that we have libraries 
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that mock the concepts of freedom and culture and democracy for which we as a nation stand."213 
These were, of course, the same values the Americans had spent considerable time, effort, and 
money trying to convince postwar Germans to adopt. The next month, a clearly chagrined State 
Department attempted to justify the book removals by falling back on policy; it took great pains 
to draw a distinction between a public library and the library in an Amerika Haus, which the 
State Department considered a “library of special purpose,” comparable to medical or legal 
libraries.214 In doing so the U.S. took a position that was technically correct. The library inside an 
Information Center was indeed a highly specialized library, one that was dedicated solely to the 
history and culture of the United States. It was not a public library, nor did it have the mission of 
a public library. Unfortunately for the Americans, their advocacy of free speech made any sort of 
book removal, no matter how unsuitable the material might be, appear to be an act of hypocrisy 
on the part of the United States.  
The problem for the State Department was two-pronged, and because they were grounded 
in the realm of ideology, were hard to combat. The Information Center libraries were guided by 
the Progressive Era values that equated education with democracy and privileged the free flow of 
information. Even if the Amerikahäuser was not a typical library, ideological litmus tests went 
against the grain of accepted library training and practice. Coupled with that was the reality that 
in Germany, the U.S. had put freedom of speech in the front and center of the political liturgy 
celebrated at the American temple to democracy, the Amerika Haus. The criticism the Americans 
received over the book removals at the Information Centers was proportionate to the amount of 
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emphasis the Americans attached to the First Amendment at the Amerikahäuser themselves. 
There, a visitor would see posters celebrating free speech and watch movies about the First 
Amendment in American life. The patron had a reasonable expectation that this American 
devotion to free speech could be experienced first-hand in the library, whose knowledge was 
presumably free to all. At the same time, the State Department ordered a complete inventory of 
the books in the 189 overseas libraries around the world, though it claimed it had no connection 
to the removal of “Communist, pro-Communist, and certain ‘controversial’ authors” from the 
library shelves.215  
 By July 1953, the State Department changed course again. This time it produced an 
internal master list of approximately 300 books that were considered unacceptable, and quietly 
returned some of the previously removed books. The State Department was quick to note that the 
number 300 referred to volumes, not authors, but declined to make the list available to the 
public. Some authors had recourse when it was alleged their works had been banned, but the 
availability of appeal was apparently based on personal relationships, not legal standing. 
Journalist and proponent of a European Union, Clarence K. Streit, had a book promoting a 
league of European democracies, Union Now, when he heard had made the list, he wrote to his 
friend, Secretary of State Dulles. The Secretary apologized to Streit, not for the practice of 
banning of books from the Information Center libraries, but for banning his book by mistake: 
I have checked with Dr. Robert L. Johnson, director of the International Information 
Administration, who assures me that no books from the overseas libraries were ordered 
removed except those by sixteen authors who were either known Communists or about 
whom there was grave public doubt. I regret that mention of removal of your books in 
connection with these has caused you embarrassment.216 
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There was no record of how Streit responded, but the momentum of public opinion began to shift 
against Senator McCarthy. President Eisenhower had obliquely referred to McCarthy in his 
address at Dartmouth, but in doing so he made it acceptable for others to follow suit, and with 
more venom. McCarthy sealed his fate when a member of his staff attacked the Protestant clergy, 
who were, he claimed, even more left-leaning than college professors. 
J.B. Matthews, Staff Director for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, and 
personally hired by Senator McCarthy, claimed that the Protestant clergy was a bastion of 
Communist support, and that “clergymen outnumber professors two to one in supporting the 
Communist-front apparatus of the Kremlin conspiracy.”217 Matthews, who up to this point had 
made his name linking ten-year old Shirley Temple to international Communism for sending 
wartime Christmas greetings to the readers of the French newspaper Ce Soir, had been a member 
of a cottage industry of anti-communist crusaders, but now he was being paid with taxpayer 
money, and with it came scrutiny. Eisenhower was furious with Matthews, and by extension, 
McCarthy. “Such attacks portray contempt for the principles of freedom and decency,” 
Eisenhower wrote to the National Conference of Christians and Jews, which had protested the 
inflammatory rhetoric of Matthews.218 For Eisenhower, this was thundering rhetoric.  
 McCarthy was losing steam in his “investigations,” and those in charge of the Amerika 
Haus libraries sensed it. Robert L. Johnson, who oversaw the information programs of the State 
Department was, like Theodore Kagan, retiring from government service and saw his 
opportunity to speak his mind. It was “one of the tragic ironies of our time,” Johnson said in a 
thinly veiled reference to Senator McCarthy, “that some of those who are in the forefront of the 
fight against Communism are among those who are damaging the action programs that do battle 
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against it.”219 Foremost among those “action programs” was the Amerikahäuser. Sensing a 
change in the political winds, Johnson and the State Department altered course slightly, this time 
towards a goal of banning books based on content, not on authorship.  
The policy was inadvertently absurdist. From this point onwards, the works of Marx and 
Engels, for example, would excluded from Amerikahäuser library shelves not because it they 
were written by men named Marx and Engels, but because their work advocated the overthrow 
of capitalism. On the other hand, the work of Dashiell Hammett returned to the shelves. Because 
Nick and Nora Charles, the protagonists of The Thin Man, were not seeking to become the 
vanguard of the industrial proletariat (hardly, they lived in a Manhattan art deco apartment with 
an Airedale), they could return to circulation, even though the author of their story was a 
committed member of the American Left who served time in prison for not testifying against his 
associates. A new directive was released to the overseas libraries in which the content of the 
book, and not the author, was the prime consideration for inclusion in the libraries, and those 
who had availed themselves of the Fifth Amendment could have their books restored if they 
passed muster.220 A year earlier, Johnson would not have dared to challenge Senator McCarthy, 
or issue such a sweeping directive, but it was an indication of changing sentiment, and not just 
because he was retiring from government service and wanted to exact a measure of revenge 
against Senator McCarthy.  
The downfall of McCarthy was swift. Within a year, public sentiment turned against the 
Senator, who would be formally censured by his Senate peers for his claims of communist 
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subversion of the American military, amid allegations that his trusted aide Roy Cohn had 
pressured the Army to give preferential treatment to David Schine, who had accompanied Cohn 
on his “inspection tour” of Information Center libraries. Cohn was publicly fired, and McCarthy 
died, his hepatitis aggravated by heavy drinking. 
 Even if we examine the Amerikahäuser libraries in the most reductive fashion, as lending 
libraries, they still remain a unique American effort at public diplomacy in postwar Germany. In 
both design and practice, the libraries were distinctive principally because they were dedicated 
solely to the explanation of the United States to a German audience. But they also stood out from 
their German counterparts for what would appear to be the most prosaic of reasons, by allowing 
German patrons the freedom to roam the stacks and choose the books they want (albeit from 
topics focusing on the American history and culture). It was this policy, taken for granted by 
most Americans, that was possibly the most demonstrative example of the First Amendment in 
American life that the U.S. could come up with in Germany. In doing so, they invested a great 
deal of intellectual capital into the enterprise by linking education to the growth of political 
democracy, a principle straight out of Democracy and Education by John Dewey, and the spirit 
that animated library science after the Second World War. However, this American commitment 
to free speech had limits in occupied Germany, limits that briefly tarnished the reputation of the 
libraries with those Germans whom the Americans most wanted to cultivate relationships with.  
The Germans got a taste of the anti-communist “Red Scare” of the 1940s and 1950s when 
the popularity of the libraries made them a convenient vehicle for the crusading Senator Joseph 
McCarthy. The Senator, who claimed to have exposed communist infiltration of the Information 
Center libraries, possibly resulting from the machinations of communist sympathizers within the 
libraries themselves, sent his two investigators, Roy Cohn and David Schine, on a tour of the 
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libraries to find out for themselves the extent of the supposed problem. The two found nothing 
except a shortage of publications from the American Legion and occasionally, a copy of The 
Maltese Falcon. There weren’t many “questionable” titles to begin with, because the State 
Department, sensing a rightward turn, preemptively purged library shelves of books by 
“controversial” authors. No books were burned, but the Department only restored the purged 
books after the tide had turned against the excesses of Senator McCarthy and his anti-Communist 
policies. Even then, while most books were returned to the shelves of the Amerikahäuser 
libraries, some books would not be. Bans remained, but based on the content, not on the name of 
the author. The mystery novels of Dashiell Hammett were returned to the shelves of the 
Amerikahäuser, but the collected works of Marx and Engels was not. The libraries would hold 
no books advocating the violent overthrow of the government or expressing overt communist 
sympathies. The embarrassment caused by McCarthy and his aides to the reputation of the 
United States called into question the depth of the American commitment to the constitutional 
principles it avowedly subscribed to.  
The libraries were essential tools in developing closer relationships between American 
occupation officials and the German elites whose support the U.S. believed was absolutely 
necessary for the growth of democracy in postwar Germany. Though open to all, the libraries in 
particular were a specialized tool to reach a specialized audience of college students, journalists, 
and members of the professions who had an interest in the United States. Staffed by Germans 
who had some experience of American society and stocked mostly with books in English, the 
libraries drew a self-selecting patronage who had a more than above-average interest in 
American society. More than a meeting place for Germans and Americans, or an example of the 
American commitment to free speech and the exchange of knowledge, the Amerikahäuser 
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libraries were a metaphor for the changing relationship between the United States and the 
Germans living in the American occupation zone and nascent Federal Republic. The open 
shelves of the libraries were a tacit admission of the failure of the policies of control that 
undergirded the early occupation statutes, particularly JCS 1067. The Americans were quick to 
realize the limitations of JCS 1067 and that the atmosphere of control that permeated relations 
between Americans and Germans was both unrealistic in that many occupation soldiers and 
civilian personnel blatantly ignored the non-fraternization statutes in the first place. The black 
market thrived until currency reform in 1948, and the high number of soldiers with sexually 
transmitted infections removed any doubt that the policy of control was a failure. Furthermore, if 
the Americans wanted democracy and economic opportunities in postwar Germany then a 
transatlantic partnership based on exchange, not American anger and condescension, was the 
only viable path forward. In this sense, the libraries were an admission of American postwar 
failure as well as expressions of hope for the American-German future.  
In addition to their popularity, the libraries in the Amerikahäuser were often the most 
visible feature of the Amerikahäuser as well, their floor to ceiling windows revealing the shelves 
of books available for perusal, as well as suites of modern furniture that invited the visitor to sit 
down (during the Vietnam War, the glass would have an almost magnetic attraction to rocks and 
eggs). This was not an accident. An Amerika Haus was something of a Gesamtkunstwerk, a 
“total work of art” inside and out, from the design and construction to the furniture and 
furnishings, all of it trying to explain the United States to a suspicious German public distrustful 
of propaganda, and leery of government in general. When it came time to build the Information 
Centers in Germany, the Americans chose a design vocabulary they knew would resonate with 
their German audience: architectural modernism. In the next chapter, we will see how the 
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Americans came to the land of the Bauhaus and replanted the modernist flag in the Information 
Centers. In creating the Amerikahäuser, the Americans placed themselves at a metaphorical 
crossroads of politics and culture; in incorporating architectural modernism, a movement whose 
origins lied in German-speaking Europe, the Americans had made that melding of politics and 
culture a concrete achievement.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE U.S. INFORMATION CENTERS AND ARCHITECTURAL MODERNISM 
 
No country can exercise political world leadership without exercising a degree of cultural 
leadership as well. Whether consciously or not, the U.S. government has now made U.S. 
architecture a vehicle of our cultural leadership.221 
 
The United States Government is making modern American architecture one of its most 
convincing demonstrations of the vitality of American culture.222 
 
Considering the assaults on civil liberties committed by Senator McCarthy and his 
followers, the “red” (communist) and lavender (homosexual) “scares” roiling the domestic 
American politics of the late 1940s and early 1950s, it is easy to characterize the period as one in 
which the politics of personal destruction were in ascendance.223 However, a closer look at the 
period reveals that this was also a time of political restoration, and the restoration of people, 
ideas, and movements that had taken a forced hiatus under National Socialism. The early years 
of occupation saw reversals of fortune on both sides of the Atlantic that were as absurd as they 
were tragic; within two years of the acceptance of the German surrender the United States and 
the Soviet Union increasingly saw each other as the enemy, while both states actively 
rehabilitated the reputations of former Nazis who had skills that Washington, Bonn, Moscow, 
Berlin, or the local city council in a rural German town needed. The latter was the case in 1948 
when the “very Nazified” community of Neustadt elected four former Nazis to the city 
council.224  
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This ad hoc rehabilitation was underway while the war was still underway, as the Allies 
closed in on Berlin from the east and west in 1945. The race was on, but not just to reach the 
Reichstag and plant the flag at the symbolic seat of German power. The Allies were engaged in 
all-out effort against the Soviet Union to secure those Germans with the skills needed to rebuild 
not just a future German state, but to make postwar contributions to the nation-states of the 
Allies as well. Without a doubt, one of the most egregious examples of this Allied largesse was 
the German missile scientist Wernher von Braun, a wartime SS Colonel who, despite the deaths 
of the slave laborers assigned to his facilities at Peenemünde was transformed into the handsome 
“shirtsleeved, tousled, and bright-eyed” von Braun of Cold War legend, and central to the 
success of the American space program.225  
However, political rehabilitation was not reserved solely for individuals after the war; 
within the larger context of the battle for the political loyalties of the German people, ideas, and 
the movements they spawned were also repurposed and put to use against ideological opponents. 
Modernist architecture is one example. It offered the Americans the opportunity to place the 
postwar prosperity-fueled material culture of the United States within a larger conversation about 
the virtues of democracy. In the libraries, the Americans linked democracy to education, but 
democracy was also intimately connected with economic consumption. Even if the West German 
government took an aggressive position in regulating markets after the war, “more than lip 
service” was paid to issues of consumer sovereignty, as Jan Logemann argued.226  The institution 
of the Amerika Haus served as a spectacular example of this mixing of consumption and 
democracy, conflating the relationship between the two almost to the point of 
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indistinguishability. And the Information Centers were spectacular, at least in terms of the 
ambition and commitment on the part of the Americans, who attempted to create buildings 
representing the virtues of U.S.-style democracy rigorously tied to a modernist aesthetic both 
inside and out.  
The Cold War in Germany both shaped material culture and imbued it with political 
meaning, seemingly regardless of how humble the object.227 In this context, buildings and their 
furnishings were not just enclosed spaces in which to live and work, but they could also be a 
form of political speech under the right circumstances, with ideas regarding aesthetics and design 
framed by both the Americans and the Soviets as democratic or anti-democratic. The Americans 
deployed modernist design specifically to win the support of a captive German population living 
under occupation, in part by appealing to the Germanic origins of the movement and co-opting 
Germanic modernist ideals, particularly the Bauhaus design school, consciously associating them 
with democratic self-rule as practiced by the United States. Through the institution of the 
Amerika Haus, the Americans demonstrated that nothing was immune from the touch of the Cold 
War, whether it was the design of a building, or the furniture within it.  
The period covered in this survey, 1945-1953, was in some days the peak of the 
Information Center program in Germany. The State Department had almost carte blanche to 
purchase land, construct, and furnish buildings almost at will, and through the financial windfall 
of wartime foreign credits, with exquisite materials. After the 1952 elections in the United States, 
the Republican Congress that swept into power also swept away a large portion of the funding 
for the Information Centers, redistributing it to the Defense Department during the Korean War. 
Until then, the part of the State Department that dealt with physical property, the Foreign 
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Building Operations (FBO) division, wanted for very little, and it showed in the details of the 
Amerikahäuser. 
This chapter examines the Information Centers as physical and symbolic objects, whose 
architecture, construction, furnishings, and exhibitions were powerful metaphors for the material 
and aesthetic sophistication of the United States, carefully calibrated to impress, but not alienate, 
a German public that was in a period of prolonged privation and resentful of occupation. 
Designers made a conscious effort to make the Information Centers a veritable “vision of 
modernity” inside and out, which, in the early years of occupation, they often were in 
comparison to the areas surrounding them. Despite the work of the women tasked with clearing 
the wreckage in the cities, the celebrated Trümmerfrauen, in the early years of occupation a 
gleaming Amerika Haus frequently stood in sharp relief against neighboring properties.228 This is 
not to say the Americans were always successful in projecting U.S. economic largesse and 
cultural pretensions in ways always appreciated by German patrons. As we saw in the exhibition 
of American postwar residential housing that toured the Information Centers, So Wohnt Amerika 
(How America Lives), the Americans often came off as tone deaf to their audiences, and 
insensitive to the realities of West German life. 
Exploring the Amerikahäuser within the context of postwar modernist architecture and 
design deepens our understanding of the institution by allowing us to see the buildings scattered 
across the western half of Germany as a medium for an American message that, as we will see, 
tied the idea of modern architecture to the German adoption of democratic institutions and 
American-style consumption practices. Furthermore, in their design and construction, the 
Information Centers often co-opted the German modernist tradition, many of whose practitioners 
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fled National Socialism and relocated to the United States. In doing so, they helped solidify the 
association between modernist design and American democracy, which, the Americans argued, 
allowed for the freedom of expression necessary to pursue creative vision.  
Particularly when it came to the divided city of Berlin, whose public and private spaces 
were increasingly coopted in the ideological battle for the “hearts and minds” of the former 
capitol, the Americans actively encouraged German patrons to compare what they saw in the 
Amerikahäuser to the design culture of the German Democratic Republic next door. There, 
architects and product designers worked under ideological restrictions not encountered in the 
West, with aesthetic choices made by designers and architects inevitably framed as inherently 
political acts by the dominant Socialist Unity Party (SED). As was the case with other creative 
professions in East Germany, there were personal and professional consequences for backing the 
wrong “side” in the ideological debates stirred by American and West German practices as 
displayed in an Amerikahaus. The “socialist modern” style popularly associated with architecture 
in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) such as the television tower in Alexanderplatz and 
the former Palace of the Republic, both in the center of Berlin, and projects further afield such as 
the Pragerstraße complex in Dresden, came later in the life of that country; in 1949, the GDR 
openly disavowed modernist trends in architecture, deriding them as “academic formalism,” 
detached from the true wants and needs of the postwar German public.229 Those designers and 
architects caught up in the dragnet against “formalism” often found themselves completely shut 
out of their careers for years before being allowed to reenter their professions, or were 
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transferred to remote areas of the Democratic Republic where they would have no effect on 
policy.  
One area the United States could compete and win against the Soviet Union, or in the 
context of the Amerikahäuser, East Germany, was in the provision of consumer goods, even if 
after the war Germans could not yet afford to buy them. In terms of pent-up consumer demand, 
East Germany was not that different from West Germany, or for that matter, the United States; 
the combination of the Great Depression and the Second World War had citizens of all three 
states not just wanting, but expecting, a plethora of consumer goods after the conversion to 
peacetime economies. Consequently, the material advantage enjoyed by the United States in 
satisfying consumer appetites for material goods demanded a highly visible statement from the 
American government, and it took full advantage of the opportunity. In this competitive spirit, 
the Information Centers, particularly the one across the street from Zoo Station in Berlin, gave 
Germans the opportunity to acquaint themselves first-hand with the “best” of American design, 
construction techniques, furnishings, and other consumer goods, with the Americans hoping the 
exposure would invite comparisons with what was on offer in the German Democratic Republic.  
Conceptually, notions of “reconstruction” permeated virtually every aspect of German 
social life immediately after the Second World War. German society was shot through with ideas 
surrounding reconstruction, whether the focus of the restoration was on buildings and 
infrastructure, or familial relationships.230 In adopting architectural modernism, the U.S. 
consciously placed itself apart from communist rivals, who had internal divisions among 
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themselves regarding modernism as an aesthetic movement.231 Both medium and message, 
Information Centers were both a reinforcement to the German modernist architectural tradition 
as expressed through the Bauhaus, a challenge to German architects and designers to adopt new 
ways of building and new approaches to materials and furnishings, they also reinforced the 
already-existing message that German architects and designers were themselves agents in the 
moral rehabilitation of the German state. 
The Construction Boom 
 The Germans were not the only ones lacking space after the war. American occupation 
forces, both military and civilian, found themselves in the paradoxical situation of occupying a 
sizable Central European country, yet lacking the physical space in which to comfortably live 
and work, a situation that greatly complicated the relationship between occupier and occupied. 
The first Americans stationed in Germany took to heart their instruction in JCS 1067, the 
document first governing American occupation forces, to treat the Germans not as “a liberated 
people,” but instead as “a defeated enemy nation,” and requisitioned German public and private 
property for housing and other  purposes.232 For the Americans stationed in German cities in the 
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first few years after the war, the life of an occupier was luxurious, but ultimately untenable; “It 
was a super-Westchester existence” recalled an observer, the Americans exhibiting a 
“tactlessness in the highest degree” that, given the collective privation the Germans faced, 
provoked active resentment.233 It quickly became clear to the Americans that if they had plans 
for a long-term presence in Germany, the Allied requisition of German property could not be an 
ongoing policy. At the same time, the Americans, as a sign of commitment to a democratic 
Germany, wanted to expand the already-sizeable pre-war diplomatic presence of the U.S. in the 
country. Officials with the State Department responded by going on a global spending spree, 
buying some of the most valuable property in the world and building modernist edifices on it. In 
this context, the expensive transatlantic undertaking of constructing the network of 
Amerikahäuser across Germany was just a part of a postwar expansion in American diplomatic 
facilities across virtually every continent on Earth, minus Antarctica.  
Few things are more illustrative of the newfound American engagement with the world 
after the Second World War than the dramatic rise in the number of American diplomatic 
facilities designed and built between 1946 and 1953. Before the war, the Americans had 
consulates in Bremen, Cologne, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart, Breslau, and Dresden. 
As evidence of the importance of Germany to American plans for the postwar diplomatic order, 
the U.S. committed to replacing all those facilities, plus Düsseldorf, including housing. Arguably 
more indicative of the centrality of a friendly Germany to postwar American foreign relations 
was that in addition to reopening the consulates, new Amerikahäuser were built in Berlin, 
Cologne, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart as well, the number peaking in the mid-
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1950s.234 Though ambitious, the expansion of the Amerikahäuser and other facilities in Germany 
was only a part of the unprecedented increase in the construction of U.S. diplomatic construction 
around the world after the Second World War, facilitated by a confluence of circumstances: 
congressional generosity; the enormous debt owed to the United States by wartime allies; and an 
almost complete lack of oversight on the part of Congress or the White House.  
 Frederick Larkin, the State Department official who after the war had the responsibility 
for the construction and maintenance of American diplomatic facilities around the world, was 
also responsible for how the much-needed buildings were financed. Larkin not only convinced 
Congress to allow the State Department to embark upon an enormous and unprecedented 
building program, he also found a way to pay for it that managed to simultaneously satisfy fiscal 
concerns, improve American foreign relations, and operate with a minimum of scrutiny until the 
mid-1950s. Larkin did it by persuading Congress to allow the State Department to tap the vast 
amount of credits owed the United States by the Allies from lend-lease agreements, surplus 
property, and the Marshall Plan.235 The amount of money extended to the State Department was 
astounding, but the time frame in which to spend it was even more so: the Department had five 
years to spend $125 million on construction, with an additional $15 million to be spent over the 
span of twelve years. Accounting for inflation, the total given to the State Department to spend 
on facilities comes to almost $17 billion today.236 However, this was not the last time the 
Department of State enjoyed such generosity during this period. Through the extension of an 
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additional $90 million in 1952, the Foreign Buildings Operations division of the State 
Department authorized the construction of more than 80 office buildings, 245 residences for 
foreign service personnel, and 14 diplomatic buildings such as embassies and consulates.237 In 
congressional testimony, State Department officials stressed that money spent in this fashion 
provided for “a maximum recovery of foreign credits owed to the United States,” while turning 
“substantial local currency credits into tangible and valuable assets.”238 Not only did the use of 
these funds “enable our allies to discharge some of their obligations without touching their 
limited hard-currency reserves.”239 Using foreign credits to pay for construction and furnishings 
also allowed for the Department to spend virtually whatever it wanted with little to no 
Congressional oversight. While the accounts the State Department drew against were monies 
ultimately owed U.S. taxpayers by foreign states, they were not filled with money generated by 
American tax revenue in the first place. The result was that barring fraud, waste, or abuse, 
Congress had almost no interest in how occupation officials and the State Department spent the 
money. This allowed the head of the FBO, Frederick Larkin, and his protégé and successor, 
Leland King, to travel the globe purchasing real estate for Amerikahäuser, consulates, and 
embassies by accessing the hundreds of millions in funds owed the United States by ally and 
enemy alike. Operating with almost complete autonomy within the State Department, Larkin and 
King travelled frequently, and when overseas, they operated more like proconsuls on the 
periphery of a distant empire than cultural ambassadors promoting understanding between 
peoples. The two men purchased property across Germany for the Information Centers without 
having to seek prior approval, regardless of cost. Utilizing the financial instrument of the foreign 
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credit, the United States was able to place Amerikahäuser in some of the most desirable locations 
in German cities such as Reuterweg in Frankfurt, Karolinenplatz in Munich, and 
Hardenbergstrasse in West Berlin. As King testified in a Congressional hearing, the use of 
foreign credits also allowed the State Department to purchase goods and services with local 
currencies, not dollars, which actually stretched the credits even further, while addressing the 
wartime debts owed to the United States, monies that otherwise would not be coming to the 
United States anytime soon.240 The building program saved the State Department from property 
rental, and when that option was unavailable, from having to confiscate scarce housing; in turn, 
this lowered friction with the local residents. Larkin correctly predicted that the building program 
would have little overall effect on the State Department budget. By 1953, fully 97 percent of the 
funds allotted for the building program as envisioned by Larkin came from allied accounts, with 
the remaining three percent obtained from the appropriation process.241 However, it is important 
to differentiate between foreign credits dedicated to the construction of the Information Centers 
and the capital committed to operations; the foreign credits were used to build the Information 
Centers, but American dollars paid for those expenses not shared with German host cities, such 
as salaries, utilities, and programming costs.  
“Dishonest Objects” versus “Good Design”: Modernism, Anti-Americanism, and the 
Information Centers 
  
In his book Modernist America: Art, Music, Movies, and the Globalization of American 
Culture, Richard Pells described the influence American magazines had on the architecture of 
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postwar West Germany. From the periodicals, Pells argued, architects could draw inspiration for 
their designs, but it was in the Amerikahäuser, especially the one in West Berlin that looked, to 
Pells “as if it had been designed by a Bauhaus architect just before he fled Germany” and the 
“streamlined American consulates in Düsseldorf, Stuttgart, and Munich” that were particularly 
useful to the new generation of West German architects.242 The use of the word “streamlined” by 
Professor Pells is problematic. All of the buildings he named, including the America Houses, 
were considered by their creators as modernist, but never “streamlined.” This is not a pedantic 
distinction; the difference between the two terms and the ideas that informed them was an 
important one to the those working in architecture and design in postwar Germany, and one often 
used as an excuse to justify their dismissiveness toward all but the most forward-thinking 
American design, all of which virtually guaranteed the Amerikahäuser drew from a modernist 
visual lexicon. The importance Germans put on the division between the two aesthetic choices, 
streamlined or modernist, placed the Amerikahäuser squarely at the intersection of consumption, 
culture, and morality.  
The use of the word “streamlined” by Pells is surprising, because few concepts inspired 
more negative reactions among the Germans who read journals such as Die Neue Stadt, 
Baumeister, and Das Wohnen than the idea of “streamlined” American architecture and design. 
Also referred to as “Art Moderne” or “Streamline Moderne,” the design practice of 
“streamlining” is an expansive term that resists easy definition; both the Chrysler Building and 
the Chrysler Airflow automobile that might have been parked in the garage underneath the 
Manhattan skyscraper were noted for their “streamlined” exteriors that exuberantly proclaimed 
their modernity. If Modernist design, particularly as it was practiced by the Bauhaus, was indeed 
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“sleek,” that was the almost inevitable result of a process of refining a design until the end result 
was almost solely dictated by function.  
In his Futurist Manifesto of 1909, Filippo Marinetti adroitly captured the attitude that 
animated “Streamline Moderne” in the decades to come. Marinetti declared “the splendor of the 
world has been enriched by a new beauty: the beauty of speed, in which… a roaring motor car 
which seems to run on machine-gun fire, is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace.” 
Indeed, after the Second World War, the German trade group representing “serious” architects 
and industrial designers, the Deutscher Werkbund, used the ties between Futurism, Fascism, and 
streamlined design to criticize American aesthetic choices, and sotto voce, American culture in 
general.243 Taking their cues from the idea and sensation of speed, American architects and 
industrial designers such as Norman Bel Geddes, Donald Deskey, and Walter Dorwin Teague 
incorporated aerodynamic forms to their work, such as wings and fins, decorative portholes, 
rounded corners on buildings with “speed lines,” and liberal use of reflective metals such as 
chrome and polished stainless steel. The Great Depression ensconced streamlined design in the 
American consciousness when it received the imprimatur of the federal government for use in 
the courthouses, office buildings, and post offices built through the Works Progress 
Administration.  
What infuriated German design elites the most about the Americans, besides having 
almost unlimited license to build wherever, whenever, and whatever they wanted to, was the 
sense that Teague, Bel Geddes, and above all, the focus of the animus of the German design 
community, Raymond Loewy, did not understand or accept the moral and ethical dimensions 
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that the members of the trade group representing the top tier of German architecture and design, 
the Deutscher Werkbund, attached to architecture and design. Nor, the members of the 
Werkbund alleged, were the Americans aware of the reformative power of “good design” and the 
consequent hopes for German design sparking a much-needed moral renaissance in the German 
people after the war.  
For the Germans of the Werkbund, Raymond Loewy embodied everything wrong with 
American design. They dismissed his practice of “refreshing” designs to meet spoken and 
unspoken consumer desires, as nothing more than crass commercialism, driven by the profit 
motive.244 As a result of his ubiquity and popularity, Loewy became something of a pantomime 
villain to the Germans, gleefully twirling his mustache while tying German design to the railroad 
track of American cultural hegemony. An evident indication of how German design elites saw 
Loewy, and by proxy American culture, was when his autobiography, Never Leave Well Enough 
Alone was translated for the German market under the title Ugliness Doesn’t Sell.245  
Countering the playfulness of Loewy and the other Americans who shared his aesthetic 
was the seriousness with which the Germans took both modernist design and themselves. The 
remarks of German architect and Werkbund member Rudolf Schwarz illustrative the point. 
When asked his opinion for the moral decline in German society during the first half of the 
twentieth century, he had a ready answer. “Most people,” he declared, “have not led their lives 
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properly, having produced and surrounded themselves with dishonest things as evidence of 
dishonest lives.” 246 However, the members of the Werkbund declared, Germans could begin to 
redeem themselves by surrounding themselves with artifacts of “good design,” whether they 
were teacups or factory buildings, as Albert Kahn, whom the Werkbund approved of, showed in 
his work for the Ford Motor Company in Detroit. In worldview of the Werkbund, bad furnishings 
were intimate evidence of a poorly-led life, which in this particular context seems a grossly 
inadequate explanation for German conduct in the twentieth-century.247 In an environment that 
considered decoration frivolous, among the members of the Deutscher Werkbund having work 
considered “decorative” was a grave insult. In their eyes, “Art Moderne” was animated by the 
profit motive. The very act of trying to make an object “attractive” rendered it crass, the 
Werkbund Germans believed, for the essential form of the object was revealed when it most 
closely addressed function, and decoration was unnecessary.  
However, as we will see, there were points of agreement between the Germans and the 
Americans when it came to design, with transatlantic designers and impresarios such as Ray and 
Charles Eames and Florence Knoll serving as bridge figures between the two countries and their 
design traditions. Information Centers showcased the “best,” or at least the most leading-edge of 
American furniture design, often from designers with European origins such as Eero Saarinen 
and Harry Bertoia. And while German rejection of the American popular styling cues revealed 
more cultural differences between the Germans and the Americans, it also revealed a 
fundamental acceptance of a shared transatlantic modernist design language that was expressed 
in the design of the Information Centers built immediately after the war. Fortunately for the 
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Americans, the U.S. government chose modernism as the architectural aesthetic guiding the 
decisions on the Amerikahäuser; to choose anything else would have most likely opened up the 
U.S. to even more criticism from those Germans the Americans most wanted to impress.  
Why Modernism? 
The State Department had carte blanche to choose a visual aesthetic to represent the 
United States in Germany, and almost unlimited funds to make that vision a reality. It chose a 
decidedly modernist look for the Information Centers and stuck with that look in the decades that 
followed. But, why modernism? Why, when it came to visually represent America in Germany 
through the construction of an Amerika Haus, was the official imprimatur given to the sleek 
angularity of modernism? After all, it was in effect, the official endorsement of an architectural 
movement that not everyone in the United States agreed with.  
“Public schools, colleges, and universities,” railed Michigan Republican Congressman 
George Dondero in a now-infamous 1949 speech, were being “invaded by a horde of foreign art 
manglers,” who, Dondero noted ominously, were “an effeminate and provincial tribe,” a 
veritable “effeminate elect,” who neatly linked class, homosexuality, and the threat of 
communist subversion. Museum directors ideologically seduced patrons, selling them  
a subversive doctrine of "isms," Communist-inspired and Communist-connected, which 
have one common, boasted goal--the destruction of our cultural tradition and priceless 
heritage.248 
 
Given the rather mixed views regarding modern art and architecture at the time, the State 
Department choose to go with an emphatically modern aesthetic to represent the United States in 
Germany, as opposed to a more traditional design language, for two valid and complementary 
answers. One is prosaic, while the other is political in nature, and more complex.  
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 The simple answer is that Leland King liked architectural modernism as opposed to a 
more historicist tradition, and in his civil service career with the State Department, first as chief 
architect, then as head of the FBO, he championed modernist architects and their work. His 
teams of architects and designers in Paris, The Hague, London, Vienna, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, 
Tokyo, and Rio de Janeiro commissioned the buildings, hired the architects, supervised the 
construction, and chose the furnishings and arranged for their installation from offices.249 King 
appreciated modernist principles, and while he was not a particularly distinguished architect 
himself, when he came into his own as head of the FBO he went out of his way to hire those who 
shared his beliefs, commissioning preeminent modernist architects Edward Durrell Stone and 
Eero Saarinen to design spectacular embassies in India and the U.K., respectively. While the 
Amerikahäuser were nowhere near as grand in scale or as iconic in design as those structures, the 
Information Centers were informed by the same aesthetic, they both underwent the same design 
and construction approval process, and as with the new embassies and consulates, the 
construction of the Amerikahäuser were supervised by FBO teams and paid for by the same 
foreign credits. It is hard to underestimate the effect that the aesthetic tastes of one man, Leland 
King, had on the visual representation of the United States in Germany and around the world. 
King consciously coopted architectural modernism and gave it the imprimatur of U.S. political 
reliability. In doing so, King ensured that the United States in Germany would be associated with 
modernity, and the more positive traits associated with it: technological prowess, a youthful 
vitality, and an appreciation of the novel. If the tastes of Leland King had run more toward 
Queen Anne-style furniture, the visual component of American foreign policy would be much 
different today. 
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Second, and in the context of postwar German cultural reconstruction, more interestingly, 
the modernist design of the Amerikahäuser was a tangible cultural commonality between the 
U.S. and Germany, mediated through the influence of the acclaimed German pre-war design 
school, the Bauhaus. In adopting modernism, then adapting it to the needs of the Cold War, the 
United States found both a visual alternative to the historicist styles then in vogue in the Soviet 
Union, as well as a politically useful narrative in the historical experience of the Bauhaus that 
once carefully edited, the Americans exploited for Cold War purposes.  
Taking Politics Out of the Bauhaus 
On both sides of the Atlantic, there was perhaps no German architect who was more 
associated with the modernist aesthetic than Walter Gropius. A protégé of the celebrated 
architect and industrial designer Peter Behrens, after the First World War Gropius helped 
establish the influential design school the Bauhaus and led the school until a falling out with a 
local government suspicious of the curriculum and instruction at the avant-garde school. At the 
Bauhaus and afterwards in American, Gropius introduced architectural modernism into the 
mainstream with a language of design we now take for granted; the use of materials such as cast 
concrete, curtain walls, the elimination of extraneous ornament, and open floor plans utilizing 
natural light are all part of a design language that began with Gropius and his peers in prewar 
Germany, a language that went underground with the advent of National Socialism, but reborn 
when Gropius and his influence returned to Europe. One of the most visible examples of the 
return of architectural modernism to West Germany in particular was the Amerika Haus.  
Walter Gropius was not a Nazi, but in the early years of the National Socialist 
government he was something of an opportunist. Ultimately an exile from Germany, two factors 
weighed heavily in the decision for Gropius to leave for England and ultimately, the United 
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States: economic hardship and the rise of National Socialism. But before his self-imposed 
emigration, Gropius sought work where he could find it, which increasingly meant cultivating 
relationships with high-level Nazi cultural bureaucrats such as Eugen Hönig, a fellow architect 
and the President of the Reich Chamber for the Visual Arts (Reichskammer für Bildende Kunst), 
the Nazi agency charged with bringing the visual arts into line with National Socialist ideology 
and policies.250 Hönig, who through the issuance of the dreaded Berufsverbot showed no 
reluctance in barring communists, homosexuals, Jews, and members of other suspect groups 
from working in their chosen professions, felt close to Gropius, despite his earlier association 
with the decidedly left-wing Bauhaus. Declaring Gropius to be a “German-feeling person,” 
(Deutschempfindenen), Hönig reassured the future chair of the Harvard architecture department 
that "you can always give proof of your value that you were admitted into the Reich Chamber for 
the Visual Arts."251  
Despite his assiduous cultivation of Nazis such as Hönig, Gropius confessed in a letter to 
a friend in 1936 that the conditions in Germany for building “…the new architecture are really 
not very favorable,” and since he had “known everything about the (modernist) movement… for 
the past twenty years,” he was inclined to emigrate.252 Gropius landed on his feet in the United 
States. Carl Friedrich, émigré political scientist, cultural interpreter for the U.S. government, and 
the epitome of the “good German” for the Americans given the task of occupying Germany after 
the war, went so far as to personally vouch for the political reliability of Gropius (the fact that he 
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had joined the Reich Chamber for Visual Arts to secure work, but not the Nazi Party, worked in 
his favor), and secured residence for the architect and his wife in the United States.  
The political vacillations of Gropius, from the socialist ideals of the Bauhaus to 
submitting designs for a Nazi “temple to the German spirit of work” (Kultstätte deutschen 
Arbeitgeistes) were downplayed by the Americans who had vested interests in legitimizing 
architectural modernism and the credentials of Gropius as a soldier in the Cold War.253 For his 
part, Gropius assisted in the American reconstruction of his reputation; his students at Harvard 
remember his pedagogy, not his politics.254 When asked about his socialist past, Gropius was 
evasive. “Many of the members of the Bauhaus were interested in social improvement,” he once 
replied, “but the main tendency was very much anti-Marxist."255 If the faculty and students there 
were not doctrinaire Marxists, most were socialists, and arguably all of them saw themselves and 
their residency at the Bauhaus as part of a larger purpose, a striving for what Bruno Taut 
described at the time as a non-agressive socialism that bridged “the schism between factions and 
nations subjected to their own self-discipline and bond human to human.”256 To say, as Gropius 
did when pressed, that the Bauhaus was interested in social improvement, is akin to saying 
meteorologists are interested in weather forecasting. From the beginning, the goal of the Bauhaus 
was to change German culture, particularly German consumer culture, through good design.257 
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Gropius had utility to the Americans, and so did the school he helped found. From the 
perspective of those in the State Department charged with finding an aesthetic to represent the 
United States abroad, the legacy of the Bauhaus as expressed through the buildings of Gropius, 
Mies Van der Rohe, and others, had a built-in advantage: most Americans, when they were 
aware of the Bauhaus legacy at all, knew it for the avant-garde consumer goods it designed, such 
as the chairs designed by Marcel Breuer made of bent steel tubes and leather straps, while others 
recalled it for the repression the school suffered under heavy-handed Nazi cultural policies. 
When it came time to adapt the Bauhaus to American Cold War needs, the State Department had 
little difficulty in establishing an alternate narrative for the school. What they arrived at was one 
that stressed two things in particular: aesthetic innovation, and political victimhood.  
The American counter-narrative emphasized the innovative designs produced by the 
faculty and students of the Bauhaus, as well as the unique pedagogical methodology stressing an 
intimate knowledge of materials and an appreciation for the benefits offered by mass production, 
not the creation of a new egalitarian society governed by vaguely-defined socialist principles. 
Also, perhaps somewhat cynically, the fact that the school was shut down by the Nazis lent itself 
to selling the modernist message. The fact that the Nazi regime, as well as the Politburos of both 
East Germany and the Soviet Union all officially shared an almost galvanic dislike of modernism 
and went to great lengths to stamp it out where they found it, actually made the task of 
architecturally representing the United States in Germany easier. Germans could draw the link 
between authoritarianism and a lack of artistic freedom for themselves, and the transposition of 
communists for Nazis, or Americans for Nazis, was a staple of German propaganda on both sides 
of the political divide.  
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Philip Johnson, Alfred Barr, and Henry-Russell Hitchcock at the Museum of Modern Art 
(MOMA) made the decision to politically enervate the Bauhaus, and to focus on aesthetics. 
Consequently, when the State Department sought to de-politicize the Bauhaus and use it for a 
stylistic alternative to Soviet aesthetic efforts, it found that most of the work had already been 
done by the museum, an effort that started with the pivotal 1932 Modern Architecture exhibition 
at MOMA that did so much to solidify the reputation of the Bauhaus in the United States. The 
program that accompanied the exhibition made copious references to the “technical and 
utilitarian factors” of the modernist movement and the pedagogical aspects of the Bauhaus, but 
nothing about the mission of the school in Dessau as a reform movement trying to improve the 
quality of life through innovative methods of design and production.258 “The aesthetic qualities 
of the style” was the focus of the exhibition, not the “…sociological aspects of the style except in 
so far as they are related to the problem of design.”259 Those “sociological aspects” went 
unexamined in the exhibition program.  
Barr, Johnson, and the others at MOMA consciously de-politicized the Bauhaus 
movement to American audiences for several reasons. First, the relative youth of the United 
States compared to those of Europe meant there was not an American architectural tradition in 
which a building style was looked at comprehensively, such as the Romanesque or Gothic. 
Americans had not lived through architectural movements that sought to totalize a world view, 
so the idea of a design school as initiating historical change was contrary to the American 
historical experience of architecture. Instead, American architects borrowed styles from 
neighboring societies on both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific, using historical styles 
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decontextualized from their historical surroundings. The result were city streets where Beaux-
Arts buildings lived next door to neo-Gothic ones, which were neighbored by Greek Revival 
edifices, and so on, with the result a visually unappealing jumble of historical styles divorced 
from historical settings or context. The closest thing the United States had as an organic 
architectural movement was the Chicago School of Louis Sullivan and his protégés, which was a 
phenomenon of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and while the steel-framed 
building and the skyscraper were the definitive markers of American architecture, they were 
relatively new vehicles for architectural expression. Similarly, while some in the United States 
such as the public intellectual Lewis Mumford appreciated the novel approach the Bauhaus took 
toward addressing the need for affordable housing, most American architects did not see 
themselves as agents of social reform.260 While the faculty and staff of the Bauhaus saw their 
work as heralding a new age of better living through intelligent design, the Americans limited 
their engagement with the work of their transatlantic peers to the technical, revealing a 
fascination with how the school approached technology and mass production, but that was all. To 
many Americans, European approaches to housing, such as the interwar Siedlungen of Gropius 
suggested of collectivism, and consequently Marxism, making the idea a difficult sell among 
those individuals and businesses, and cities most likely to afford modernist architecture. It is hard 
to tell which is more ironic: that the “cool, sleek, powerful, and efficient,” as well as expensive, 
postwar corporate modernist architecture we associate with Walter Gropius and Ludwig Mies 
van der Rohe originated in a school that saw architecture and design as the vehicles for societal 
reform, a belief most likely anathema to all but the most enlightened American patrons; or that 
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Gropius and van der Rohe founded it.261 Finally, it was important to Philip Johnson, who at age 
26 was wealthy and precocious enough to both organize and pay for the Architecture and Design 
department at the Museum of Modern Art, as well as supervise several pivotal exhibitions 
revolving around modernist design. Johnson, in addition to being supportive of modernist art and 
design, was also an anti-Semite, a racist, and a promoter of Nazi propaganda, and did not want 
the work he loved so much to be associated with socialism.262 However, a year later, under 
pressure from National Socialist government, the Bauhaus closed, with many of the faculty 
leaving for the United States. Later that year, modernist buildings were prominently featured in 
the Chicago World’s Fair, a sign that modernist architecture had broken out of coastal enclaves 
and moved into the public sphere of mid-America.263 
The Value of the Bauhaus to the Americans 
Though most of those employed in the State Department office of Foreign Building 
Operations who were charged with supervising the design and construction of the  Information 
Centers genuinely approved of the use of a modernist aesthetic in the newly-constructed 
facilities, there was a cynical aspect to the American championing the Bauhaus and modernist 
principles in general, in that the popularity of Gropius and his school had “as much to do with… 
victimization by the Nazis,” as their avant-garde reputations.264 For the Americans, being closed 
down by the Nazis gave the Bauhaus legitimacy in the fight against authoritarianism, and the 
historical memory of the institution and the struggle it had with Nazi authorities was fully 
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adaptable to the fight against communism, becoming en route “a polestar of International Style 
liberalism.”265 The founder of the school was rehabilitated as well, and made the shift from 
designing Nazi congress halls to American embassies with consummate grace. Both his left-wing 
past and his acquiescence to the Right were actively forgotten, and his career was transformed in 
ways he could never have imagined, going from the status of “enemy alien" to that of “…an 
American cultural ambassador and internationally recognized authority on democratic 
approaches to urban planning."266  
In Germany, one of the most highly visible examples of this melding of architecture and 
the new political reality was a U.S. Information Center, whose ability to draw they eyes of 
visitors rested in the modernist “curb appeal” of the Amerikahäuser scattered across western 
Germany. While many of the first facilities were housed in confiscated Nazi properties that the 
Americans prized as much for their symbolic value as much as their utility, the need for purpose-
built facilities became clear very quickly, particularly as habitable property in urban areas was 
scarce and American property requisitions were deeply resented by the Germans. According to 
U.S. officials, the scarcity of urban space also “did not permit attention to high standards of 
modern architecture,” while many of the Amerikahäuser “could do no more than develop a few 
rooms which resembled American counterparts.”267 Despite the cost savings, occupying former 
government buildings were released back to the Germans, the Americans quickly settled on 
prime real estate in cities across western Germany, creating buildings in the “cool, sleek, 
powerful, and efficient" International Style.268 Careful thought was given as to how these new 
facilities should look, with the State Department commissioning the architectural firm Skidmore, 
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Owings, and Merrill (SOM), a firm virtually synonymous with architectural modernism in the 
United States, to come up with plans informing the construction of Information Centers going 
forward. 269 The result was an arresting combination of architecture and furnishings that struck a 
chord with German elites, who saw in the buildings an American acknowledgment of the debt 
owed to the German modernist tradition. However, there was another unspoken message, one the 
Germans were less willing to acknowledge, and that the Americans had to finesse; despite 
German origins, the Americans were the heirs to the modernist tradition. The design, materials, 
and furnishings of the Amerikahäuser testified to the strength of such a claim. 
Inside the Amerika Haus 
 It is important to remember that when the first purpose-built Information Centers were 
constructed in the late 1940s, many Germans, particularly those living in urban areas, were 
existing in a subsistence economy with severe shortages of food, clothing, and shelter, and many 
German cities had yet to fully clear away the bombed-out rubble. All of this made the 
Amerikahäuser stand out in comparison with their surroundings. But when patrons went inside, 
the relative opulence of their surroundings made them acutely conscious of both American 
affluence, but also the pauperization that Germany had undergone. In 1952, Leland King, Chief 
of the State Department Foreign Building Operations toured the Lever House in Manhattan, and 
impressed, contracted with architect Gordon Bunshaft and his employer, Skidmore, Owings & 
Merrill (SOM) to provide planning for the expansion of both the Information Center program, as 
well as other overseas State Department buildings. Bunshaft and his firm successfully 
championed the Bauhaus idiom in corporate America, and in a transatlantic gesture of aesthetic 
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solidarity repaid the intellectual debt owed German modernism in the design of Amerikahäuser 
and other State Department buildings.  
No two Information Centers were identical, but the ones built in the initial postwar period 
followed a pattern laid out for them in the guidance from SOM. Seen from above, they were 
often notably set back from the road, emphasizing the Häuser as self-contained destinations in 
themselves, not merely one of many things competing for the attention of the potential German 
visitor. Seen from above, the early Information Centers often took the shape of a not-quite-
Palladian asymmetrical dumbbell, with two boxes connected by a glass-fronted walkway which 
also served as a lobby. It was not an accident that these buildings closely resembled the 
American consulate in Bremen; Gordon Bunshaft designed both buildings. While the auditorium 
portion of the buildings were usually constructed from solid brick, the rest of the buildings were 
to follow the lead of the “dignified and sober,” yet “sparkling and elegant” Bremen consulate in 
the use of painted steel that had first been “welded, sand-blasted, acid-etched, zinc-coated,” and 
“finally painted steel” for the frames of the rest of the buildings.270 Unfortunately, it was difficult 
to produce enough exotic steel in sufficient quantities in either Germany or the United States to 
meet the specifications laid out by SOM, and less rarified materials were substituted.  
Glass was integral to the design of the Amerikahäuser, both practically as a building 
material, but also symbolically, for it both spoke to American notions of openness, transparency, 
and movement, and it also had the power to shock and awe German visitors. That we take the 
liberal use of glass in modern buildings as a given speaks volumes to how we have absorbed the 
lessons of architectural modernism, but in the late 1940s most Germans had never opened a door 
of solid glass, or sat in a room with glass walls dividing it from other interior spaces. The 
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obvious cost and technical expertise necessary for such a display was not lost on the German 
visitors, whose own manufacturing industries were either destroyed as a result of the war, or 
taken apart and carted away for reparations. Even surviving manufacturing concerns such as the 
nascent Volkswagen factory in Wolfsburg were years away from being able to produce such 
technical marvels. Yet the Americans could, and so shortly after the cessation of hostilities. 
When Philip Johnson, head of the Architecture division of the Museum of Modern Art declared 
that “modern art does not fight the machine age, but accepts it,” a German need look no further 
than an Information Center for confirmation of the claim.271 
Overall, the exteriors of the early Amerikahäuser reveal their aesthetic indebtedness to 
Ludwig Mies Van der Rohe and the “skin and bones” school of modernist architecture. The 
emphasis was on form, not ornament, unlike “the pretentious classicism of official Soviet 
architecture abroad,” as one American observer described the mish-mash of historical styles 
employed by the Soviet Union to describe itself to the world, while Alfred Barr of the Museum 
of Modern Art declared Soviet efforts as the “…stylistic chaos and pomposities of the 
nineteenth-century in the name of proletarian taste and socialist realism.”272 The desire for box-
like, rectilinear shapes among modernist architects was also influenced by the gestalt school of 
psychology, which stressed interdependence, and that “…instead of a specifically formed part 
defining function, the function is determined by the way that part belongs to the whole.”273 This 
dovetailed nicely with the Bauhaus emphasis on function as a determiner of form, simplicity, and 
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lucidity.  In 1927, while Walter Gropius was still leading the Bauhaus, gestalt psychologist 
Rudolf Arnheim lectured at the Bauhaus, where his message resonated with faculty member 
Josef Albers, reinforcing his desire and that of other designers for simple shapes determined by 
form and free of ornamentation.274 Because humans have an innately ability to group similar 
objects together, subscribers of gestalt psychology argued, humans were most likely to clearly 
remember basic shapes such as spheres, cubes, and rectangles than more complex shapes. There 
was widespread agreement in the State Department that, as the Amerikahauser might be the most 
sustained contact between Germans and the United States “other than automobiles and 
refrigerators,” as a State Department official put it, it was important not to visually confuse the 
German patron with complex forms.275  
A great deal of consideration was given to the interiors of the Information Centers in the 
resulting plans, with decidedly modern choices in furnishings and interior materials.276 The look 
of the Amerikahäuser was the result of the tastes of three people: as discussed earlier, the Chief 
of the FBO Leland King; Anita Moeller Laird, champion of modernism who served as head of 
the FBO design group from 1949-1972; and the American design impresario, Florence Knoll. 
This group of three, two inside government and one closely associated with it, decided what the 
United States looked like for German visitors, providing the aesthetic first impression for 
countless Germans who encountered the United States at an Amerikahäuser.277  
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 While not as grand as the other diplomatic buildings, the Information Centers were still 
quite sumptuous in comparison to the experience of most Germans and many Americans. Anita 
Moeller Laird, who had received her education at the Parsons School of Design was involved in 
almost every aspect of the interior design of the Amerikahäuser. She conferred with the 
architects and State Department officials and frequently with the American modernist furniture 
company, Knoll International. Taking full advantage of the foreign credits available, Laird used 
the most appropriate materials to convey a sense of quiet affluence within the Information 
Centers, using materials from around the world to complement the modernist design. Like the 
American consulates, the newest Information Centers were “extraordinary for the refinement of 
the architectural detailing, the dramatic use of modern materials… and the way in which the 
buildings stood out amidst the older environs.”278 This designed environment was an unspoken 
advertisement for American affluence, but also, through the medium of displays and exhibits, a 
level of affluence the Germans could achieve through the quick adoption of democratic 
institutions, rejection of communism, and an end to what Jan Logemann describes as a 
“bürgerlich ethos of consumption,” which emphasized restraint, saving, and purchasing only 
“quality goods.”279 
Furnishings 
 When asked why the prominent American furniture company Knoll International did not 
have a storefront on one of the busiest commercial streets in West Berlin, employee Toby Rodes 
replied, “We do not need to be at the Kudamm to get the right people come to us.”280 He was 
right; through the auspices of the Information Centers, which were filled with modernist 
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furniture by Knoll designers, targeting his intended audience of German cultural elites could not 
have been easier. The customers did not have to come to Knoll, the company came to them. 
Knoll International was the probably the most forward-thinking furniture company in America 
after the war, a company synonymous with the new and innovative furniture produced by such 
luminaries as Bertoia, Eames, and Saarinen, and also with the facility Knoll had with U.S. 
government contracts. Given the ubiquity of Knoll-branded furniture in U.S. Information 
Centers, consulates, and embassies, one American official wondered if the company “was really 
tied up with the CIA.”281 Though their ties to the intelligence community were only commercial, 
the Information Centers and other facilities were essentially showrooms for Knoll products, 
because the head of the FBO interior design group from 1949 until 1972, Anita Moeller Laird, 
both appreciated modernist design and had a close working relationship with Florence Knoll, the 
head of the company named after her late husband.282  
 Florence Knoll was a major force in modern American design, who reached her creative 
peak after the war. The daughter of either a German-speaking Michigan engineer or the owner of 
a commercial bakery (biographies differ), she was orphaned at twelve, and a graduate of the 
prestigious Cranbrook Academy of Art, where she was befriended by Finnish modernist architect 
Eliel Saarinen, and went on to work at Harvard with Marcel Breuer and Walter Gropius and at 
with Mies van der Rohe at the Illinois Institute of Technology. She matched her design 
sensibilities with a personal charisma that charmed at least one reporter from the New York 
Times, who described Knoll as: 
A little below average height and small-boned, she has, at 48, the slight figure and quick 
movements of a schoolgirl, but the poise is that of a woman used to being in command of 
a situation. She is frequently described as stunning or beautiful —terms inspired not so 
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much by rather delicate but slightly irregular features as by an inward radiance and 
animation. Her intelligence shows.283 
 
She came to the attention of Hans Knoll, a German expatriate and interpreter of European 
modernism to American intellectuals, when he gave here the task of designing the office of 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The two married, but not before she became a full partner in 
the firm on her own merits.  
 The relationship forged between Knoll and the U.S. government, particularly within the 
Departments of State and War virtually guaranteed that the Amerikahäuser would be filled with 
furniture from Saarinen, Bertoia, Jens Risom, George Nakashima, Isamo Naguchi and others 
who we now associate with the “Mid-century Modern” design era. Indeed, given the current 
desirability of the furniture of this period, if the United States government had kept much of the 
furnishings of the Information Centers intact and in good condition, the pieces could be sold 
today at prices far more than the government had initially paid for it. The Americans were 
offering German visitors, particularly those from East Berlin and the Soviet occupation zone in 
general, an aesthetic alternative to East German offerings. By giving the imprimatur to modernist 
architecture, art, and design through the construction of the Information Centers, the Americans 
were staking a position in almost complete opposition to the Soviet Union and their client state, 
East Germany.  
The Houses of Culture of the Soviet Union: Progressive or Reactionary? 
East German aesthetic policy was formally expressed in 1952, the result of a two-day 
conference in Berlin, “Issues of German Interior Design and the Design of Furniture,” in which 
General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Walter Ulbricht gave the keynote address. 
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He made his views clear, and to the modernists in the audience, they were chilling. Railing 
against “designs that had nothing to do with beauty,” Ulbricht declared that “furniture 
manufactured in the Bauhaus style does not correspond to the sensitivity to beauty possessed by 
the new Germany’s progressive human beings.”284 To Ulbricht and his supporters, formalism 
was the opposite of beauty and synonymous with “the so-called American lifestyle,” which was 
nothing more than “a direct continuation of decadence,” the only purpose of which was to 
“uproot human beings, making them suitable as objects of exploitation.”285 Particularly galling to 
the East German leadership in Berlin was that these modernist architectural trends, apparently so 
threatening to the creation socialism in East Germany were highly visible, as they were on 
display in the Amerika Haus across the street from the popular Berlin Zoo. After the construction 
of the Berlin Wall (or “anti-fascist protective barrier,” in East German political rhetoric) in 1961, 
the location value of the Amerika Haus at the Zoo Station diminished greatly, but until then, 
American-style modernism was just a bus ride away for the residents of East Berlin. 
In the popular imagination, the aesthetic often associated with East Germany is that of a 
technocratic modernism, with buildings such as the now-demolished Palace of the Republic and 
the television tower in Alexanderplatz, both in Berlin, serving as examples. However, those 
buildings came later in the life of the German Democratic Republic, with the Fernsehturm 
opening in 1969, while the seat of the East German parliament opened in seven years later. In the 
first postwar years, a different aesthetic prevailed in the official East German imagination, one 
where ironically, some of the most memorable architecture of the German Democratic Republic 
would have been criticized as contrary to socialist principles in both Berlin and Moscow 
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immediately after the war. In the planned economy of East Germany, art and design were 
inherently political, and practitioners paid a price for being on the wrong side of the aesthetic 
argument. The interest in these questions ran to the very top rungs of the communist 
bureaucracies in both East Germany and the Soviet Union, where despite their other differences 
both Walter Ulbricht and Joseph Stalin were united in their hostility toward modernist design. In 
shearing the Bauhaus of left-wing origins, the Americans engaged in historical manipulation for 
overtly political purposes; but where the Americans were content to draw a line of continuity 
from pre-war Bauhaus modernism to the present day, the East Germans appropriated all of 
German architectural history, in which the “great masters of German building” (große Meister 
des deutschen Gebäudes) of the past would guide the creation of the East German building 
tradition. Of particularly ominous note for those East Germans favoring a modernist aesthetic, 
there an emphasis was placed on those Meister working “around 1800.”286 By looking to the past 
for inspiration, the East German government hoped to gain a measure of legitimacy with both 
domestic and foreign audiences and draw a line of aesthetic continuity from the German past of 
architects such as Schinkel to the East German present. In this sense, there was no cultural “zero 
hour” (Stunde null) for the East Germans after the war. By restoring a treasured cultural artifact 
such as the State Opera House in Berlin, the East Germans wanted to show reluctant Germans 
that it was both the inheritor and guarantor of the German cultural tradition. This was in 
opposition to their Western brethren, who, it was claimed, had succumbed to the commercial 
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wiles of the crass Americans, whose obsession with novelty was manifested in the modernist 
architecture of buildings such as the Information Centers.  
 The aesthetic differences between the Amerikahäuser and the Houses of Culture of the 
Soviet Union (Kulturhäuser der Sowjetunion) were starkly contradictory and challenging to any 
lingering vision of the Soviet Union as home to an aesthetic avant-garde. The Soviets utilized 
their facilities in a similar fashion to the Americans, as sites for exhibitions, film screenings, 
lectures, and musical performances, and they also had libraries stocked with material vetted as 
ideologically appropriate by Soviet, not East German, authorities. Given the German printing 
and poster tradition, the Soviet authorities in Moscow sent several poster art exhibitions west to 
Germany.287 However, that was where the similarities between the two institutions ended.  
By the end of the Second World War, little hope was left that the Soviet Union would be 
a place that encouraged artistic experimentation. The reality was quite the opposite, with 
Socialist Realism emerging as the Party-approved form of expression in all of the arts, including 
architecture and design, with punishment waiting for those who transgressed Moscow-imposed 
artistic limits.288 Socialist Realism, not to be confused with Social Realism, was predicated on 
providing the most optimistic depiction of live under Soviet-flavored socialism, for it was little 
more than propaganda illustration. As such, it was the very antithesis of the art being produced 
and consumed virtually anywhere else in Europe and North America, art that explored issues of 
consumption, alienation, form and color. While German visitors to the art shows at an Amerika 
Haus correctly sensed that for good or for ill, the nexus of the postwar art world was inexorably 
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shifting toward New York and away from narrative painting, while those visiting a House of the 
Culture of the Soviet Union must have walked away from the experience with an overwhelming 
sense of both familiarity, obsolescence, and of having been the target of clumsily-made 
propaganda, an illustration of the profound misreading of the German intelligentsia that marked 
Soviet cultural efforts immediately after the war.289  
While the State Department in Germany was appropriating the Bauhaus, (removed of any 
vestigial traces of the social justice context it sprung from) via the construction of the 
Amerikahäuser, the Soviet Union looked to the past for inspiration in representing itself to the 
Germans, choosing historicist styles we most often associate with the forces of reaction. The 
most notable example of this phenomenon occurred, appropriately, in Berlin, when the Soviet 
authorities requisitioned a palace in Berlin to house their flagship House of Culture. In both 
cases, American and Soviet, the exteriors of the buildings gave a clue as to what awaited the 
visitor inside. While the Amerikahäuser were filled with the latest in modernist furniture, the 
products of a transatlantic design culture that while elegant, was sometimes severe in 
appearance, Soviet Houses of Culture took the opposite tack, adapting an air of luxuriousness to 
their buildings. While visitors to an Amerikahaus would see modern furniture from the most 
acclaimed American designers, Soviet authorities utilized Biedermeier and Chippendale-style 
furniture in their public spaces, and completed the rooms with heavy curtains and thick carpets. 
Arguing that nothing was too good for the worker, the East Germans went in for overstuffed 
luxuriousness, while the furniture groupings in the Amerikahäuser had an elegant simplicity that 
belied their innovative design and production methodologies, but perhaps even more 
importantly, when Germans encountered the furniture in an Information Center, they saw a 
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reflection of their own design tradition. That was not the case in a Soviet House of Culture. The 
architecture and furnishings in an Amerika Haus was a transatlantic mix of Bauhaus design 
principles and American mass production, stressing the current moment and pointing toward the 
future; Soviet efforts at self-expression were thoroughly grounded in the European past.  
MOMA Notices the Amerikahäuser  
 The U.S. commitment to modern design in the Amerikahäuser did not go completely 
unnoticed, especially by the American institution that championed the modernist aesthetic before 
most, the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA). On 7 October 1953, the exhibition “Architecture for 
the State Department” opened, furnished with a selection of models and large-scale photographs 
of the new facilities being designed and constructed around the world as part of the expanded 
American diplomatic footprint. Described by a museum press release as “one of the most 
convincing demonstrations of the vitality of American culture,” the exhibition was organized by 
Arthur Drexler, the Curator of the Department of Architecture and Design at MOMA, who along 
with Alfred Barr and Philip Johnson, perhaps did more for modernist design in the United States 
than anyone else.290 The plans of Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill for Information Centers in 
Germany were prominently featured, as well as photographs of the new Information Center in 
Cologne, which noted the extensive use of glass, and of the contrast between the auditorium 
housed in “solid brick… while the library, offices, and exhibition space are contained in a glass 
and steel wing.”291 Carefully noting the cost-saving measures of using foreign credits owed the 
United States, the MOMA press release also pointed out that since the revitalized building 
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program had come online, the United States had saved nearly six million dollars in global 
property rental costs alone.292   
The review in The New York Times praised the exhibition, and after making the 
apparently obligatory mention of the foreign credits paying for the newly-built facilities, took 
note of the America Houses, describing them as “library-information center-exhibition 
buildings,” that, like the other diplomatic buildings under construction shared  
A common, twentieth-century architectural vocabulary. It is one that aims at frank 
expression of both structure and function; clear separation of articulation of parts; use of 
modern technology and such materials as steel, glass and reinforced concrete; beauty 
through clarity, relationships of parts and careful detailing. 
 
One would be hard pressed to find a more concise litany of Bauhaus principles. Praising the 
“human scale” of the buildings, the review declared that while the various buildings might not 
have been “the greatest, most original or most imaginative examples of American modern 
architecture,” they were “without a doubt the best group of official buildings that we have seen 
produced by any government.”293  
 Architectural modernism in the tradition of the Bauhaus found a home in the United 
States during the interwar period, but it was particularly after the Second World War when it 
became more prominent to a wider public, both in the United States and Germany. The 
Amerikahäuser facilitated this resurgence as part of an unprecedented building program for the 
State Department that has never been replicated. 1945 to 1953 was a period of immense growth 
in the number of diplomatic facilities around the world, but the centrality of West Germany to 
U.S. plans for postwar Europe assured the primacy of German facilities in State Department 
plans. 
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 The State Department came through spectacularly, employing the firm Skidmore, 
Owings, and Merrill, a firm virtually synonymous with corporate modernism, to come up with 
plans for the expansion of the Information Centers in Germany. In doing so, SOM employed a 
rigorous modernist aesthetic to the project, in keeping with building in the land of the Bauhaus. 
Indeed, it would have been very surprising if the Americans had built the Information Centers 
and other facilities in any other style than modernist. The adoption of Bauhaus-inflected 
modernism accomplished two goals. First, it gave Germans an aesthetic alternative to Soviet 
offerings, which were decidedly retrograde compared to the Americans, with their Houses of 
Soviet Culture looking to the past for visual references, employing a tired historicism to 
represent themselves to the German people. Secondly, it allowed the Americans to draw a line of 
continuity from the creative ferment of the Weimar period, across the lacuna of the Second 
World War, and on to the present day. While modernism had to go underground during the 
period of National Socialist rule, it had continued to flourish in the absence of the Germans. 
While the Soviets attempted to draw lines from German architecture of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, focusing on Meister such as Schinkel, the Americans drew from a much 
nearer time period. Both the Soviet Union and the United States proclaimed themselves the 
defenders of the modern, but in the first years after the war the American orientation was toward 
the future, while the Soviet examples were a collective salute to the past.  
 In choosing a design for their buildings, the State Department inserted itself into a long-
running discourse over the propriety of architectural modernism, with the U.S. coming out 
strongly in favor of the Bauhaus tradition, and putting it squarely at odds with Soviet and East 
German efforts. However, it was also a reinforcement of the relationship between the Bauhaus 
and the United States, where so many faculty and students who fled Nazi Germany found refuge. 
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The founders of the Bauhaus, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Walter Gropius found security and 
acclaim in the United States, with Gropius leading the Harvard architecture and design school, 
while van der Rohe took up residency at the Illinois Institute of Technology outside Chicago and 
became a titan of modernist architecture.  
Foreign credits owed the United States as a result of the war paid for most of the 
Amerikahäuser during this period, with the interiors of the Amerikahäuser serving as literal 
showrooms for the leading furniture designers in the United States, funneled through the 
impresario Florence Knoll and here eponymous company. Because of her background and 
intimate familiarity with the state of European design and designers, Knoll became a transatlantic 
cultural bridge figure between Germany and the United States who, along with FBO chief 
Leland King, and Anita Moeller Laird, who was responsible for the interiors of State Department 
facilities around the world, including the Information Centers, where Eames desks and chairs 
were commonplace, along with furniture by such leading designers as Bertoia and Saarinen, who 
were paid a commission for each piece sold, an unusual practice for the time, and one that helped 
keep designers coming back to Knoll with their designs. 
Usually set off the road so as not to compete with other attractions, the Information 
Centers were destinations in their own right. Outside, they were often sheathed in glass curtain 
walls running the length of a building, the glass reinforcing messages of both transparency and 
strength. Above all, the Americans wanted to project a message of forthrightness and honesty. 
Glass was the material that fronted the libraries, where pedestrians observed patrons roaming the 
library stacks, a literal personification of the free access to information promised by the 
Americans in charge of the Information Centers. Glass was both expensive and also hard to 
produce in the quantities used by the Americans, another message for the Germans as well. The 
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Amerikahäuser were an advertisement for the American future, and in utilizing Bauhaus 
modernism, a link to the German modernist tradition. While it was born in Germany during the 
intensely creative period of the Weimar Republic and took a hiatus during National Socialism, 
architectural modernism returned to the place where it began, but this time with an American 
accent.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 On November 26, 1947, Ray Moseley, an insurance broker from Missouri, wrote a letter 
to his friend, President Harry Truman. Acquaintances of Moseley had returned from Sweden 
after attending a meeting of the Baptist World Alliance, and while in Europe they also toured 
England, Norway, Denmark and several other countries, but apparently not Occupied Germany. 
Moseley felt obligated to share the consensus opinion of the travelling Baptists, whose judgment 
challenged media representations of postwar Europe as a place of hunger and privation. Moseley 
believed that Europe was in better shape than newspaper reports indicated, and that perhaps 
those living there “were not in want as badly as has been stated.” This led Moseley to conclude 
that when it came to the rebuilding of Europe, there was “a limit as to what we should do in the 
way of draining our own resources, and certainly if the need is not any more apparent… we may 
be making a mistake.”294 Instead of a form letter from the White House acknowledging receipt of 
the correspondence, Truman replied to the appeal from his friend with a personal note. 
The President took exception to the findings of the Baptists. In a rather terse response to 
Moseley, Truman corrected his friend regarding the current state of Europe, only two years 
removed from a devastating war. “Germany,” Truman wrote, “was almost completely destroyed 
so far as its industries and homes are concerned,” and told Mosely get a broader perspective on 
European events, advising him that he needed “a picture of the whole thing before you can make 
a decision on any of it.” Unsurprisingly, as far as the President was concerned the United States 
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was dealing with the question of European recovery “in the right way.”295 On the face of it, the 
presumption of Moseley to lecture the President on the state of postwar Europe seems laughable, 
but the concerns of Moseley over how to approach the reconstruction of Europe, and Occupied 
Germany in particular, were among the most vexing foreign policy issues the United States faced 
immediately after the Second World War.  
Some Americans, such as former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, advocated 
for the so-called “pastoralization” of West Germany, which entailed reorienting the German 
economy away from heavy industry, “towards agriculture and other activities directly related to 
the satisfaction of civilian wants."296 There would be no heavy industry for export, and an 
emphasis was placed on a seemingly autarchic level of self-sufficiency. Morgenthau and his 
supporters saw German business, particularly the large cartels that dominated certain sectors of 
the German economy as the prime enablers of the Nazi regime. If allowed to remain, it was 
argued, the cartels would form a “system of commercial interrelationships penetrating the 
economies of other nations, all of which would help Germany restore a war economy.”297 
Consequently, the former Treasury Secretary and others saw the dismantling of the industrial 
cartels as a matter of extreme necessity.  
Conversely, there were those who saw the restoration of the German export economy as a 
necessity, for it was to provide the fuel for postwar European economic growth as well as 
markets for American products. “Do you think permanent peace les in the direction of subduing 
and keeping these people from doing business and participating in world trade?” was the 
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question one Senator asked of his colleagues.298 In 1945, the House Special Committee on 
Postwar Economic Policy and Planning argued against artificially limiting the growth of the 
West German economy to only subsistence levels would break an already fragile European 
economy.299 The realities of life in German cities in particular, were stark. When the Allies 
occupied Berlin, for example, General Lucius Clay, the American Military Governor, noted that 
“three million people were packed into the remaining buildings of a city which had suffered 
frightful destruction.”300 The official rations of 1240 calories a day “was being met by only two-
thirds that amount. Workmen…fainted from exhaustion until we brought in sufficient food to 
provide them with hot noon meals.”301 Keeping the West Germans at a subsistence economy was 
not a tenable policy going forward, either for West Germany or the larger European economy. 
What both sides agreed on though, was the importance of a democratic West Germany to 
European stability and later, as a defense against further Soviet expansion into Central Europe. 
The task of transforming West Germany into a democracy was enormous and was not a short-
term undertaking. Consequently, it required the Americans to formulate novel approaches to the 
task of political reeducation. A hungry West Germany would not be up to the task of 
reconstituting itself, and it is to the credit of the Americans that they realized West Germans, 
particularly West German elites, were hungry for culture as well as for food. The Americans 
were in a position to make themselves indispensable to the rebirth of culture in postwar West 
German society, and it was in West Germany that the Information Centers were the most visible 
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product of this new American effort at public diplomacy. In creating the Information Centers, the 
Americans drew lessons from previous U.S. attempts at public diplomacy in the twentieth 
century, efforts with very mixed results.  
 Prior attempts by the United States at public diplomacy, particularly the Committee on 
Public Information (CPI) during the First World War, left many people both inside and outside 
of government ambivalent toward the use of propaganda, finding it a necessary evil at best. The 
intrusiveness of the CPI, as well as the reputation it held for exaggeration, led many in the 
United States to associate propaganda with, if not lies, then a flexible approach to the truth. 
However, as the Second World War began to loom larger in the imagination of Americans, so 
did interest in propaganda as a tool of both persuasion and statecraft. In 1940, "one of the most 
talked-about courses at Radcliffe College,” according to The New York Times, was “Public 
Opinion and Propaganda,” taught by the influential German émigré scholar, Carl J. Friedrich, 
who took a position as Professor of Government at the College after his arrival in the U.S.302 By 
the end of the decade, “persuasion, communication, and information were the favored locutions 
for what formerly had been called propaganda,” and those Americans in the military stationed 
overseas were intimately familiar with the practice of propaganda through the English-language 
radio broadcasts of “Tokyo Rose,” or “Lord Haw-Haw,” organs of the respective Japanese and 
German governments.303  
Victory in the Second World War forced the American government to come to terms with 
the reality that the United States had displaced Europe as the economic and political center of 
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gravity in the North Atlantic, and it was in the interest of the United States to attempt to shape a 
national image for export, particularly in West Germany, which was on the front lines of 
international communism, and the Americans believed, needing tutelage in the ways of 
democracy. By 1953, when the construction of Amerikahäuser was peaking, even the most 
hardened isolationist recognized that the United States was in a position of economic and global 
ascendency and settling in for an ideological effort against the Soviet Union in West Germany 
that in terms of duration and sheer repetitiveness, seemed akin to the trench warfare of the First 
World War.  
The policy document governing the Americans at the start of the occupation, JCS 1067, 
emphasized the segregation of Americans from West Germans, as befitting “a defeated enemy 
nation” being occupied, not liberated.304 Regardless of the draconian tone of the document, the 
reality of life in occupied Germany immediately after the war was one of frequent contact, both 
licit and illicit, between Americans and West Germans. Of course, it was the illicit contacts that 
were problematic for the Americans. High rates of sexually transmitted infections among 
American troops and West German women, and a flourishing black market with American 
cigarettes functioning as an alternate currency with enough value to ensnare more than one 
soldier, was enough evidence to move American policies in West Germany to a more realistic 
basis.305 From the beginning of the program, the ethos informing the Information Centers was 
one of inclusion, and ran counter to both the spirit and policy of JCS 1067. The Amerikahäuser 
existed to facilitate contact between Americans and West Germans in a space tailored around the 
interests of postwar West German elites both transfixed by the products of their own culture, and 
after the experience of National Socialism, curious about American society.  
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The Information Centers used culture a means of establishing an emotional connection 
between West Germans and the United States, with the ultimate goal of securing elite West 
German support for American occupation policies. The Americans knew it was impossible to 
compete with the Germanic cultural tradition, but instead of directly challenging the West 
Germans in the cultural sphere, the programming at the Amerikahäuser acknowledged the 
cultural debt the West owed to Germanic culture. The American promotion of Germanic artistic 
contributions alongside those of Americans allowed the U.S. to position itself as both the 
promoter and defender of Kultur against the threat of an allegedly culturally-homogenizing East 
German state.  
The American manipulation of culture was not limited to music and the other arts. In 
choosing the modernist aesthetic for the Information Centers in Germany, the Americans 
effectively payed homage to the influential German architectural school, the Bauhaus. Again, the 
Americans positioned themselves as the defender of the West German cultural tradition. Closed 
by the Nazis for “degeneracy” and condemned by the East Germans as a school for “formalism,” 
the Bauhaus had great cultural weight among West German elites, and the Americans saw the 
influential design school a vehicle for demonstrating U.S. commitment to freedom of expression. 
Indeed, American support for modernism and non-representational art in the Information Centers 
was, the U.S. argued, was an example of the American commitment to freedom of expression, 
with the work of sculptor Alexander Calder frequently displayed.306 His large, amorphous  
Hextopus, made of welded steel, was prominently displayed in the courtyard of the Frankfurt 
Amerika Haus, “visible through the building’s glass facades that literalized the transparency of 
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American democracy,” in the words of one critic.307  The very buildings of the Information 
Centers, as well as their contents, reinforced the American commitment to the defense of culture 
in West Germany. 
In April, May, and June 1944, a college of Physicians and Surgeons was called at 
Columbia University in New York City for a conference, “Germany After the War.” Those 
attending were interested in what made Germans into Nazis. As if they were epidemiologists, 
they wanted to find the symptoms of Nazism, so the underlying disease could be isolated and 
studied like any other pathogen. The conference findings urged the Army to conduct behavioral 
experiments on German prisoners as soon as possible, for “…It could be of high importance to 
observe such individuals, talk to them, study them, and discover who among them might be most 
and least subject to change and by what methods.”308 In addition to discussions on possible 
causes of Nazism and an exploration of the “authoritarian personality,” the conference report 
published in the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry concluded that to keep future Germans 
from becoming Nazis was going to be more than a matter of regime change. According to the 
doctors, the embrace of democracy had to come from a change of heart in the German individual, 
an assertion the Americans running the Information Centers wholeheartedly agreed with. When 
it came to the possibility of political reform in whatever remained of Germany after the war, the 
authors of the conference report were frank: 
... it is plain that it would be folly to think of managing postwar Germany merely by 
encouraging her to change ideologies... The only democratic point of view which could 
have any value would have to spring from a new kind of character. The Germans would 
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have to develop in such a way as to think of democracy themselves, to conceive it, want 
it and create it.309 
 
What the Americans wanted to avoid was a repeat of the politics of the interwar Weimar 
Republic, where a member of the German cultural elite supported democracy as a matter of 
reason, a so-called Vernunftrepublikaner, as opposed to forming an emotional bond with 
democratic self-rule. The Amerikahäuser existed to help West Germans “conceive, want, and 
create” a better future for themselves and their progeny. 
The Information Centers in West Germany were in at least a superficial way, analogous 
to achurch. Both were buildings of contemplation and devotion; in the case of the 
Amerikahäuser, visitors were urged to compare their national past to that of the United States, 
and the gleaming modernist edifices housing the Information Centers could not help but invite 
comparisons to the West German present. Visitors were nudged to contemplate the wickedness 
of their recent national history, while also being offered a democratic alternative to the hells of 
National Socialism and Stalinism. While the patrons of a local Amerika Haus were not promised 
eternal life in the hereafter, they were told that with the adoption of democratic reforms they 
would enjoy a better life here on Earth, the measure of which was a standard of living far 
surpassing anything in their experience. While the analogy might be tortuous, the Information 
Centers were the indisputable focal point for American efforts in reconstructing civil society in 
West Germany. The Information Centers were more than displays of American affluence, their 
centrality to the American enterprise in West Germany, while now mostly forgotten, deserves to 
be recognized and studied. While they were arguably “the best group of official buildings that we 
have seen produced by any government,” the Information Centers were more than that. They 
were political actors in their own right. 
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